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The purpose of this present study is to understand the role of habit in information 
security behaviors. The automatic aspect of habit and its impact on secure behavior and 
the intention-behavior relationship was explored in this dissertation through the lens of 
protection motivation theory. Three secure behaviors were selected for the investigation 
after following a rigorous process to identify habitual secure behaviors. The three 
behaviors that were investigated are: locking the PC when leaving it unattended, 
verifying the recipient email addresses before sending email and visiting only verified 
websites. Separate pilot studies were conducted for each of the behaviors followed by a 
main investigation. Habit was measured with a first-order reflective and second-order 
formative scale that captured the multidimensional aspects of habit: Lack of Awareness, 
Uncontrollability and Mental Efficiency.  
Data were collected for each of the behaviors separately via separate online 
surveys using Amazon Mechanical-Turk. The results of the data analyses indicate that 
habit significantly influence the performance of secure behavior while negatively 
moderating the intention-behavior relationship for each of the three behaviors. The 
 
 
findings also confirm that when certain behaviors are habitual, the cognitive resources 
needed to make decisions on performing behavior reduce. Several alternate models were 
analyzed as a part of the post hoc phase of the study.   
The findings of this study provide several contributions to the IS research and 
practice. This study investigated the role of habit in an information security context using 
a second-order formative scale. The findings indicate that habit play a significant role in 
the performance of secure behaviors and verifies the relationship between intention and 
behavior in an information security context. The findings provide directions to 
organizations in understanding habits of their employees and to foster positive habits 
while breaking negative habits. The findings of this study provide several future research 
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Organizations continue to struggle protecting their information systems daily 
from various threats and spend billions of dollars to build defenses to counter these 
threats. Some of these threats include natural and manmade disasters, errors by internal 
employees, acts of competitors with malicious intent, hackers, spyware and viruses (Loch 
et al. 1992; Willison and Warkentin 2013).  The reliance of organizations on information 
systems and the increased connectivity of organizational information systems to the 
internet has increased the exposure to threats from hackers, spyware and viruses 
(Whitman 2003). These increased threats have caused many organizations to enforce 
strong countermeasures to deter and prevent them, including technical and behavioral 
controls. Although technical controls were the primary form of information security in 
the past, organizations have realized that technology tools alone cannot secure their 
information systems. An increased focus on insiders (e.g. employees) and their behavior 
has resulted in organizations implementing security education, training, and awareness 
(SETA) campaigns (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Puhakainen and Siponen 2010), strict 
information security policies and procedures (Warkentin and Johnston 2008), and 
sanctions to deter policy violations (D’Arcy and Devaraj 2012; D’Arcy and Herath 2011; 
D’Arcy et al. 2009; Xu et al. 2013) to counter threats to their information systems. 
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However, these controls and security policies are only effective to the extent that 
employees and others follow them. 
Organizations have implemented information security policies that require their 
employees to perform many secure behaviors on a routine basis. Some of these enforced 
behaviors include technical aspects such as backing up data, running anti-virus software, 
encrypting sensitive data before sending it over the internet, locking workstations and 
behavioral aspects such as being cautious about opening email attachments, visiting only 
verified or known websites and avoiding discussing sensitive information in public areas 
(Posey et al. 2013). These behaviors, performed on a routine basis by employees, provide 
organizations with significantly reduced information security risks that originate inside 
the workplace. Employees may initially perform these secure behaviors due to sanctions 
being in place for non-compliance or due to threat awareness. However, employees may 
perform these behaviors automatically after successful repetition.  
Information security policies that are properly implemented would most likely be 
unsuccessful if employees do not follow them. With the critical nature of information 
security, it only requires one incident or lapse of following security measures for an 
information security breach to occur. Thus, employees are identified as the weakest 
security link in an organization (Crossler et al. 2013; Warkentin and Willison 2009). 
Security policy violations or noncompliant behavior can be malicious or non-malicious in 
nature (Guo et al. 2011), but both types of behavior will open an organization to 
information security threats. Organizations continuously attempt to reduce malicious 
behavior through security controls, deterrence and organizational policies. Non-malicious 
behavior or “human error” is known to be the reason for the majority of policy violations 
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and security incidents at organizations (Plamondon 2011). Organizations have increased 
their efforts to curtail these non-malicious employee behaviors through measures such as 
information security training and behavioral shaping (e.g., creating habitual security 
practices) (Harnesk and Lindström 2011).  
It is important to understand that most of these positive or negative behaviors 
performed by employees may be a part of their work routine, performed frequently and 
automatically. When certain behaviors are performed successfully on a routine basis and 
in a stable context, employees may perform these behaviors automatically or habitually 
(Limayem et al. 2007). Habit is defined as “learned sequences of acts that become 
automatic responses to specific situations, which may be functional in obtaining certain 
goals or end states” (Verplanken et al. 1997, p. 540). Therefore, when information 
security behaviors are performed as automatic responses to certain environmental 
situations, in order to achieve goals (securing information), they can be called ‘habitual.’ 
For example, an employee may frequently and automatically lock his or her computer 
every time he or she leaves the terminal unattended, which exhibits a habitual compliant 
behavior or a positive habit (Siponen et al. 2010). On a similar note, even though the 
organizational policy states otherwise, an employee may intentionally share his or her 
password to a secure system with a colleague (Siponen and Vance 2010). Continuously 
sharing of passwords, however, may become a habitual (automatic) non-compliant 
behavior or a negative habit. Several research studies also identified that habits can be 
formed in password construction, changing passwords and writing down passwords 
(Brown et al. 2004; Florencio and Herley 2007; Morris and Thompson 1979).  It is also 
important to note that some employees may not lock their computer due to negligence. 
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The employee does not fail to lock the computer due to any malicious intentions, thus it 
is non-malicious (Guo et al. 2011; Willison and Warkentin 2013). The negligent behavior 
cannot be considered habitual since is not initiated intentionally and does not initiate the 
habit formation process. Therefore, habitual behaviors can be either positive or negative 
and not all behaviors form habits. Extant research on information security focuses more 
on behavioral intention and behavior, and most of these studies have ignored the 
influence of these habitual behaviors related to security.  
The remainder of the chapter provides an overview of information security risks 
and organizational security policies followed by descriptions of threat avoidance, 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Habit Theory. These theories provide the 
foundation for the conceptual model that seeks to explain and predict the direct effect of 
habit on actual secure behavior and the moderating effect habit on the relationship 
between behavioral intention and actual behavior. An overview of the conceptual model, 
the research objective and research methods are described, followed by statements about 
the significance of the study and the organization of the rest of the chapters. 
Information Security Risks 
Information security risks have become a cause of major concern to most 
organizations. The security risks have multiplied with the information explosion that has 
been experienced globally by organizations especially in the last decade. These security-
related issues have been complicated with more users having ubiquitous access to 
computers and the internet. With a plethora of data available, organizations have been 
struggling to keep the data organized, easily accessible, and most importantly, highly 
secured (Whitman 2003). Organizations also rely on data as a strategic asset. Maintaining 
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the integrity of that data is a primary goal of information assurance and security of each 
organization. In order to secure the information from external parties, such as hackers and 
thieves, organizations have employed different technical controls such as firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, honeypots, honeynets and other security mechanisms 
(Whitman 2003). These mechanisms are effective in securing company information only 
from external parties such as hackers. The Information Systems(IS) Threat Taxonomy 
(Willison and Warkentin 2013), as illustrated in Figure 1.1, provides valuable insights 
into how the threats to information systems can be categorized.  
 
Figure 1.1 IS Threat Taxonomy (Willison and Warkentin 2013) 
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Threats to information systems were formerly considered to be only external to 
the organizations. However the threat landscape has become more complicated such that 
internal threats have become a major area of concern. Both internal and external threats 
to IS, can be divided into two categories: human and non-human threats. Non-human 
external threats such as natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes), 
power failures or telecommunication failures have resulted in billions of losses to 
organizations. Non-human internal threats such as hardware failure, power surges and 
leaks are similar in nature to external threats. Although these types of threats are not 
controllable, organizations have taken measures such as creating redundant servers at 
remote locations, redundant backup systems in different locations and investing in more 
reliable fail-proof hardware to reduce the repercussions from these threats. 
The most serious external and internal threats to information systems of 
organizations originate from humans (Warkentin and Willison 2009; Willison and 
Warkentin 2013). In terms of external human threats, intentional malicious acts by 
external parties such as espionage and hackers have become an increasing threat to secure 
or sensitive information stored on corporate servers. The goal of most hackers who 
operate with malicious intent is to gain access to secure corporate data in order to carry 
out espionage or make the secure information public in order to degrade a company’s 
ability to secure its data (Hu et al. 2011).  Recent developments indicate that hacking 
groups or ‘hacktivists’ such as Anonymous and LulzSec operate to simply gain access to 
sensitive data from corporations and governments and make them public in order to 
“publicize the corruption and illicit activities” taking place in the organizations (Gjelten 
2012). Hacking groups use techniques such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
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attacks to disable corporate and government websites and employ sophisticated hacking 
techniques to gain access to data and deface the websites.  
Malicious software (malware) such as viruses and spyware pose another extreme 
threat to organizational data (Luo and Warkentin 2008). While most viruses or spyware 
are utilized for installing adware programs, to wipe out personal data or impose software 
or hardware restrictions on personal computers, some malware are programmed to take 
an extra step of accessing and transmitting secure data that belongs to organizations. 
According to the Computer Crime and Security Survey (2011), malware attacks were 
reported as the most common threat to corporate information security. Recent 
developments in the malware threat landscape suggests that malware are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and used as a weapon to conduct espionage on other 
governments or corporations and counter-terrorism activities. In a recent New York Times 
article, it was revealed that ‘Stuxnet,’ which was a virus that disabled nuclear enrichment 
equipment in Iran, was created by the collaboration between the United States and Israel 
(Sanger 2012). Another virus called ‘Flame,’ which is known to “exceed those of all 
other cyber menaces known to date,” has been discovered in Iran (Kaspersky 2012, p. 1). 
The Flame virus has the ability to capture the content on a user's screen, turn on a 
computer's microphone to record conversations, detect who and what is on a network, 
collect lists of vulnerable passwords, and transfer users computer files to another server 
(Goldman 2012). If a virus were to infect a corporate or government server with highly 
sensitive data, it would have damaging consequences. It is interesting to note that the 
Stuxnet and possibly the Flame virus were infected through an employee plugging in a 
USB drive from an unknown source to a corporate or organizational computer and not by 
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hacking activity that penetrated through the server security defenses. This shows how the 
internal threats can be a major concern to many organizations.  
According to the 2011 Computer Crime and Security Survey (Richardson 2012), 
respondents from government, financial, medical, business, and higher education 
institutions reported malware and insider abuse (internal threat) comprised the most 
frequent forms of information security breaches. Willison and Warkentin (2013) 
categorize the internal human threats into passive (non-volitional), volitional (non-
malicious), and intentional (malicious) in terms of security policy violations of an 
organization. Intentional malicious threats include data theft, intentional data corruption, 
deliberate policy violations and fraud. These types of threats cannot be prevented 
completely but they can be reduced through stringent technical controls in place that will 
alert the management of any illicit actions that are taking place using IS. Although 
intentional and malicious violations of security policy can occur, their occurrence is rare 
(Richardson 2012). The more common occurrences of internal threats in an organization 
are the volitional and passive threats (Willison and Warkentin 2013). In passive or non-
volitional non-compliance of security polices, employees may violate security policies 
unintentionally by acts such as accidental data entry or deletion, forgetful oversights or 
any other unintentional acts. Although these acts may be unintentional, they can be 
detrimental to the information security of the organization. Volitional but non-malicious 
acts that are performed frequently by employees can also have serious repercussions on 
information security. Some of these volitional acts may include delaying backups, not 
changing passwords regularly or failing to log off or lock the computer when leaving it 
unattended as required by the company security policy.  
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The increased threats from insiders have resulted in organizations implementing 
security education, training, and awareness (SETA) (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010), strict information security policies and procedures (Warkentin and 
Johnston 2008), and sanctions to deter policy violations (D’Arcy and Devaraj 2012; 
D’Arcy and Herath 2011; D’Arcy et al. 2009; Xu et al. 2013) to counter threats to their 
information systems. With the increased focus on insider threats to organizations, 
scholars have conducted various research studies on all three categories of internal 
threats. One of the most frequently studied areas in IS security research is the 
organizational security compliance and the factors that influence employees to comply or 
violate these policies (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; LaRose 
et al. 2008; Pahnila et al. 2007; Vance et al. 2012). 
While some employees may comply with the security policies and perform the 
recommended secure behaviors, other employees may intentionally violate these policies. 
These compliant or positive behaviors and the previously discussed negative behaviors, 
when practiced on a routine basis, may become habitual. Organizations should strive to 
influence their employees to practice secure behaviors automatically or habitually since it 
significantly reduces the chances of non-compliance by employees due to negligence. 
Therefore, organizations should encourage their employees perform secure behaviors 
habitually. Similarly, organizations would prefer their employees to refrain from forming 
non-compliant habitual behaviors. If certain non-compliance behaviors are performed 
habitually by employees, the organizations should attempt to break those habits. SETA 
programs can be effective solutions to form positive habits and break negative habits of 
employees through frequently administered security communications such as pop-up 
 
10 
messages, sidebar in a newsletter or post-it notes with encouragement to comply with 
security policies. Recent research seems to suggest that both positive and negative habits 
are formed similarly (Neal et al. 2013). Although behaviors performed habitually by 
employees can be either positive or negative, the focus of this present study is on positive 
habits related to information security at the workplace.  
Threat Avoidance 
Criminology research and a plethora of psychology research suggest that it is 
human nature to seek rewards and avoid punishment (Becker 1968; McCarthy 2002; 
Paternoster and Pogarsky 2009; Paternoster and Simpson 1996; Piquero et al. 2005; 
Westland 1997). Rational Choice Theory (RCT) provides the foundation to this view by 
arguing that an individual undergoes a cognitive process that balances the costs and 
benefits of his or her actions before a course of action is taken (Beccaria 1770; Bentham 
1781; Paternoster and Simpson 1996). Behavioral theories based on reinforcement 
suggest that an individual who is satisfied by performing a certain behavior is likely to 
repeat the same behavior. Similarly, an individual is likely to avoid repeating a behavior 
that had resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes (Freud 1915). These threats that humans 
typically try to avoid (Witte 1992) can be in the form of health-related threats, natural 
disasters, terrorism and information technology threats, to name a few.  
Based on Cybernetic Theory (Wiener 1948),  which posits that humans self-
regulate their behaviors through feedback loops, Liang and Xue (2009)  developed the 
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT). TTAT explains individual behavior of 
avoiding certain IS security threats by utilizing positive feedback loops. In these positive 
loops, an anti-goal is the threat or occurrence that needs to be averted.  TTAT posits that 
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individuals perform secure behaviors to distance themselves from these anti-goals. Threat 
and coping appraisals are recognized as major components of the threat avoidance 
process and process view of TTAT affirms that threat appraisal occurs first (Liang and 
Xue 2009). This is consistent with theories such as the Extended Parallel Process Model 
(EPPM) posit that threat appraisals need to occur prior to coping appraisals (Witte 1992). 
If the threat is not perceived first, individuals will have no necessity to apply coping 
mechanisms. If a threat is perceived, it will lead to coping appraisal, which may be either 
emotional-based coping or problem-based coping. Emotional-based maladaptive coping 
may be in the form of religious faith or denial of the presence of a threat. Problem-based 
coping is performing an adaptive response such as following the recommended response. 
However, the variance theory view of TTAT, which provides a cross-sectional view of 
the threat avoidance process, suggests that threat and coping appraisals can occur in 
parallel. The view that threat and coping appraisal could occur in parallel was initially 
suggested by Rogers (1983) and many recent IS security studies have followed this view.  
According to TTAT, when an individual faces a threat, a threat appraisal process 
is activated, followed by the coping appraisal process, and adaptive or maladaptive 
behavior is performed as a result. This process continues on a feedback loop.  However, 
TTAT does not consider the outcome of the feedback loop being repeated many times in 
a stable context. When the adaptive behavior is repeated in a stable context, habits may 
be formed, developing a habit loop. The habit loop consists of a cue, routine and a 
reward. A cue or environmental trigger will initiate the automatic behavior, which results 
in a reward or satisfaction (Duhigg 2012). The habit loop will continue until there is a 
disturbance in the environment or a trigger causing the process to return to the positive 
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feedback loop. The automatic nature of habit and the variance theory view of TTAT 
provide a sound theoretical basis for this present study to investigate the role of habit in 
information security behaviors and explore the primary research question as shown 
below. 
The primary research question that is explored in this study is: 
RQ: What role does habit play in individuals’ performance of information 
security behaviors in the workplace? 
While exploring the primary research questions, the findings of this study are 
utilized for additional analysis. The impact of threat and coping appraisals on the 
performance of secure behavior in various levels of habit strength, was investigated in 
this study. Furthermore, this study explored the direct effect of habit on secure behaviors 
and the moderating effect of habit on the intention-behavior relationship. 
Protection Motivation Theory 
Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975), which was drawn from expectancy 
value theories and cognitive processing theories, suggests that individuals act to avoid 
and prevent threats to their safety and security if and when they perceive that the threat is 
sufficiently severe and if they perceive that they are susceptible to the threat.  Individuals 
are also likely to form perceptions about their ability to respond to the threat (self-
efficacy), conduct an assessment about the effectiveness of the recommended response 
(response efficacy), and analyze the costs involved in performing the recommended 
behavior (response cost) (Bandura and Adams 1977). These two appraisals: threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal, form the foundation for the individual user’s behavioral 
intention to carry out or execute the recommended response to a threat (Witte 1992, Witte 
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1996).  A substantial amount of research studies using PMT have revealed both threat 
and coping appraisals to be significantly correlated with behavioral intention. However, 
coping appraisal variables have been shown to have a stronger relationship with 
behavioral intention than threat appraisal variables (Milne et al. 2000). While PMT 
suggests that the threat and coping appraisals may occur concurrently, theories such as 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) suggest that threat appraisals occur prior to 
coping appraisals. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) utilized the view of EPPM in their 
study, which investigated the influence of PMT variables on behavioral intention to use 
anti-spyware software. This dissertation focused on the original view of PMT where 
threat and coping appraisals can occur simultaneously.  
Previous studies have suggested that threat appraisal and coping appraisal 
variables, which are the foundation of the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), 
influence security behavior of individuals (Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; 
LaRose et al. 2008; Lee and Larsen 2009; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). 
When individuals face a threat, they are likely to adopt protective technologies to deter 
the threat. These protective technologies help users avoid harm from a growing number 
of negative technologies, such as malware (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and 
Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010). PMT has also been utilized to investigate the impact 
of threat and coping appraisal on security policy compliance (Herath and Rao 2009; 
Ifinedo 2012; LaRose et al. 2008; Pahnila et al. 2007), backing up data (Crossler 2010; 
Malimage and Warkentin 2010) and risky online behavior (Marett et al. 2011) .    
Protection Motivation Theory, which has been widely used in information 
security research, provides a highly validated theory to test the role of habit in 
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information security behaviors. The cognitive mediating process provides an excellent 
background to explore the influence of habit, since habitual behaviors reduce cognitive 
processing. Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012) tested PMT and habit in the 
context of information security, but both studies failed to capture the automaticity of 
habit. This study investigated the role of habit in information security behaviors utilizing 
PMT while capturing the multidimensional and automatic nature of habit.  
Role of Habit 
Behavioral Theories such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) are well 
established theories that have provided a core foundation to most behavioral research 
studies across many disciplines (Conner et al. 2003; Liao et al. 2007). These theories 
operate under the assumption that actions are guided by a rational and intentional 
decision-making process. However, these underlying theories do not address that, over 
time, habitual patterns are developed when certain behaviors are repeated successfully in 
a stable context. These formed habits will decrease the role of rationality and 
intentionality of the decision making process, therefore, theories such as TRA and TPB 
do not provide the best theoretical foundation for the study of behaviors, which are 
already habituated (Guinea and Markus 2009).  
Triandis (1977), who was one of the first scholars to integrate habit into 
behavioral research, states that habit and intentions are at the opposite ends of a 
continuum, where the more habitual an action becomes, the less intentional it would be. 
However, the true meaning of habit has been a topic of much debate among researchers. 
There are clearly two definitions of habit. One group of researchers argue that habits are 
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equal to the frequency of past behavior (Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990; Bagozzi 1981; 
Beck and Ajzen 1991; Landis et al. 1978; Quine and Rubin 1997; Tuorila and Pangborn 
1988). Under this definition, any behavior when performed frequently would become a 
habit. Another group of researchers asserts that while frequency is a component of habit 
formation, frequency itself does not constitute habit. They state that habit is a form of 
goal-oriented automaticity (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; Neal 
et al. 2011; Sheeran et al. 2005; Verplanken and Orbell 2003; Wood and Neal 2007). This 
dissertation followed the view that habitual behaviors are performed automatically and 
defines habit as “learned sequences of acts that become automatic responses to specific 
situations, which may be functional in obtaining certain goals or end states” (Verplanken 
et al. 1997, p. 540). The automaticity aspect of habit is multidimensional and consists of 
dimensions such as lack of awareness, uncontrollability and mental efficiency. 
The power of habit has been utilized by many organizations to foster positive 
habits and to break negative habits of their employees. Several organizations such as 
Starbucks have developed training programs to instill positive habits in their employees, 
which has resulted in great success (Simon 2011). Companies such as Proctor and 
Gamble have taken advantage of consumers’ habitual urges to create highly profitable 
products like Febreze (Bittar 2000). Non-profit organizations such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous have used the power of habit to reform lives by breaking habits that lead to 
alcoholism and providing individuals with alternative positive habits.     
Technology adoption models such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
(Davis 1989) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) 
(Venkatesh et al. 2003) were based on TRA, which assumes that individuals only 
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perform behaviors after a formal decision-making process. When a routine or repetitive 
task needs to be performed, this formal decision making process may not be beneficial 
since there is no need to weigh costs and benefits of the same action (Guinea and Markus 
2009). Kim and Malhotra (2005) and Venkatesh et al. (2000) suggests that over time, the 
decision-making process and intentions change and that the influence of intentions on 
behavior decreases. When habits are formed, the predictive power of behavioral intention 
reduces and over time habit becomes the main driver of actual behavior while 
suppressing the intention-behavior relationship. While habit has been modeled as a 
mediator and a direct effect on behavior, Limayem et al. (2007) posits that the automatic 
aspect of habits can only be captured by including habit as a moderator of the intention-
behavior relationship. The moderating effect of habit was initially suggested by James 
(1890) and received support from several other researchers (Landis et al. 1978; Montano 
and Taplin 1991; Ronis et al. 1989). Aarts et al. (1998) suggests that individuals do not 
consume cognitive resources when performing a habitual behavior and therefore, TRA 
and TPB may not be applicable in situations where habitual behaviors are performed. 




Figure 1.2 Habit as a Moderator (Sood 2012) 
 
Theorizing habit as a moderator is suggested as the best way to capture the 
automaticity nature of habitual behaviors. However, scholars have found empirical 
evidence that habit and intention are independent constructs, which predict actual 
behavior in the contexts of blood donation, seatbelt usage and food consumption (Charng 
et al. 1988; Mittal 1988; Tuorila and Pangborn 1988). Limayem et al. (2007) also found 
habit to have a significant direct influence on actual behavior. These findings suggest that 
habit exhibits a moderating influence on the intention-behavior relationship and also acts 
as a direct influence on actual behavior.  
Habit has been investigated heavily in social psychology using both the frequency 
of past behavior and automaticity views. With more than 40 percent of daily behaviors 
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performed by an individual being habitual (Duhigg 2012; Neal et al. 2006), and 
information systems being used heavily on a daily basis, it stands to reason that habit 
plays an important role in behaviors related to information systems. Habits have been 
shown to influence our daily behaviors related to sending emails, online shopping, web 
browsing, smartphone usage and using information systems in general (Oulasvirta et al. 
2012). Given the applicability of habit to IS related behaviors, it is surprising that only a 
few researchers have investigated the role of habit in IS research.  
Table 1.1 Recent Empirical IS Research Investigating Habit 
Study Behavioral Context 
Cheung and Limayem (2005) Student use of Blackboard 
Chiu et al. (2012) Online purchaces 
Gefen (2003) Online CD/book vendors 
Khalifa & Liu (2007) Online shopping 
Khalifa et al. (2002) Online grocery shopping 
Kim and Malhotra (2005) Web based information system 
Limayem and Cheung (2011) Student use of Blackboard 
Limayem and Hirt (2003) Student use of WebBoard 
Limayem et al. (2001) Student use of WebBoard 
Limayem et al. (2007) World Wide Web 
Pahnila et al. (2007) Security policy compliance 
Polites and Karahanna (2012) Student use of GoogleDocs 
Siponen et al. (2010) Security policy compliance (qualitative) 
Vance et al. (2012) Security policy compliance 
Wu and Kuo (2008) Google searches 
Ye and Potter (2011) Student use of web browsers 
 
Reflecting on that void in IS research, Benbasat and Barki (2007) called for 
scholars to consider investigating the role of habit in information systems. Scholars in the 
IS continuance and discontinuance area have utilized habit in their research to a certain 
degree since it is highly applicable. There has been an increase in the number of IS 
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articles exploring the influence of habit, which is highlighted by the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) 2 model integrating habit as one of the 
exogenous variables (Venkatesh et al. 2012). Table 1.1 lists some recent research in IS 
that has utilized habit as a construct in their investigations.  
Extant research in IS that has utilized habit is scarce, which is baffling given the 
applicability of habits in routine usage of information systems by individuals. Even more 
surprisingly, there have been only a few studies to our knowledge where habit was 
investigated in the context of information security. Several information security research 
studies have identified habit to be a key factor in secure behaviors. Some of the secure 
behaviors identified to be habitual in these studies were password creation and usage 
(Bellman et al. 1999; Farn et al. 2004; Florencio and Herley 2007; Herath and Rao 2009; 
Morris and Thompson 1979; Yang and Shieh 1999), data backup (Chunli and Donghui 
2012; Dunnavant and Childress 2010; S.B.Thorat et al. 2010; Spennemann and Atkinson 
2002), locking or logging off computer terminal when leaving them unattended (Morgan 
et al. 2007; Siponen et al. 2010), clicking web links or visiting websites (Chen and 
Halsey 2009; Frøkjær and Hornbæk 2002) and behaviors related to emailing such as 
reviewing the addresses of recipients before sending email (Etchells 2008; Vandermeer 
2006) and exercising care when opening email attachments (Ng et al. 2009). Other 
information security studies have identified habit as a possible antecedent to actual 
behavior and have suggested scholars investigate the influence of habit on secure 
behaviors in the future (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Herath and Rao 2009).  
Although many information security studies have identified habit as a key factor, 
only a few research studies have actually tested habit in an information security context.  
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Pahnila et al. (2007) modeled habit and other variables related to PMT and Deterrence 
Theory to investigate security policy compliance. They hypothesized that habit has a 
direct influence of behavioral intentions to comply with security policies. Siponen et al. 
(2010) followed a qualitative approach to test the influence of habit on security related 
behaviors such as secure use of the internet, writing down passwords and locking one’s 
PC. Vance et al. (2012) used scenarios to test the influence of habit in the presence of 
PMT. They hypothesized that threat and coping appraisal mediated the relationship 
between habit and policy compliance intention. Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. 
(2012) found empirical evidence to support their hypotheses related to habit, utilizing the 
cognitive mediating process to mediate the relationship between habit and intention 
(Vance et al. 2012) and modeling habit as a direct influence of behavioral intentions 
(Pahnila et al. 2007). However, these investigations are in contrast to the automaticity 
nature of habit and follow the notion that habits are equal to frequency of past behavior.  
Information security behaviors are performed routinely, on a repetitive basis in 
stable contexts by employees at the workplace. Over time these behaviors can become 
habitual. Several information security research studies have identified that habit is a key 
factor in secure behaviors. However, only a few studies that investigated the role of habit 
in information security behaviors and those studies do not capture the automatic aspect of 
habit. This study attempted to fill this research gap by developing a research model to 
explore the role of habit in information security behaviors with a focus on the 
automaticity view of habit. 
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Conceptual Research Model 
This study proposed a research model to test the influence of the threat appraisal 
process and coping appraisal on behavioral intentions and to test the role of habit in 
moderating the intention-behavior relationship. Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
(TTAT), Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Habit Theory provide the theoretical 
basis for the research model. The main research model for this study is shown on Figure 
1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 Conceptual Research Model 
 
It was hypothesized that perceived threat severity and vulnerability will positively 
influence intention to perform a secure behavior. Coping appraisal variables, response 
efficacy and self-efficacy were hypothesized to positively influence intentions while 
 
22 
response cost was hypothesized to negatively influence intentions. Behavioral intentions 
were hypothesized to influence actual behavior. Habit was hypothesized to directly 
influence behavior while negatively moderating the intention-behavior relationship. The 
suppressing effect of habit on relationship between intention and behavior was explored 
by Limayem and Hirt (2003) and  Limayem et al. (2007) in the context of IS continuance. 
This study investigated the suppressing relationship in the context of information security 
with the presence of threat and coping appraisal variables. 
Research Objectives 
The primary purpose of this study was to explore the role of habit in information 
security behaviors while capturing the automatic nature of habit. With the increasing 
severity and frequency of information security threats, a single incident can jeopardize 
the security of a whole organization. Therefore, identifying the role of habit in the 
performance of information security behaviors by employees at the workplace is critical. 
There have been only a few studies in the information security domain that utilized habit 
as a construct to predict secure behaviors or intentions to perform secure behaviors. This 
present study filled this research gap by developing a comprehensive research model that 
can be applied in the information security context to test the role of habit in information 
security behaviors in the workplace. 
In order to confirm that the research model presented in this study is appropriate, 
comparisons of the path coefficients and variance explained are conducted with several 
other alternative models that investigate PMT and habit. Research models positioning 
habit as an indirect effect (Vance et al. 2012), direct effect on intentions (Gefen 2003), 
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and direct effect of behavior (Limayem et al. 2007) were analyzed and compared with the 
proposed conceptual model of this study.  
Research Methods 
The initial challenge of this present study was to identify which information 
security behaviors were habitual. Due to the lack of prior research in information security 
that utilized habits, a rigorous process had to be followed to identify behaviors that are 
habitual. As mentioned previously, habitual behaviors can be positive or negative. For the 
purposes of this study, only positive habits related to information security were 
considered. After compiling a list of forty-nine positive secure behaviors, a subject-
matter expert panel was convened to identify which of those behaviors their employees 
performed habitually. An employee panel was also convened to identify which of those 
behaviors they performed habitually. The responses were compiled and members of a 
measurement panel were requested to identify three behaviors that the panelists identified 
as habitual, but still were practical to be measured through an online survey.  
Three online survey instruments were developed for the three distinct behaviors 
and the content validity was assessed by a panel of instrument experts. After several 
rounds of modifications, the panel agreed on the content validity of the instrument. The 
surveys were hosted on Qualtrics and respondents randomly received one of the three 
surveys that tested a secure behavior. A pilot test was conducted using the same 
respondent pool that was utilized for the full scale study. Pilot study data were analyzed 
for the construct validity and reliability and after some required refinements were 
conducted, the full-scale study was deployed. The sampling frame for the pilot test and 
the full scale study was corporate employees across a diverse range of industries. 
 
24 
Although many research studies use students as their respondents, for the purposes of this 
study and to measure the role of habit, a corporate sampling frame was deemed more 
appropriate due to generalizability and realism (Compeau et al. 2012). Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques were used to analyze the data collected from the 
full-scale study. 
Significance of the study 
The findings of this present study contribute to research as well as practitioners. 
The findings are expected to empirically confirm the role of habit has a key factor in 
information security behaviors as identified by prior information security research. While 
extending the findings of prior research that investigated habit and PMT, this study 
captured the true nature of habit: automaticity. Prior information security research 
utilizing PMT has suggested that threat and coping appraisals significant influence 
behavioral intention. The findings of this study indicate that while the PMT variable exert 
their influence on behavioral intentions, when habit is present, the influence of behavioral 
intentions on the performance of actual behavior reduces. This in-turn reduces the 
influence of the PMT variables on actual behavior. 
For organizations, the findings mean that they should strive to ensure that their 
employees form habits to perform secure behaviors, which are critical to the security of 
the organization. When a certain behavior becomes habitual, it is less likely that the 
employees will forget to perform that behavior since the behaviors are automatically 
triggered. With information security, it requires only a single incident to compromise 
security, thus habitual performance of secure behaviors such as locking the computer 




This dissertation proposal is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter provides 
a brief introduction and an overview about this dissertation. Chapter II provides a detailed 
literature review on TTAT, PMT and habit, resulting in the development of the 
conceptual model and hypotheses. Chapter III presents a detailed description of the 
research method that was employed for this dissertation study. Chapter IV presents the 
results of the data analyses and Chapter V concludes the study with a discussion of the 
findings, theoretical and practical implications and a presentation of the limitations and 






The purpose of this chapter is to review the extant literature regarding the primary 
theories addressed in this study and to articulate the formation of the research model 
along with the hypotheses. First, the background literature on threat avoidance is 
reviewed along with the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT). Next, Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT) and the extant literature utilizing PMT in information systems 
(IS) research are reviewed. Habit is defined, followed by explorations of the formation of 
habit and extant literature that apply habit in psychology and IS. After the background on 
current habit research, how habit can be applied in IS security research is presented. The 
research model is then discussed in detail along with the constructs that are tested in the 
model. Finally, paths from the independent variables to the dependent variables and the 
moderating relationships are theoretically justified and the associated hypotheses are 
defined. 
Threat Avoidance 
Psychology research on human behavior has provided ample evidence that 
humans’ motivational foundation is to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Some of the prolific 
researchers and founders of behavioral psychology such as Sigmund Freud and William 
James have agreed with the notion that human behavior revolves around setting goals to 
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achieve positive outcomes and distance themselves from negative outcomes (Freud 1915; 
James 1890). Behavioral theories, based on reinforcement, assert that when humans 
receive rewards or satisfaction after performing a certain behavior they are more likely to 
repeat the same or similar behavior while punishments or unsatisfactory behavior will 
reduce the chances of that behavior being repeated. A threat can be identified as a 
negative outcome which humans would typically try to avoid. Threats faced by humans 
can be of different forms in contexts such as health-related issues, natural disasters, 
terrorism and information technology. Whatever the threat may be, individuals are likely 
to take action to deter the threat if and when they perceive it (Witte 1992).  
Cybernetic Theory, which was created by Wiener (1948), asserts that humans 
self-regulate their behaviors through feedback loops. These feedback loops are also called 
cybernetic loops. There are two feedback loops presented in the cybernetic theory: 




Figure 2.1 Cybernetic Loop (Liang and Xue 2009) 
 
The cybernetic loop, which may be positive or negative, is activated by a 
disturbance in the environment, which will be captured by the input function and 
perceptions created. The cybernetic loop is presented in Figure 2.1. The comparator in the 
cybernetic loop compares the present state, as signaled by the input function, with the 
values set by the goal or anti-goal. This is called a positive feedback loop or a positive 
cybernetic loop. In a negative feedback loop or negative cybernetic loop, if the 
comparator finds the values between the goal and present state are different, the output 
function activates a behavior in order to reduce the difference. This behavior will impact 
the environment changing the present state and it will then be sent to the comparator by 
the input function to decide whether the behavior needs to continue. This process 
functions as a negative feedback loop since it “functions to decrease the discrepancy 
between the present state and the desired end state” (Liang and Xue 2009, p.74).  
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Technology acceptance theories such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
(Davis 1989) operate under the assumption that human behaviors are goal directed and 
that through cognitive processes they chose the behavior that results in the best outcome. 
However, the technology acceptance theories explain only the link between the 
comparator and the output function. These theories ignore the reasons why the goal was 
initially formed and does not even test the actual goal of the individual.  
The positive feedback loop is applicable to assess humans’ propensity to avoid 
threats since it describes how individuals may try to increase the discrepancy between the 
present state and the anti-goal. When the comparator finds that a present value is too 
close to the undesired goal, the output function activates a behavior that continues until 
“the discrepancy is sufficiently large” (Carver and Scheier 1982; Liang and Xue 2009, 
p.77). The positive feedback loop can be utilized to describe the phenomena of how 
individuals behave to avoid certain threats. In the IS security context, this loop explains 
how individuals may avoid security threats such as computer viruses, spyware and data 
loss by following a recommended response or by simply ignoring the threat. For 
example, losing data may be the anti-goal or occurrence that an individual wants to 
prevent. When the threat of data loss is perceived by the input function through a 
disturbance in the environment, such as witnessing the computer behaving abnormally or 
hearing about a colleague losing data, the comparator may find that the current state is in 
close proximity to the anti-goal. The output function moves the current state away from 
the anti-goal by activating avoidance behavior, such as backing up your data. Cybernetic 
theory was used as a foundation by Liang and Xue (2009) to develop the Technology 
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Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), which explains individual behavior of avoiding 
certain IS Security threats.  
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
With the number of information technology threats such as viruses and spyware 
increasing on a daily basis, individuals as well as organizations are likely to experience at 
least some of these threats at some point. In order to deter these threats lurking in any IT 
environment, evasive actions need to be taken by end users. According to the Technology 
Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), users go through two cognitive processes: threat 
appraisal to evaluate threats and coping appraisal to decide how to cope with those threats 
(Liang and Xue 2009). Based on the theories rooted in the psychology discipline that 
suggest humans seek pleasure and avoid pain, TTAT posits that approach behavior, 
which is represented by the negative feedback loop in cybernetic theory is different from 
threat avoidance behavior. Neurological research also supports this position by 
identifying that the left prefrontal cortex is associated with approach behavior while the 
right prefrontal cortex is associated with avoidance behavior (Louis and Sutton 1991; 
Sutton and Davidson 1997). It is important to note that acceptance and avoidance are 
cognitive processes that involve decision making, utilizing the prefrontal cortex of the 
brain. Thus, when a certain behavior is learned or becomes habitual, the decision making 
that was conducted in the prefrontal cortex part of the brain will cease, and a part of the 
brain which is responsible for routine and automatic behavior, basal ganglia, will take 
precedence (Ashby et al. 2010). The latter part of this chapter will discuss how a 
successful repetition of a similar behavioral feedback loop may result in habitual 
behavior, which is automatic and unconscious. 
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The process view of TTAT, while stating that threat and coping appraisals are 
significant parts of the threat avoidance process, asserts that threat perception activates 
the coping appraisal. This implies that the threat appraisal occurs before coping appraisal. 
As it is illustrated in Figure 2.2, once the environment changes with the emergence of 
malicious IT, threat perceptions are created. These threat perceptions depend on the 
perceived probability of the threat’s occurrence and the perceived severity of the 
consequences if the threat was to occur. Threat appraisal evaluates the threat and 
activates coping appraisal where the user analyzes which options are available to deter 
the threat before deciding on the behavior to avoid the threat. Therefore, if an individual 
perceives no threat, there will be no requirement for the analysis of coping mechanisms 
or behavior to cope with a threat. However, the variance view of TTAT, which describes 
the threat avoidance process in a cross-sectional manner, utilizes the original approach 
taken by (Maddux and Rogers 1983) where threat and coping appraisals may occur 
concurrently.  
Once an individual perceives a threat and analyzes the different options available 
to cope with the threat, actual coping behavior takes place as a form of problem-focused 
coping or emotion-based coping. In problem based coping, an individual moves away 
from the anti-goal by performing a behavior that deals directly with threats, such as 
installing anti-virus, installing anti-spyware software or backing up data. In emotion-
focused coping, individuals “create a false perception of the environment without actually 
changing it” (Liang and Xue 2009, p.78), which reduces the threat perceptions or 
motivation of coping without actually changing the present state. Some emotion-focused 
coping may include belief that God will remove the danger (religious faith), acceptance 
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of a threat or a risky situation (fatalism), denial of the presence of the threat, or self-
blame for not being able to control the threat (Rippetoe and Rogers 1987).  Individuals 
are likely to select only one of the coping methods for most situations, but high threat 
situations may influence individuals to select both types of coping methods.  
In the process view of TTAT, Liang and Xue (2009) presents several 
propositions. In proposition 1 (P1), they propose that once users become aware of a 
certain threat in the environment, they would perform avoidance behavior to distance 
themselves from the anti-goal or the undesired end state. In proposition 2 (P2), it is 
proposed that individuals need to appraise the threat before they assess available 
behavioral options to cope with the threat. This is consistent with the Extended Parallel 
Process Model (EPPM), where threat perception is a necessary condition for individuals 
to keep methods to cope with the threats. Proposition 3 (P3) suggests that individuals 
may perform problem-focused or emotion-focused coping to reduce a threat that they 
perceive. Individuals may evaluate several options available to avert the perceived threat 
before selecting one of the options in problem-focused coping (P3a). Emotion-based 
coping (P3b) creates a false perception of the environment without changing the reality. 
However, the process view of TTAT fails to identify that once a coping mechanism or 
secure behavior is repeated successfully, over time a habit loop may be created, which 




Figure 2.2 Process of IT Threat Avoidance (Liang and Xue 2009) 
 
Liang and Xue (2010) utilized TTAT on a variance model where they 
hypothesized that perceived threat and perceived avoidability will positively influence 
avoidance motivation and that avoidance motivation will positively influence avoidance 
behavior. They found empirical evidence to validate their research model, which was 
derived from TTAT, with all but one of their hypotheses being supported. Their findings 
are largely consistent with the Protection Motivation Theory where individual’s threat 
appraisal and coping appraisals lead to protective behaviors or recommended responses.  
Although tested as a variance model, their paper utilizing TTAT provides 
valuable insight into how behavioral feed-back loops work in the context of threat 
avoidance. However, consistent with similar studies, their study did not take into account 
that when the feed-back loop is repeated many times in a stable context, coping behavior 
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may become habitual by creating a habit loop instead of the positive feedback loop. The 
habit loop will be initiated by a trigger, followed by the actual coping behavior before 
approaching the rewards stage. TTAT along with habit provide a theoretical foundation 
for this study.  
Protection Motivation Theory 
Protection Motivation Theory was originally developed by Rogers (1975) to 
demonstrate how fear appeals affect health attitudes and behaviors. Fear appeals are 
defined as “persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible 
things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends” (Witte 
1992, p. 329). A successful fear appeal will heighten the awareness of a threat by 
increasing the threat severity and vulnerability levels of an individual and by increasing 
the coping appraisal to the recommended response. A plethora of research studies have 
found that fear-arousing messages contribute to the increased acceptance of 
recommended response or secure behavior (Sutton 1982). As identified by the fear 
appeals theory (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Witte 1992), certain adaptive responses 
can be associated with certain threats. Table 2.1 illustrates threat-response pairs related to 
health-awareness campaigns and IS security in organizations. Crossler and Belanger 
(2012) posit that although a threat is usually associated with a single recommended 
response, individuals may perform alternative responses to avert a threat. 
Perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity and response efficacy 
were identified as the main components of PMT by Rogers (1975), while self-efficacy 
was included as a core component of PMT at a later stage (Maddux and Rogers 1983; 
Rogers 1983). PMT suggests that once an individual receives information about a threat, 
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a cognitive mediation process causes that individual to evaluate the threat. If the 
individual perceives that the threat is sufficiently severe and that he or she is susceptible 
to the threat, he or she will act to avoid or prevent the threat (Rogers 1975). 
Table 2.1 Threat-Response Pairs 
Threat Recommended Response Source 
Health-related   
Injury due to a Car Crash Wear seat belts  (Schwarzer et al. 2007) 
Lung cancer/smoke 
related death 
Smoking cessation  (Rogers 1975) 
HIV infection Condom usage  (Abraham et al. 1994) 
   
IS Security Related   
Loss of Data Backing up data  
Changing password 
Keeping software updated 
Set up user access controls 
(Crossler and Belanger 
2012; Crossler 2010; 
Malimage and Warkentin 
2010) 
Computer Virus Infection Anti-Virus software usage  (Ng et al. 2009) 
Spyware Infection Anti-Spyware software usage  (Johnston and Warkentin 
2010) 
Unauthorized access to 
user account 
Changing password frequently  (Zhang and McDowell 
2009) 
Corporate data breach Encrypting corporate data  (Vance et al. 2012) 
Unauthorized use of user 
credentials 
Locking the computer  (Vance et al. 2012) 
 
In addition to the cognitive appraisal of threat severity and threat susceptibility, 
individuals also form perceptions of the recommended response to the threat by assessing 
their own individual capabilities (self-efficacy), coupled with an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the response (response efficacy) (Bandura 1977; Witte 1992; Witte et al. 
1996). Individuals also assess the cost related to performing a selected coping behavior 
(response cost).  Response costs can be in the form of time, money and/or effort 
expended while performing the adaptive coping behavior (Floyd et al. 2000). PMT 
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consists of two cognitive mediating processes; threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The 
threat appraisal process consists of perceived threat vulnerability and perceived threat 
severity while the coping appraisal process consists of response efficacy, self-efficacy 
and response costs.  The perceptions created in the threat appraisal and coping appraisal 
processes will increase the likelihood of an individual performing a recommended 
response (Floyd et al. 2000). Figure 2.3 demonstrates the cognitive mediating processes 
of PMT. 
When an individual perceives a threat, he or she may accept the recommended 
response (adaptive coping) or choose to ignore the threat or react negatively (maladaptive 
coping). Adaptive coping results from an individual perceiving an average threat or fear 
appeal. Maladaptive coping results from a very high or very low threat perception or fear 
appeal, where an individual may ignore the threat or perform a behavior, which is the 
opposite of the recommended response. Therefore, the relationship between threat 
perception or fear and motivation to carry out the recommended response is suggested to 




Figure 2.3 PMT Cognitive Mediating Process (Floyd et al. 2000) 
 
PMT has been widely used in health research domains such as smoking cessation, 
sunscreen usage, moderate alcohol consumption and dietary improvements and the four 
primary variables have been found to be significantly correlated with the behavioral 
intention. According to a meta-analysis of extant PMT studies, coping appraisal variables 
were strongly related to behavioral intention and behavior of the adaptive response 
compared to threat appraisal variables (Floyd et al. 2000; Milne et al. 2000). Response 
cost has only been utilized as a PMT variable in the research models on a limited number 
of studies (Vance et al. 2012). This may be due to validity or reliability issues or simply 
because it was not applicable to the context of those studies in question. For this present 
study, response cost is included as a PMT variable in the research model as secure 
behaviors may involve a degree of cost to the individual performing them.  
PMT has provided the foundation to several behavioral information security 
research studies conducted in different contexts to explain how individuals are motivated 
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in response to perceptions of certain threats. The different contexts and different 
adaptations of PMT in these studies have yielded contrasting findings. Woon et al. (2005) 
used PMT to find factors that influenced home users’ behavior to protect their wireless 
networks. They found that all the PMT variables except perceived vulnerability had a 
significant impact on the probability of an individual enabling security in their wireless 
network. Lee and Larsen (2009) utilized PMT to investigate factors effecting small and 
medium sized business executives’ decision to adopt anti-malware software for 
organizations. Their findings indicated that threat severity had the strongest impact on the 
executives’ intention to adopt anti-malware software. Herath and Rao (2009) 
hypothesized that PMT variables had a direct effect on attitudes, which then had a direct 
effect on behavioral intention to comply with security policies. Their findings indicate 
that the perceived severity of a security breach was significantly related to security 
breach concern level. 
 Johnston and Warkentin (2010) employed PMT along with the Extended Parallel 
Process Model (EPPM) where they hypothesized threat appraisal to directly affect coping 
appraisal and the coping appraisal to directly affect behavioral intention to adopt anti-
spyware when faced with the threat of spyware. Their Fear Appeals Model (FAM) 
indicated that perceived threat severity significantly influenced response efficacy when 
fear appeals were provided. They also found that response efficacy and self-efficacy 
significantly influenced individuals’ intentions to use anti-spyware software.  Liang and 
Xue (2010) utilized PMT to test a variance model of TTAT also utilized the threat of 
spyware in their study. They hypothesized that while threat and coping appraisal had a 
direct influence on behavioral intention (motivation), an interaction effect between 
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perceived threat and response efficacy constructs. Their data showed significant 
relationships in all of their hypothesized relationships except the interaction effect of 
threat severity and vulnerability on perceived threat.  
Lee (2011) investigated the factors effecting the adoption of anti-plagiarism 
software by university faculty with PMT variables. He found that threat appraisals had a 
stronger influence on anti-plagiarism software adoption by faculty members than coping 
appraisal. Moral obligation was also found to be a factor that influenced the adoption of 
the software while social influence did not have a significant effect. Marett et al. (2011) 
investigated the risky online behavior of internet users using PMT and fear appeals. They 
found that PMT explained both adaptive and maladaptive responses. Ng et al. (2009) 
investigated the influence of threat and coping appraisals on email related security 
behavior and found that perceived severity moderated the effects of self-efficacy on 
secure behavior. A list of recent research studies that applied PMT in information 
security contexts are presented in Table 2.2. 
Use of behavioral intentions as the ultimate dependent variable has been criticized 
as incomplete (Lee 2011), but measuring actual secure behavior is very challenging and 
in most cases impossible (Crossler et al. 2013; Warkentin et al. 2012). Due to these 
challenges, behavioral security researchers have measured actual secure behavior through 
self-reports. Even though significant limitations exist in self-reported actual behavior, it 
provides researchers the ability to test the intention-behavior relationship in secure 
behaviors and test the direct impacts of PMT variables on actual behavior. Only a very 
few research studies have collected actual secure behavior through computer logs that 
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reflected behaviors such as password changes, security patch updates, backups and 
software usage (Lee 2011; Workman et al. 2008).  









Anderson & Agarwal 
(2010) Security related behavior Intention N/A N/A 
Crossler (2010) Backing up data Behavior No Yes 
Gurung et al. (2009) Anti-spyware usage Behavior No Yes 
Herath & Rao (2009) Security policy compliance Intention N/A N/A 
Ifinedo (2012) Security policy compliance Intention N/A N/A 
Johnston & Warkentin 
(2010) Anti-spyware usage Intention N/A N/A 
LaRose et al. (2008) Security policy compliance Intention N/A N/A 
Lee & Larsen (2009) Anti-spyware adoption Behavior Yes Yes 
Lee (2011) Anti-plagarism tool adoption Behavior Yes No 
Liang & Xue (2010) Anti-spyware usage Behavior Yes Yes 
Malimage & 
Warkentin (2010) Backing up data Intention N/A N/A 
Marett et al. (2011) Risky online behavior Intention N/A N/A 
Ng et al. (2009) Opening Email attachments Behavior No Yes 
Pahnila et al. (2007) Security policy compliance Behavior Yes Yes 
Vance et al. (2012) Security policy compliance Intention N/A N/A 
Woon et al. (2005) Wireless security enabling Behavior No Yes 
Workman et al. (2008) Secure computing practices Behavior No Yes with actual 
 
It is important to note that behavioral intentions change over time (e.g., through 
repetition) and may not be the driving factor of actual behavior (Guinea and Markus 
2009). Several other variables may directly impact actual behavior and other variables 
such as habit may negatively moderate the intention-behavior relationship of PMT 
constructs. Most of the extant information security literature that investigate factors 
influencing secure behaviors, do not take into account that these behaviors may have 
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already been habituated. Measuring the factors that influence secure behaviors without 
considering the influence of habit would have serious repercussions to the findings of 
these studies. This study attempted to address that gap by investigating the role of habits 
in information security behaviors and how habits moderate the intention-behavior 
relationship in a PMT model.  
Concept of Habit 
Recent behavioral research has made significant progress in our understanding 
and prediction of the initiation of human behaviors by applying theories such as Theory 
of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) (Ajzen 1991). Both theories focus on actions guided by an intentional decision 
making process. Although TRA, TPB, and other theories that explain human decision 
making have been heavily utilized, validated, and proven their strengths in predicting 
behavior across many disciplines and in many paradigms, they are weak in one aspect. 
They lack the concept of repeated actions and habitual patterns of humans and how these 
habitual actions may influence behavior.  
The earliest investigation of habit dates back to James (1890) and Watson (1914) 
where they investigated instinct, which was equated to habit in a biological perspective, 
focusing on learned associations between stimuli and responses in the context of the 
repetitive behavior of animals. The concept of habit was adjusted to be used in the 
context of human behavior by Abelson (1981) and Schank and Abelson (1977) where 
they introduced the idea of cognitive schema and scripts. These scripts represent standard 
events or behavioral sequences, which are frequently practiced under unchanging 
circumstances (Polites and Karahanna 2012). Since human cognitive resources are 
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limited, these scripts provide useful cognitive mechanisms that can make decisions 
mostly automatically utilizing only a few environmental cues.  
Building on the previous behavioral research on habit, where habit was conceived 
as learned behavior that was triggered by the environment (Dewey 1922) and consistency 
of behavior across time (Landis et al. 1978), Triandis (1977, 1980) was one of the first to 
integrate habit into his research model. Triandis states that habit and intention are at the 
opposite end of a continuum where the more habitual an action becomes, the less 
intentional it is. He also stated the possibility that in extreme situations, an action is 
determined only by habit on one end and only by intention on the other. It is important to 
note the significance of habit in human behavior when trying to integrate it into 
behavioral research models. According to William James (1899), “all our life, so far as it 
has definite form, is but a mass of habits.” James further states that about 99 percent of 
what we do each day are habitual, which may be somewhat extreme. Recent scholarly 
research suggests that more than 40 percent of the actions people performed each day are 
habitual in nature, which did not consist of a formal decision making process (Duhigg 
2012; Neal et al. 2006). Thus, habit is an important factor to consider whenever 
behavioral research is conducted. 
Definition of Habit 
The true definition of habit has been a topic of much debate for decades among 
scholars, which has also resulted in researchers viewing habit from different theoretical 
lenses. There has been a general consensus that habit is a learned sequence related to 
routine behavior and that habit provides an individual the benefit of behavior while only 
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using a limited amount of cognitive resources. However, a debate revolves around the 
formation of habit, resulting in a debate on the overall definition of habit as well.  
Habit was initially conceptualized as equal to the frequency of past behavior and 
that when a certain behavior is carried out on a routine basis it was defined as the 
formation of habit. The notion that habit is formed when an individual performs a certain 
act on a repetitive basis in a stable environment was evaluated and the findings published 
by many scholars (Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990; Bagozzi 1981; Beck and Ajzen 1991; 
Landis et al. 1978; Quine and Rubin 1997; Tuorila and Pangborn 1988). However, latest 
developments in social psychology research view habit as a form of goal-oriented 
automaticity (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; Neal et al. 2011; 
Sheeran et al. 2005; Verplanken and Orbell 2003; Wood and Neal 2007) . These goals are 
defined as “desired, or anticipated, outcomes and end states” (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 
2000, p. 54) or anticipated, desired effect guiding the performance behavior (Sheeran et 
al. 2005). Research conducted defining habit as frequency of past behavior and 
automaticity are described in detail in the next section. While frequency and past 
behavior are critical to the formation of habit, those alone cannot constitute habit since 
past behavior is a construct that has no explanatory value (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000). For 
the purpose of this study, while recognizing that frequency of past behavior is a major 
predictor of habit, habit is defined as “learned sequences of acts that become automatic 
responses to specific situations, which may be functional in obtaining certain goals or end 
states” (Verplanken et al. 1997, p. 540). 
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Frequency of Past Behavior 
The habit construct has been commonly tested through measuring the frequency 
of past behavior. Ouellette and Wood (1998) state that when certain behaviors occur in 
domains where habits can develop, frequent past performance reflects habitual patterns 
that are likely to predict future behavior. They conducted a meta-analysis of prior studies 
and found that studies, which examined behaviors performed annually or biannually did 
not find past behavior to be a strong predictor of future behavior even though the 
relationship was significant. They also indicated that studies which examined routine 
behaviors (performed daily or weekly) in stable contexts found past behavior to be a 
strong predictor of future behavior. These studies also indicated that behavioral intention 
was significant but did not have a strong influence. Their structural model is shown in 
Figure 2.4 where Panel A represents studies on behavior performed annually or 
biannually and Panel B represents studies on behaviors performed on a daily or weekly 
basis. 
 
Figure 2.4 Ouellette & Wood Structural Model (Ouellette and Wood 1998) 
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Past behavior and frequency of past behavior are the most frequently used 
methods to measure habits with the theoretical lens that for the development of habits, it 
requires a certain amount of repetition and practice. With the repetition of a behavior, it is 
“learned”, thus reducing or removing the need for intentions to form for the actual 
behavior. For example, an email user who checks his/her email regularly each day will 
eventually create the habit of checking email while another user who checks email only 
occasionally may never create the habit of checking email and will always go through the 
decision making process in order to check email (Limayem et al. 2007). However, 
Gardner et al. (2012) suggests that once habits are formed, the habitual behavior does not 
need to be performed frequently. These formed habits are elicited only as frequently as a 
trigger is encountered. For example, an individual may have formed a habit of eating 
popcorn when visiting a cinema but the habit is elicited only when he/she visits the 
cinema.  
When a behavior is performed repetitively, an individual gains adequate practice 
and increased familiarity with the behavior, providing that individual with the ability to 
perform future behavior without a significant cognitive process. Reflecting on findings of 
Ouellette and Wood (1998),  Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) highlighted that the strength 
of habit created through repetitious past behavior is directly related to the frequency of 
the past behavior that was performed. Therefore, when a certain behavior such as 
checking email is performed on a daily basis, there is a higher likelihood to form stronger 
habits than a behavior performed on a weekly or monthly basis. Table 2.3 lists a 
summary of previous research conducted where they defined habit as past behavior or 
frequency of past behavior. 
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Table 2.3 Prior Research on Habit With Past Behavior Dimension (Limayem et al. 
2007) 
Study Area Purpose 
Ajzen (1991) Human decision 
process 
To review research on various aspects of the 
theory of planned behavior. 
Bagozzi (1981) Actual blood 
Donation behavior 
Test attitude- behavior relation in the context of 
a longitudinal field study. 
Bagozzi and 
Warshaw (1990) 
Goal pursuit To revise and extend the TPB to better explain 
goal pursuit. 
Beck and Ajzen 
(1991) 
Dishonest Action Self-reports of behavior with respect to 
cheating on a rest, shoplifting, and lying to get 
out of assignments. 
Bergeron et al. 
(1995) 
Use of executive 
information systems 
(EIS) 







To compare the Fishbein-Ajzen (1975) model 
with the Bentler-Speckart (1979) model. 
Landis et al. 
(1978) 
Social behavior  Assess the relative impact of habit and 






To test an expanded TRA to predict 
mammography participation. 
Quine and Rubin 
(1997) 
Use of hormone 
replacement 
therapy 
To examine women’s attitude towards the use 
of hormone replacement therapy and try to 
predict intention to use it using TPB. 
Trafimow (2000) Intention to use 
condoms 





To compare predictions based on TRA and 
Triandis’ model. 
 
However, the notion that past behavior or frequency of past behavior forms habit 
has been criticized by several scholars (Gardner 2012; Ouellette and Wood 1998; 
Verplanken and Orbell 2003).  They state that behavioral frequency or the number of 
times the past behavior was performed does not recognize the automatic nature of habit 
(Verplanken and Orbell 2003). While frequency and past behavior are critical to the 
formation of habit, those alone cannot constitute habit since past behavior is a construct 
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that has no explanatory value (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000).  Due to these arguments, it is 
recommended that studies using frequency of past behavior or past behavior as a “proxy 
measure of habit should be considered with caution” (Limayem et al. 2007, p. 714).  
Automaticity 
Latest developments in social psychology research views habit as a form of goal-
oriented automaticity (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; Bargh and Ferguson 2000; Gardner 
2012; Limayem et al. 2007; Neal et al. 2011; Sheeran et al. 2005; Verplanken and Orbell 
2003; Wood and Neal 2007). A clear definition that is accepted widely among many 
disciplines states that habits are “learned sequences of acts that become automatic 
responses to specific situations, which may be functional in obtaining  certain goals or 
end states” (Verplanken et al. 1997).  With the recent definition of habit as an 
explanatory force in understanding current behavior, several important points are 
clarified on how habit influences behavior. First, habitual behaviors are “learned 
sequences of acts.” Thus there is a requirement that the behavior has been repeated 
previously in a successful manner for an individual to learn the behavior and be familiar 
with it. Therefore, it is implied in the definition that habit occurs in the context of routine 
behavior. Second, habits are “automatic responses”, which distance themselves from 
normative decision making process using cognitive resources. Due to the automatic 
nature of habit, habitual behavior occurs outside of awareness, where an individual may 
not be aware of a reason that led him or her to perform a certain behavior (Polites and 
Karahanna 2012). Behavioral intentions play a minor role when habits are strong, and it 
frees the cognitive resources of an individual to do other things (Bargh 1994; Verplanken 
and Orbell 2003), thus  habits are mentally efficient (Polites and Karahanna 2012). Third, 
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habitual behaviors are performed automatically as a result of specific situations, 
environmental cues or a trigger. With repetition of behaviors, individuals, while 
familiarizing themselves with the behavior, will also learn to associate environmental 
cues or triggers with particular behavioral responses. These triggers can be in different 
forms for different individuals, but yet these triggers should occur in stable contexts 
(Verplanken et al. 1997).  When an individual performs a certain behavior in similar 
environmental cues and goals across consecutive situations, it is considered to be in a 
stable context (Limayem et al. 2007). An example of a stable situation that triggers a user 
to lock the computer may be simply leaving it unattended or going back home from work 
at the end of the day.   
Habitual behavior is also about obtaining “goals and end-states”. These goals are 
defined as “desired, or anticipated, outcomes or end states” (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000, 
p. 54) or anticipated, desired effect guiding the performance of behavior (Sheeran et al. 
2005). Obtaining the goals or end states successfully through repetition is also equally 
important. If an individual performs a behavior to obtain a certain goal and accomplishes 
success, he or she is more likely to perform the same behavior again when the need to 
obtain the same end state arises, given that a similar stable context and environmental 
cues exist. Aarts et al. (1997) who conducted research on habitual health behaviors such 
as physical exercise, posit that satisfactory experiences increase the tendency of an 






Table 2.4 Prior Research on Habit With Automaticity Dimension (Limayem et al. 
2007) 






To explore when travel choice behavior is 
habitual. 
Aarts et al. (1997) Health related 
behavior 
To describe a theoretical model of exercise 
habit formation. 
Bargh (2002) Consumer 
behavior 
To examine the role of non-conscious 
influences in real life in decisions and behavior. 




To propose a view of cognitive processing that 
involves automatic and cognitive modes. 
Mittal (1988) Seat belt usage To examine the role of habit in seat belt usage. 
Orbell et al. (2001) Ecstasy 
consumption 
To explore to what extent variables specified 
by the TPB can predict ecstasy use intentions 
and behavior. 
Ronis et al. (1989) Repeated health-
related 
behaviors 
To propose that repeated behavior is largely 
determined by habits rather than by attitudinal 
variables. 










on travel mode 
choices 
To synthesize past work in support of the 
argument that habit is a concept worth 
studying. 




To test a model of travel mode choice 
predicting behavior from the attitudes toward 
choosing a car, choosing an alternative mode 
and car choice habit. 




To examine in 3 studies the role of habit in 
information acquisition concerning travel mode 
choices. 




To investigate (in a field experiment) the 
prediction and change in repeated behavior in 
the domain of travel mode choices. 
 
As it was discussed previously, it is important to note that several components 
need to exist for habitual patterns to form. These components which are clearly defined in 
 
50 
the automaticity definition of habit itself are very similar to the three components of the 
habit loop: trigger, routine, and reward, which will be discussed later in the chapter.  
Several studies have been conducted across many disciplines with the view of 
habit as a form of goal-directed automaticity. All these studies concur to the notion that 
habit is a learned action sequence, which was originally intentional that may be repeated 
without conscious intention when triggered by environmental cues in a stable context 
(Guinea and Markus 2009). From the automatic dimension of habit, past behavior or 
frequency of past behavior is indicative of only a portion of the habit construct, where the 
repetition helped an individual to learn a behavior to attain certain goals. Table 2.4 
illustrates a summary of previous research conducted with a view of habit as a form of 
goal-directed automaticity. It is important to note that habit studies related to IS were 
excluded from this table and will be shown in a later section. 
Habit and Behavior 
Behavioral researchers have utilized TRA and TPB extensively in their 
conceptual models to predict behavioral intentions across many disciplines. The link 
between behavioral intention and actual behavior has been evaluated and established 
extensively, such that some researchers only utilize behavioral intention as their ultimate 
dependent variable. These studies imply that a significant relationship between 
behavioral intention and behavior already exists. For example, in technology adoption 
literature, research has revealed that behavioral intention to adopt a certain technology 
explains a significant amount of variance in actual usage of the technology. In TAM-
based IS research, behavioral intention explained 40 percent of the variance of actual 
usage in Davis (1989), 27 percent in Venkatesh and Davis (2000) and 25 percent in 
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Venkatesh et al. (2000). These findings are consistent with the meta-analysis study of 87 
TRA-based studies that found behavioral intention to explain about 28 percent of the 
variance of actual behavior (Sheppard et al. 1988). Most behavioral research models 
including Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and Unified Theory of Acceptance and 
Use of Technology (UTAUT) presume that intention is formed as a result of a conscious 
decision making process. However, these models do not address how the decision making 
process and intentions change and evolve over time (Kim and Malhotra 2005) or how 
individual behaviors may consist of ‘unreasoned actions’ or actions which are not 
deliberate (Guinea and Markus 2009). Instead, these models imply that within each time 
period, new perceptions and intentions are formed without any influence of previous 
decisions or intentions.  
 The notion that behavioral intentions may not solely explain the variance in 
behavior has been reflected in a meta-analysis of behavioral studies where 28 percent of 
variance in behavior was explained by intention. The authors suggested that automatic 
activation of behavior may account for a portion of the remainder of unexplained 
variance (Sheeran 2002). Ajzen (2002) posited that past behavior has a “residual impact” 
on later behavior beyond what is explained by intention and perceived behavioral control. 
It was also suggested that most behavioral patterns are “semiautomatic response patterns” 
where these patterns involve a mixture of controlled and automatic behaviors. With habit 
being defined as “learned sequences of acts that become automatic responses to specific 
situations, which may be functional in obtaining certain goals or end states,” it has been 
utilized in behavioral models in three different perspectives: as an indirect effect, as a 
direct effect, and as a moderator. 
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Scholars who postulate that actual behavior is only driven primarily by intention 
but yet consider the habit construct to be a significant factor in their research models, 
have tested habit as a predictor of intention. This perspective results in behavioral 
intentions mediating the influence of habit on actual behavior, which according to critics, 
“suffers from both theoretical and empirical shortcomings” (Limayem et al. 2007, p. 
717). Its theoretical shortcomings stem from the view that habit is a form of goal-directed 
automaticity. The true nature of automaticity is that behavior is conducted automatically, 
thus not following the normative decision making process. Therefore, habit does not 
influence behavioral intention directly, which is in stark contrast to several studies that 
have modeled habit to directly influence behavioral intention. Although there are several 
studies that empirically support a direct relationship between habit and behavioral 
intention, none of the studies provide solid support and have other shortcomings such as 
omitting to include actual behavior in the model (Limayem et al. 2007). 
Some scholars suggest that habit and intention are independent constructs that 
predict actual behavior. Several studies have found empirical support when habit was 
modeled as a direct predictor of actual behavior. Studies modeling habit as a direct 
predictor on actual behavior in blood donation (Charng et al. 1988), seat belt usage 
(Mittal 1988), and food consumption (Tuorila and Pangborn 1988) found empirical 
support on their assumptions. The “automaticity” view provides some support to this 
view because habitual behaviors reduce the influence of cognitive processes on actual 
behavior. With the absent or weakened behavioral intentions, habit may become the 
driving force of actual behavior. Limayem et al. (2007) found empirical evidence of habit 
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having a stronger direct influence on actual behavior than behavioral intentions. Based on 
the prior evidence, this study tests the direct influence of habit on actual secure behaviors.  
 Limayem et al. (2007) suggests that “the relationship between intention and habit 
is more complex” than a simple direct effect on actual behavior. Even though behavioral 
theories such as TRA and TPB suggest that behavioral intention is the main predictor of 
actual behavior, advocates of habit as early as 1890 suggested that habit reduces or 
eliminates conscious decision making when a behavior is performed (James 1890). 
Initially Triandis (1980) and later Verplanken et al. (1998) suggested that habit has an 
interaction effect between behavioral intention and behavior, where intentions are 
assumed to predict behavior when habits are weak. When habits are strong, the 
relationship between behavioral intention and behavior is assumed to weaken and in 
some instances become nonexistent. Strong empirical support exist in modeling habit has 
a moderator of the relationship between behavioral intention and actual behavior (Landis 
et al. 1978; Montano and Taplin 1991; Ronis et al. 1989; Verplanken et al. 1998). 
Moreover, some of these studies found that while habit is a stronger predictor of actual 
behavior than intentions, whenever habit was weak or not present, behavioral intentions 
became an important predictor of behavior, which is consistent with the idea of habit as a 
moderator.  
While modeling habit as a moderator in a behavioral model, it is important to note 
that habit acts as a suppressor variable between behavioral intention and actual behavior. 
A suppressor variable “cancels out, reduces, or conceals a true relationship between two 
variables” (Limayem et al. 2007, p. 720). Habit as a moderator does not disprove the 
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existence of the relationship between behavioral intention and behavior, but only suggests 
that the relationship is weakened depending on the strength of habit. 
Formation of Habit 
It is important to understand how habits are formed in different contexts before 
integrating into a research model. Examining the commonly accepted definition of habit, 
by Verplanken et al. (1997), several factors emerge as requirements for habit formation. 
The factors that can be easily distinguished from the definition itself are: learned 
sequences, specific situations, and goals or end states. There are also some factors 
implied in the definition, such as a stable context and satisfactory experience upon 
performing a behavior.  
Before any habitual behavior is formed in any context, perceptions are formed 
that lead to behavioral intention, which is consistent with the behavioral normative 
decision making models. A graphical representation of how habits form was presented by 
Aarts et al. (1997)  in their model of “physical exercise and habit formation”. For 
example at a given point of time (t=0), when an individual wishes to reach a certain goal 
or end-state, perceptions of desirability and other factors associated with the behavior are 
considered. According to Aarts et al. (1997), individuals who perform a certain behavior 
for the first time, or have little or no experience with the behavior “may seek additional 
information externally for further subjective validation of one’s perceptions. This 
external information may be collected through the forms of books, magazines websites or 
through consulting friends and colleagues who have experience in similar behavior. Once 
the behavioral goal is set and solidified, the intentions that were formed are implemented, 
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which results in actual behavior. This common decision making process by Aarts et al. 
(1997) is shown in the upper part of Figure 2.5. 
Once the behavior is performed, a user will evaluate if the goal or end-state was 
achieved using the performed behavior and determine if the experience was satisfactory. 
A “satisfactory experience” with the behavior is a key component of repeating the 
behavior in question, thus a key factor for habit formation (Limayem et al. 2007). If the 
behavior was not satisfactory, perceptions are adjusted, and any new attempt to perform 
the behavior will initiate with the updated perceptions, which in-turn will create new 
behavioral intentions. An individual is more likely to perform the same behavior 
repeatedly when a satisfactory performance of the behavior was experienced previously. 
The successful outcome will also increase positive perceptions and attitudes towards the 
behavior, and an individual will learn that the goal or end-state can be accomplished.  
This “learned” behavior will reinforce the individual to choose the “same course 
of action when facing the same situation next time,” increasing the chances of repeated 
behavior given that the desired goals are similar and behavior is performed in a stable 
context (Aarts et al. 1997). It is also important to note that individuals recognize that the 
“same or similar” behavior can be executed repeatedly in a stable context. As depicted in 
the habit formation model, once the same behavior is repeated over-time, memory of past 
behaviors will enable the creation of cognitive shortcuts that reduce the use of 
perceptions and attitudes to create behavioral intention to perform a behavior. 
Habits are formed when certain behaviors are carried out consciously and 
intentionally and repeated frequently over time in a stable context with a “satisfactory 
experience” (Limayem et al. 2007; Polites and Karahanna 2012). According to Aarts et 
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al. (1997), habit is suggested to have been formed to some degree with just “a single 
experience” that was satisfactory and additional positive experiences with the behavior 








When habit is in full force, all which is needed for an automatic behavior to occur 
is the initiation of a goal or end-state to act in memory and a situational cue that triggers 
the behavior. Thus the frequency of the behavior that is performed will influence the 
strength of habit, where repetition of a behavior routinely (e.g., daily basis) will form 
stronger habits than behaviors that are practiced less often (e.g., monthly basis). 
Once strong habits are formed, behaviors will no longer be guided by reasoned 
considerations and behavioral intentions will have very little influence on the actual 
behavior that is performed. This habit formation process is represented in bold arrows in 
the bottom left of Figure 2.5. 
Habit Loop 
Recently, a similar but innovative concept on habit formation called “habit loop” 
was introduced by Duhigg (2012). According to Duhigg, habits account for more than 40 
percent of an individual’s daily routine, and every habit initiates with a psychological 
pattern called a "habit loop," which is a three-part process. In the first part, there's a cue, 
or a trigger, that tells your brain to go into automatic mode and let a behavior unfold. 
This is similar to the environmental cues or specific situations that are defined by 
Verplanken et al. (1997). Next is the routine or the behavior itself, such as brushing your 
teeth, locking your computer or locking your door. The third step is the reward, which is 
something your brain enjoys and helps it reinforce the “habit loop” in the future.  
Habit-making behaviors are traced to a part of the brain called ‘basal ganglia’ by 
neuroscientists, while decisions are made in a different part of the brain called prefrontal 
cortex. But as the decision making and behavior becomes automatic or habitual, the 
decision making part of the brain is free or in sleep-mode, which enables the brain to use 
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its resources on something else. The influence of basal ganglia on creating habits was 
tested by Graybiel (2008) of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), when it was 
noticed that mice with damaged basal ganglia developed problems with tasks such as 
learning how to run through mazes or remembering how to open food containers. An 
experiment was conducted to investigate the brain activity in the basal ganglia of rats 
using a maze where the rats were required to find a piece of chocolate (reward) at the end 
of the maze. When the rats heard a click (trigger) and saw a partition disappear, they 
wandered through the maze and often made several wrong turns before finding the piece 
of chocolate. The equipment used in the experiment detected high brain activity during 
the time the rats were attempting to find the chocolate.  
The scientists repeated the experiment several times and discovered that the brain 
activity of each rat changed as they moved through the same route many times. After 
several repetitions of the experiment, rats learned how to navigate the maze and found the 
chocolate quickly without making any wrong turns. Scientists also uncovered that as each 
rat learned the navigation of the maze, its brain activity decreased as the route became 
more automatic, and each rat started thinking less and less. Scientists attributed the 
“learned sequences” of rats’ behavior to the basal ganglia, where the habits were stored 
and activated even when the brain activity ceased. The graphs depicting the brain activity 
during the initial behavior and routine behavior is portrayed on Figure 2.6. During the 
initial stage, the rat’s brain functions are in full force when the maze is encountered and 
the trigger is supplied. After a week, when the behavior is routine and the rats are familiar 
with the path that leads to the piece of chocolate, not only did they make correct turns 
majority of the time, but also reached the chocolate in a very quick time. This illustrates 
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that when the routine behavior is performed, the brain activity of rats slow down 
significantly. Graybiel (2008) suggests that a similar process happens in human brains. In 
the initial stages of a human behavior, it is not automatic but it is goal directed similar to 
an animal attempting to find the food reward. But with repetition and success of 
obtaining the reward in each attempt, the behavior becomes automatic. These notions 
were confirmed in lab tests that investigated human brain activity of habitual smokers 
using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (Janes et al. 2009).   
When behaviors are habituated, this process where the brain converts a sequence 
of actions into an automatic routine is known as “chunking.” In this process, our neural 
circuits engage in some type of chunking behavior frequently. From simple automated 
behavior, such as putting toothpaste on the toothbrush before inserting in to the mouth, to 
rather complex behavior, such as getting dressed or making kids lunch, our brains are 
constantly involved in the chunking processes (Duhigg 2012). Chunking in our brains 
happen in the three steps where the habit loop is formed. An environmental cue or trigger 
informs the brain to go into automatic mode and select which habit to use, based on the 
desired goal or end state. Then the routine is performed, which is the repetitive behavior 
that has been “learned”. Finally, a reward helps the brain to figure out if this loop is 






Figure 2.6 Rat’s Brain Activity With Habits (Duhigg 2012) 
 
A habit loop can also be used to create new habits or break current habits. An 
appropriate example for a situation where a habit needs to be broken is when one wants 
to stop smoking. By identifying the cues and rewards that are associated with cigarettes 
and then choosing new routines that provide similar rewards, the habit of smoking can be 
broken while replacing it with a newly created habit, such as a piece of Nicorette or a 
quick series of push-ups (Duhigg 2012). Organizations such as Microsoft and Google are 
spending millions to understand the neurology and psychology of habits, their strengths 
Initial Behavior Routine Behavior 
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and weaknesses, and how habits can be created and broken when necessary. For this 
study, the focus will be only on the routine or habitual behavior, while the rewards and 
cue will not be investigated. How the habit loop can be integrated in to individual threat 
perceptions and threat responses in information security research will be discussed later 
in this chapter. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the habit loop consisting of a cue, a routine, and a 
reward. Once this loop is repeated, habitual behavior emerges. 
 
Figure 2.7 Habit Loop (Duhigg 2012) 
 
Habit in IS Research 
Although there is an abundance of behavioral research literature in the field of 
information systems, habit has gained little attention. As with other behavioral research, 
most behavioral IS research models explore behavioral intentions or behavior at a given 
point in time. Thus, these studies usually do not consider the importance of habit in their 
models. Since most behaviors are routine or habitual in nature, even when behavioral 
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research studies are conducted as cross-sectional, individuals may have already formed 
habitual patterns for the behavior that is tested. There has been an abundance of 
technology adoption literature following TAM and UTAUT and various research studies 
that have been conducted extending these models. Attention has also been focused on 
post-adoption behavior, or so called IS Continuance or Discontinuance, because after the 
initial adoption stage, an end user will have to make the ultimate decision whether to 
continue using a certain technology or information system or to discontinue the usage. 
Individual behavior in the context of IS usage is usually repetitive or performed on a 
routine basis. With satisfied outcomes or experiences, individuals are likely to continue to 
use an IS or perform IS related behavior repetitively, which will result in the formation of 
habitual behavior. Karahanna et al. (1999) found that different factors affect the users to 
initially adopt a technology (adoption intention) and to continue or discontinue using 
such technology (post-adoption). Several other studies (Bhattacherjee 2001; Jasperson et 
al. 2005; Saga and Zmud 1994) have confirmed these findings and elaborated the 
importance that the success of a technology or information system depends on how many 
users have moved beyond the initial adoption stage and used the technology regularly. 
Behavioral intention may play a significant part in the initial IS adoption stage, but with 
repeated behavior, individuals are likely to use IS automatically because learning and 
stable contexts exist.  
Venkatesh et al. (2000), in a longitudinal five month study of technology 
adoption, found that although usage of IS was heavily influenced by behavioral intentions 
in the initial state (t=1), as time progressed (t=2 and t=3), “behavior became more 
habituated” resulting in a significant decrease of the influence on IS usage from 
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intentions. This reflects the automaticity view of habit where habit is conceptualized to 
have a direct effect on actual behavior while having a suppressing effect on the 
relationship between behavioral intention and behavior. Although it was not included in 
the original Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model 
(Venkatesh et al. 2003), the notion of habit is reflected in the UTUAT2 model 
(Venkatesh et al. 2012).  
Venkatesh et al. (2012) posit that in terms of continued usage, individuals will 
form “differing levels of habit” depending on the frequency of usage and familiarity 
gained with a technology or continuance behavior. In UTUAT2, habit is operationalized 
as a self-reported perception consistent with prior research such as Limayem et al. (2007) 
and Polites and Karahanna (2012a). They developed a 3-item scale to measure habit and 
discovered that habit, along with several other variables, explained more variance in 
behavioral intentions and actual behavior compared to the original UTAUT model. They 
also found that certain demographic characteristics such as age moderated the habit-




Figure 2.8 UTAUT 2 Model (Venkatesh et al. 2012) 
 
Kim and Malhotra (2005) conducted a longitudinal study on how individual 
users’ evaluations and behaviors evolve as they gain experience with the IS. Their 
findings suggest that the influence of intentions on actual behavior decreased with time, 
which is consistent with the findings of Venkatesh et al. (2000). Although research 
studies conducted across many disciplines are in disagreement on how habit is defined, it 
is of interest to note that a majority of the recent IS literature utilizing habit are in unison 
with the view of habit as goal-directed automatic behavior. Cheung and Limayem (2005) 
and Limayem and Hirt (2003) investigated habitual behavior in the student use of 
WebBoard and BlackBoard systems. They collected their data utilizing a two-stage 
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questionnaire-based survey and found that the inclusion of habit increased the variance 
explained by the actual behavior construct. However, they modeled habit as a direct 
effect on behavior along with behavioral intention. 
Kim and Malhotra (2005) defined habit as “a repeated behavioral pattern that 
automatically occurs outside awareness.” They observed that, Web Portals, when used 
frequently in a stable environment, habitual behaviors emerged that overshadowed the 
effect of intention on future use. Similar to previous studies, data were collected in two 
stages, and actual usage was measured employing a self-reported scale. 
Gefen (2003) used a different approach compared to other IS literature that 
utilized habit. He defined habit as “previous usage preference of an IT” and suggested 
that repeated previous behavior often dictates current behavior independently of any 
rational assessments. The results suggest that habit was a strong predictor of continued 
purchases from a specific website through data collected from experienced shoppers. 
However, habit was modeled to influence behavioral intention directly, hence an implied 
indirect effect of actual behavior, which is theoretically challenged given the automaticity 
nature of habit.  
Given the applicability of habit in behaviors related to information systems usage, 
there have been only a few studies that actually tested the role that habit plays in IS 
usage. Concerned by the lack of research studies applying the concept of habit, Benbasat 
and Barki (2007) called for more research investigating the role of habit in IS. Recently 
there has been an increasing trend in the number of articles published utilizing habit on IS 
research literature in the IS Continuance and Discontinuance area (Limayem and Cheung 
2011; Limayem et al. 2007; Wu and Kuo 2008; Ye and Potter 2011). 
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 Limayem et al. (2007, p. 705) defined habit in the context of IS usage as “the 
extent to which people tend to perform behaviors (use IS) automatically because of 
learning.” While hypothesizing that continued IS usage is not only a consequence of 
intention, but also habit, they tested a model where habit moderated the relationship 
between behavioral intention and behavior. This moderating relationship of habit 
captures the true nature of the habit definition, which is automaticity, where automatic 
responses reduce the need for cognitive processing, thus reducing the influence of 
intentions of behavior when habits are strong. Investigating habitual usage of the World 
Wide Web (WWW), habit was found to significantly suppress the relationship between 
behavioral intention and behavior, confirming their hypotheses. Limayem and Cheung 
(2011) investigated the role of habit in internet-based learning technology usage and 
found that habit negatively moderated the intention-behavior relationship. Some of the 
recent research in IS utilizing habit as a construct are listed in Table 2.5 along with their 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Some of the extant literature on applying the concept of habit has modeled 
behavioral intention as the ultimate dependent variable (Gefen 2003; Polites and 
Karahanna 2012; Vance et al. 2012; Wu and Kuo 2008). This is rather contradictory to 
the definition of habit where habit is formed beyond behavioral intentions. Moreover, by 
testing a research model that does not measure behavior, researchers will not be able to 
capture the true strength of habit, since the link between behavioral intention and actual 
behavior is only implied and not tested. Most of the research models incorporating the 
automatic nature of habit, have modeled actual behavior as the ultimate dependent 
variable. Due to challenges such as Institutional Review Board (IRB) issues, denied 
access to server logs, and inaccessibility of information, researchers have used self-
reported scales to measure actual behavior (Crossler et al. 2013; Warkentin et al. 2012). 
Although a subjective behavioral measure such as self-reported actual behavior is 
sufficient, Straub et al. (1995) suggests that it should be supplemented with other 
objective measures whenever possible. Several methodologies utilized by researchers to 
operationalize habits and their strengths and weaknesses will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Habit in IS Security Research 
Research studies in IS security have utilized several behavioral theories such as  
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Gurung et al. 2009; 
Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee 2011; Liang and Xue 2010; Marett et 
al. 2011; Vance et al. 2012), General Deterrence Theory (GDT) (D’Arcy and Devaraj 
2012; D’Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and Rao 2009; Hovav and D’Arcy 2012; Siponen and 
Vance 2010), Self-efficacy (SE) (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Zhang et al. 
2006), Extended Parallel Processing Model (EPPM) (Johnston and Warkentin 2010), 
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Fear Appeals Model (FAM) (Johnston and Warkentin 2010) and Rational Choice Theory 
(RCT) (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Most of these studies utilized behavioral intention as the 
ultimate dependent variable. Since actual behavior is not measured, these studies can only 
assume that a positive relationship exists between behavioral intention and actual 
behavior. Furthermore, these studies only measure individual perceptions in a cross-
sectional manner, thus they do not take into consideration that the relationship between 
intention and behavior change over time and that the behaviors become habitual.  
Among many behavioral research studies utilizing theories such as PMT and 
Deterrence Theory in the context of information security, it is surprising that the concept 
of habit was investigated in only few of the behavioral research studies. There is 
empirical evidence in social psychology literature which suggests that many behaviors 
we perform are habitual (e.g., driving a car, wearing seatbelts, drinking alcohol, smoking, 
use of condoms, food consumption, blood donation). Recent behavioral research in IS, 
such as the ones listed previously, also suggest that individuals form habitual patterns of 
behavior in using information systems (Blackboard usage, shopping online, surfing the 
web, use of web browser, searching the web). With more than 40% of daily behavior of 
individuals being habitual (Duhigg 2012; Neal et al. 2006), it is imperative to assume that 
habits are very much applicable to many information security behaviors at organizations 
since they are performed routinely by employees in the presence of certain environmental 
cues in order to attain desired outcomes or end states. For example, in the behavior of 
backing up data, the trigger or the environmental cue may be in the form of the time (e.g. 
end of work day or end of week), and the routine or behavior is backing up data. The 
desired outcome or end state is that the data is backed up, and the reward is the feeling or 
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assurance that the data is secure in case of hard drive failure. Similarly, volitional but 
non-malicious behavior, which still violates organizational security policies (Willison and 
Warkentin 2013), can become habitual when performed on a routine basis. 
Although habits have been tested in the context of information security only on a 
few occasions, several information security research studies have clearly identified habit 
as a major factor that drives secure behaviors. The behavior of password creation and 
usage was suggested as habitual by several research studies where they identified habitual 
patterns in password creation such as choosing the same password across multiple 
applications or websites, choosing an easy to guess password and the automaticity of 
entering passwords (Adams et al. 1997; Bellman et al. 1999; Farn et al. 2004; Florencio 
and Herley 2007; Herath and Rao 2009; Morris and Thompson 1979; Yang and Shieh 
1999) . One study identified that programmers may form habits related to writing 
programming code according to IT security rules (Farn et al. 2004), while another study 
identified the habituation of validating all input by a programmer (Rietta 2006). The role 
of habit in network usage and the detection of malware such as worms were identified by 
Wang et al. (2005).  
Backing up data, which has been a behavior of study in information security 
research (Crossler and Belanger 2012; Crossler 2010), was identified by several scholars 
as a behavior where habits can be formed (Chunli and Donghui 2012; Dunnavant and 
Childress 2010; S.B.Thorat et al. 2010; Spennemann and Atkinson 2002). Logging off or 
locking the computer terminal when leaving it unattended is one of the secure behaviors 
recommended by organizations (Siponen and Vance 2010). This behavior when 
performed repetitively and successfully in a stable context is suggested to form habits by 
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some scholars (Morgan et al. 2007; Siponen et al. 2010). Clicking on unknown web links 
on emails and social media sites have been identified as a behavior that may compromise 
information security by security experts. However, some individuals evaluate the safety 
of the website before visiting it or clicking on a link. Chen and Halsey (2009) and 
Frøkjær and Hornbæk (2002) suggest that clicking on unknown web links and the 
evaluation of the safety of visiting websites are behaviors that can be habitual. Behaviors 
related to emailing such as reviewing the addresses of recipients before sending email 
(Etchells 2008; Vandermeer 2006) and exercising care when opening email attachments 
(Ng et al. 2009). Herath and Rao (2009) suggest that while actual behavior is 
significantly influenced by behavioral intentions, “may factors such as habits” should be 
considered for future studies. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) indicated that future research 
should identify the role of habit in secure behaviors and possibly as a moderator to their 
research model. These research studies provide ample support to the argument that 
information security behaviors can be habitual. 
Although many research studies have identified habit as a key factor that 
influences secure behavior, only a few studies have tested the role habit plays in 
information security. Pahnila et al. (2007) was one of the first studies to investigate habit 
in the context of information security. They hypothesized that habit directly influenced 
behavioral intention to comply with security policies along with other independent 
variables such as sanctions, threat and coping appraisal, facilitating conditions and 
rewards. The data were collected from a single company in Finland using an online 
survey and habit was measured using a pre-validated self-report scale by Limayem and 
Hirt (2003). Their data analysis indicated that habit positively influenced behavioral 
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intention to comply with security policies. They suggested that organizations should get 
their employees “into the habit of complying with security policies.” 
Using a qualitative approach, Siponen et al. (2010) suggested that habit 
influenced security related behaviors such as secure use of the internet, writing down 
passwords and locking one’s PC. They employed a grounded theory approach to identify 
key concepts and develop linkages between them. Interviews were conducted with 
employees of a global company located in Switzerland, China and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). They identified secure use of the internet, writing passwords down, password 
selection and locking the workstation as behaviors for their study. They found habitual 
enactment to be a factor of locking one’s PC, writing down passwords and secure use of 
the internet but password selection was not associated with habit. Employees who were 
interviewed responded that following security procedures such as locking the PC is 
inconvenient and time-consuming.   
Vance et al. (2012) hypothesized that PMT variables, representing threat appraisal 
and coping appraisal mediated the relationship between habit and behavioral intention to 
comply with IS security policies. They utilized a hypothetical scenario method which 
presented the respondents with a scenario that reflected a certain non-compliant behavior. 
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked to answer survey questions. After 
convening an expert panel, they selected five non-compliant behaviors to be investigated 
in their study. These behaviors were: sharing passwords, failing to lock or log off a 
workstation, allowing reading confidential material at printers, allowing children at home 
to use and install software on a work laptop, and copying highly sensitive information to 
a USB stick. The results of their data analysis indicated that habit directly influenced the 
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threat and coping appraisal variables of PMT. They also found that all the PMT variables 
except the threat vulnerability significantly influenced behavioral intention to comply 
with security policies. The research model of Vance et al. (2012) is illustrated in Figure 
2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 Vance et al. (2012) Research Model 
 
This study significantly differs from previous information security studies that 
tested the role of habit, in many aspects such as the use of theories, hypothesized 
relationships, method used and expected findings and contributions. These differences are 
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discussed in detail on this section, while details on how this present study overcomes the 
shortcomings of the previous studies are explained.  
Similar to the present study, both Pahnila et al. (2007) and  Vance et al. (2012) 
utilize Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and habit theory in an information security 
context. Siponen et al. (2010) utilized a grounded theory approach to construct their 
research model. Compared to the present study, previous studies differ significantly on 
how they utilized habit in their research models. Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. 
(2012) agree with the notion that frequency of past behavior alone does not constitute 
habit and recognizes that the habit construct is based on the key element of automaticity. 
They also agree that when habits are formed, individuals may perform certain behaviors 
without making conscious decisions and that these habitual behaviors may be triggered 
by environmental cues. However, Pahnila et al. (2007) hypothesizes that habits will 
directly influence behavioral intentions to comply with security policies and Vance et al. 
(2012) hypothesizes that awareness of threats will trigger the cognitive appraisal process 
of the PMT, which in turn leads to intention to behave. This contradicts their earlier 
notion that habitual behaviors are performed with little or no involvement of conscious 
decision-making. This present study follows the definition of habit by Verplanken et al. 
(1997), where habit is defined as a form of goal-oriented automaticity. The automatic 
nature of habit implies that conscious decision-making is reduced or non-existent when 
habitual behavior is performed. Therefore, the view that when habits are strong the 
influence of the cognitive process towards performing an actual secure behavior is 
reduced or non-existent is used for this study, which is consistent with prior psychology 
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research (Verplanken 2006). Siponen et al. (2010) found that habits influenced certain 
secure behaviors directly, which is consistent with a hypothesis of this study.   
During the initiation of a new secure behavior, the threat and coping appraisal 
processes of PMT are activated, leading to creating behavioral intentions that will 
eventually lead to actual performance of the secure behavior. When this behavior is 
performed repetitively and successfully in a stable context, it will gradually become 
automatic or habitual. These habitual secure behaviors may be triggered by 
environmental cues or events. It is important to note that when a certain secure behavior 
is habitual, it may be performed simply due to habit, without going through the cognitive 
mediating process defined in PMT. Therefore, threat and coping appraisal processes or 
other perceptions such as sanctions, facilitating conditions and normative beliefs may 
have little or no impact on the actual performance of a behavior when behaviors have 
become habitual. In contrast to the previous studies, this present study clearly 
distinguishes the automatic nature of habit where habits reduce or negate any influence of 
the cognitive mediating process. 
The present study modeled habit to negatively moderate the intention-behavior 
relationship and directly influence actual behavior. This is in contrast to Pahnila et al. 
(2007) who hypothesized habit to directly influence behavioral intentions and Vance et 
al. (2012) who hypothesized that PMT variables mediated the relationship between habit 
and behavioral intentions. 
Protection Motivation Theory suggests that when an individual faces a threat, he 
or she assesses the severity and vulnerability of the threat in the threat appraisal process. 
In the coping appraisal process, individuals also assess their own capability and the 
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capability of the recommended response in deterring the threat while considering the 
costs involved in practicing the recommended behavior. Both threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal processes will lead to the formation of behavioral intentions to perform secure 
behavior (Rogers 1983). Intentions will then lead to actual behavior. 
However, when intentions are formed based on the threat and coping appraisals, 
influence of habit would be at the weakest level. The influence of habit would become 
stronger as an individual performs the secure behavior repeatedly and eventually, the 
secure behavior will become an automatic response to an environmental trigger. If the 
threat perceptions are reduced or the behavior becomes unsatisfactory, new behavioral 
intentions are formed. This means that habit is weakened, and the cognitive processes 
therefore, become the driving force of actual behavior until the habit loop forms. Habits 
are automatic in nature and involve little or no cognitive power (Verplanken et al. 1998). 
Modeling habit in a research model as an indirect effect on actual behavior or a direct 
effect on behavioral intention may create theoretical issues and does not capture the true 
nature of habit (Limayem et al. 2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that the conceptual 
models of Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012) are theoretically weak, at least 
from the automaticity point of view. 
In terms of the methodology utilized, Pahnila et al. (2007) used an online survey 
to collect their data from a single company. They utilized a self-report scale developed by 
Limayem and Hirt (2003) to measure habit. They also modeled actual compliance as the 
ultimate dependent variable in their research model, which allowed them to test the 
relationship between intentions and behavior. Vance et al. (2012) collected data utilizing 
a hypothetical scenario, which is a common method of assessing unethical behavior 
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(Nagin and Pogarsky 2001). They used five scenarios of different policy violations in 
their study and utilized the self-report habit scale (Verplanken and Orbell 2003) to 
operationalize habit. Although they found that behavioral intentions to comply with 
security policies differed significantly depending on the scenarios received by the 
respondents, they analyzed data from the five different scenarios together, as one 
behavior. This does not allow the identification of how each behavior differs in habit 
strength and the differences that exist on how habit influences each behavior in the 
context of information security. Vance et al. (2012) also modeled the ultimate dependent 
variable as behavioral intention to comply with security policies but respondents were 
presented with a scenario relevant to one of the five security policy violations. This may 
have introduced serious flaws in their instrument design since an employee who may 
violate some sections of the security policy yet comply with other sections does not 
comply with security policies overall. For example, an employee may lock his or her 
computer every time it is left unattended but may use unencrypted portable media to copy 
company data. In this situation, if an employee answers that he or she intends to comply 
with the security policies, the responses will be erroneous. This especially applies to the 
way they measured habit. They measured the habit of security policy compliance in 
general which implied that the employees complied with all the security policies. 
Similarly, Pahnila et al. (2007) also tested the behavioral intentions and actual 
compliance of security policies in general, which may have introduced similar errors in 
their data as mentioned previously.  
Vance et al. (2012) utilized behavioral intention as the ultimate dependent 
variable with their study, which is similar to other PMT related studies. However, as 
 
81 
discussed previously, recent information security research studies have measured self-
reported actual behavior since behavioral intentions may not always be the perfect proxy 
for actual behavior (Lee 2011). Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012) collected 
their data only from one organization. Collecting data from a single company provides 
advantages to researchers such as all respondents have the same security policy, same 
organizational culture, thus reducing the need to control for those factors. However, 
collecting data from multiple organizations across different industries makes the findings 
more generalizable (Compeau et al. 2012).  
Pahnila et al. (2007) found that habit significantly influenced behavioral 
intentions to comply with security policies and the intentions significantly influenced 
actual policy compliance. They suggest that employers should get their employees into 
the habit of complying with IS security policies. Vance et al. (2012) found that habit 
significantly influenced threat and coping appraisals and all the variables except 
perceived threat vulnerability had a significant impact on behavioral intentions. They 
discussed the theoretical and practical implications of their findings related to the 
relationships between the PMT constructs and behavioral intention to comply with 
policies. However, they failed to discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the 
relationships they found on habit with relation to the PMT variables. From the discussion 
above, it is clear that the studies by Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012) do not 
provide a theoretically sound argument on how habit influences secure behaviors. Our 
study provides a fresh perspective into investigating the role of habit in information 
security behaviors utilizing PMT while correcting any potential drawbacks in the Pahnila 
et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012) studies that may have biased their findings. 
 
82 
In terms of organizational security, firms would require their employees to form 
positive or secure habits while breaking their negative or mal-adaptive habits. 
Organizations would also prefer their employees to perform secure behaviors 100 percent 
of the time. This can be achieved by encouraging them to habitually or automatically 
perform those behaviors or perform them intentionally. This is important because it takes 
only one incident for an information security breach to occur (Motorola 2010). It is 
important to note that habits may not be applicable to every secure behavior. Certain 
secure behavior, such as backing up data or changing passwords, may require some 
cognitive processing in order to perform the behavior, thus reducing the chances of those 
behaviors becoming habitual. Behaviors such as backing up data and usage of anti-virus 
software may also be automated by the organizations where individuals do not need to 
perform any behavior related to them (PWC 2013). However, secure behaviors such as 
logging off or locking the computer terminal when leaving it unattended, if performed on 
a routine basis, may become automatic in nature, thus habitual. It is important to 
understand which secure behaviors are habitual and which are not. There are no extant 
studies that have investigated the automatic nature of secure behaviors. Therefore, a 
rigorous and exhaustive approach needs to be taken to identify secure behaviors which 
are habitual and worth measuring before a full-scale study is deployed. 
According to the variance model on TTAT, the positive feedback loop will be 
used by individuals initially to assess the threat and coping mechanisms, which will 
eventually lead to the performance of coping behavior. This study hypothesizes that once 
this loop is performed repetitively, habitual behavioral patterns may emerge. When these 
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patterns emerge, the behavior will skip the positive feedback loop and initiate the habit 
loop when it reaches the coping stage.  
Figure 2.10 illustrates how the habit loop will be created at the coping stage of the 
positive feedback loop when the same behavior is repeated under a stable context. Once 
the feedback loop continues at a given point of time, the coping behavior will become an 
automatic response to a stimuli or environmental cue. An environmental trigger will 
activate the habit loop instead of the threat perceptions that usually lead to coping 
appraisal and eventually coping behavior. The habit loop will be initiated by a trigger, 
followed by the actual coping behavior, before approaching the rewards stage. The loop 
will then continue until it is disturbed. The positive feedback loop will cease to function 




Figure 2.10 Extended TTAT Process Model 
Note: Adopted from Liang and Xue (2009) and extended with habit loop 
Once habits are formed, the threat and coping appraisal processes will have little 
impact on the actual behavior that is performed. However, the positive feedback loop will 
spring into action when the habit loop is disturbed. An example of a disruption in the 
habit loop is when an individual does not receive satisfaction or a reward following the 
performance of a habitual behavior. In that case, since the automatic behavior is not 
satisfactory or rewarding, the positive feedback loop will be reactivated, creating new 
threat perceptions and coping appraisals. This will be followed by coping behavior 
performed after intentions are created. Different individuals are likely to perceive the 
same threat differently. Some individuals may perceive the threat of unauthorized access 
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to their computer to be severe with dire consequences. Others may view that as a minor 
threat not requiring any coping behavior. Similarly, some individuals are likely to form 
habitual behaviors quickly while others may be slow or may not develop any habitual 
behavior. 
Model and Hypotheses 
Based on the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT) and Habit Theory, this study proposed a research model to 
explain the influence of threat appraisal and coping appraisal on behavioral intentions and 
the influence of behavioral intentions on performing secure behavior. Primarily, this 
model assessed the moderating influence of habit on the relationship between behavioral 
intention and actual secure behavior. Similar to extant IS security literature where PMT is 
utilized in a variance model, this study tested the influence of PMT variables in a cross 
sectional manner to assess the influence of threat appraisal and coping appraisal on 
behavioral intentions. Additionally, the relationship between behavioral intention and 
behavior is assessed along with the influence of habit on that relationship. Figure 2.11 
shows the conceptual research model that utilizes the PMT and Habit Theory. Rogers 
(1983) suggests that threat appraisal variables: perceived threat vulnerability and severity, 
will positively influence behavioral intentions along with coping appraisal variables: 




Figure 2.11 Conceptual Research Model 
 
The present study included the threat and coping appraisal variables as direct 
antecedents of behavioral intention. Similarly, the relationship between behavioral 
intention and actual behavior relationship as posited by TRA and TPB, is reflected in the 
research model. This is consistent with PMT (Rogers 1983) and several other research 
studies in information security that utilized PMT.  
In order to measure the role of habit on information security behaviors, habit is 
positioned in two different ways. First, habit is positioned to directly influence actual 
behavior. TRA and TPB suggest that behavioral intentions influence actual behavior and 
a meta-study found that 28 percent of the variance of actual behavior was explained by 
behavioral intentions (Sheppard et al. 1988). This also means that other factors may 
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influence behavior directly. Habit has been studied as a variable that directly influenced 
behavior, and in some cases it was found to be a stronger predictor of actual behavior 
than behavioral intentions (Saba et al. 2000; Towler and Shepherd 1991). It is 
conceivable that habit would influence behavior directly in the context of information 
security. Therefore, habit is positioned as a direct effect on secure behavior. 
Habit is also positioned as a moderator variable that suppresses the intention-
behavior relationship. Prior research on habits suggest that when behaviors are performed 
repetitively and in a satisfactory manner, they “may lose its reasoned character” 
(Verplanken et al. 1998, p. 113). These studies also suggest that when habits are strong, 
intentions were not a strong predictor on behavior, but when habits were weak or 
nonexistent, behavioral intentions played a major role in predicting behavior (Wood et al. 
2002). Consistent with those findings, Limayem and Hirt (2003) and Limayem et al. 
(2007) suggested that the most appropriate way to capture automaticity is to position 
habit as a suppressor variable of the intention-behavior relationship. Similarly, habit is 
also positioned as a moderator variable of the intention-behavior relationship in the 
research model of this study. Thus, when a certain information security behavior becomes 
habitual, the influence of threat and coping appraisals would have minor impacts on the 
actual behavior mediated by intentions. 
Threat Appraisal 
In the research model model, threat appraisal, which comprises of perceived 
severity and perceived vulnerability, is articulated as a direct determinant of behavioral 
intent. Perceived threat severity refers to the extent to which an individual perceives that 
negative consequences caused by the threat will be severe. Therefore, when a person 
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believes that the threat is severe, he or she is more likely to follow the recommended 
actions (Rogers 1975; Witte 1992). In this study, it was expected that individuals will 
identify threats such as unauthorized access of their computer at work, computers getting 
infected by malware or an unintended individual receiving an email with sensitive data. 
Previous literature suggests that perceived threat severity is a factor that significantly 
influences behavioral intent to perform secure behavior in order to deter threats. 
Although some studies had inconsistent findings (Ifinedo 2012), Crossler (2010), Herath 
and Rao (2009), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Lee and Larsen (2009), Lee (2011), 
Liang and Xue (2010) and Woon et al. (2005) found that perceived threat severity was a 
significant predictor of their dependent variable. Once a threat is identified, and an 
individual perceives that threat to be severe, it is expected that he or she would perform 
the recommended actions to avert the threat. Hence, it is hypothesized: 
H1: Perceptions of threat severity will positively influence end user intentions to 
perform a secure behavior. 
Perceived threat vulnerability, which is the perception of the probability of 
encountering a threat, was also included by Rogers (1975) in the PMT model.  A person 
is likely to adopt the recommended or threat aversive behavior if the individual assesses 
the probability of exposure to the adverse threat. Perceived vulnerability has been tested 
extensively in PMT research where perceptions of increased likelihood for a threat to 
occur have been found to significantly influence intentions to perform the recommended 
actions (Witte et al. 1996). In the context of this study, it was expected that perceptions of 
the likelihood of the threats such as unauthorized access to their computer at work, 
computers being infected with malware, or an unintended individual receiving an email 
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with sensitive data would influence an individual to take evasive action. Previous 
perceived threat vulnerability is also a factor that significantly influences behavioral 
intent to perform secure behavior in order to deter threats. However, the results are mixed 
in different studies, which may be attributed to the context of the studies or simply due to 
the studies being tested at only one point in time where perceptions may have been 
changed previously. Ifinedo (2012),Lee and Larsen (2009), and Liang and Xue (2010) 
found perceived threat vulnerability to be a significant factor, while some other studies 
did not (Herath and Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Woon et al. 2005). 
However, exploration of previous literature on PMT suggests that perceived threat 
vulnerability, while context specific, significantly influences the behavioral intention to 
perform secure behavior. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
H2: Perceptions of threat vulnerability will positively influence end user 
intentions to perform secure behavior. 
Coping Appraisal 
In addition to the severity of a threat and the vulnerability of a threat, an 
individual evaluates the effects or efficacy of adopting the recommended behavior in 
coping appraisal. Response efficacy refers to the extent to which a person believes that by 
adopting the recommended behavior, a threat can be prevented (Rogers 1975; Witte et al. 
1996). If individuals perceive a threat, such as unauthorized access to their computers 
when left unattended will result in negative consequences, they are likely to consider 
ways to protect their computers from unauthorized access. Locking the computer terminal 
is a known method to prevent unauthorized access to the computer terminal when it is left 
unattended (Microsoft 2012). Since locking a computer terminal is perceived as an 
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effective method to avert the threat of unauthorized access to a computer, the greater 
perceived response efficacy will result in increased likeliness of adopting the 
recommended behavior. Most of the prior studies that utilized PMT in the context of 
information security found that response efficacy had a significant impact on behavioral 
intentions to perform secure behavior (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; 
Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; 
Workman et al. 2008). PMT literature also suggests that augmented levels of response 
efficacy are associated with increased behavioral intentions. With this argument, response 
efficacy is hypothesized as follows: 
H3: Response efficacy will have a positive effect on end user intentions to perform 
secure behavior. 
In coping appraisal, self-efficacy also directly influences behavioral intent. If an 
individual believes that an action is easy to perform and is confident in his or her ability 
to adopt and perform a recommended action, they are more likely to adopt that action 
(Bandura and Adams 1977). Rogers (1983) extended the PMT model with self-efficacy, 
where it was viewed as a determinant of intent concerning a recommendation to address a 
threat. Several studies have found that self-efficacy has a significant impact on behavioral 
intent of conducting protective actions. Milne et al. (2000) suggests that self-efficacy was 
the PMT variable that had the strongest relationship with behavioral intention in a meta-
analysis of past PMT research studies. Several research studies in the context of 
information security found significant relationship between self-efficacy and behavioral 
intentions (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 
2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Lee 2011; Liang and Xue 
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2010; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). If an individual perceives that the 
behavior of locking the computer whenever leaving it unattended is not difficult to 
perform, they are more likely to adopt that behavior. Hence it can be hypothesized: 
H4: Self-efficacy will have a positive effect on end user intentions to perform 
secure behavior. 
Response cost refers to any costs, such as time, money, and inconvenience 
associated with performing a secure behavior to cope with a threat (Floyd et al. 2000). 
When an individual perceives the related costs of performing a behavior, it will lead to 
reduced behavioral intentions. Previous IS security literature suggests that response cost 
is a significant factor that influences behavioral intention negatively (Herath and Rao 
2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Woon et al. 2005). Several studies that 
utilized PMT in the context of information security did not employ response cost in their 
research models (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Johnston and Warkentin 2010). However, 
for the purposes of this study, response cost is regarded as an appropriate variable which 
needs to be tested. While habits are formed when a behavior is performed repetitively in a 
successful manner, when individuals perceive costs related to the behavior performed, 
they are less likely to form behavioral intentions that will eventually lead to habit 
formation. Therefore, response cost is hypothesized as follows: 
H5: Response Cost will have a negative effect on end user intentions to perform 
secure behavior. 
Behavioral Intention and Behavior 
Prominent research models such as TRA and TPB suggest that once behavioral 
intentions are formed by an individual, they are likely to perform a behavior based on 
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those intentions. Behavioral research theories in IS such as TAM and UTAUT have 
confirmed these suggestions by finding empirical support of the intention-behavior 
relationship. This relationship has also been confirmed by a large number of IT adoption 
studies as well as many other behavioral studies in psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; 
Venkatesh et al. 2003). Consistent with prior research, it is argued that users who have 
stronger behavioral intentions are more likely to engage in the performance of secure 
behavior. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
H6: Behavioral intention will have a positive effect on secure end user behavior. 
Direct and Moderating Effects of Habit 
Previous research utilizing PMT has modeled behavioral intention as the 
dependent variable and has tested the influence of threat and coping appraisal along with 
other possible independent variables on behavioral intention. One of the most important 
aspects that has been overlooked in PMT research is that many of the behaviors studied 
are repetitive in nature and may have already been a routine or habitual behavior at the 
time of study, given that users were in a post-adoption stage (Verplanken et al. 1997). 
Failing to capture this important element in fact may have biased the findings of previous 
PMT research. For example, studies that measured individuals’ behavioral intentions to 
perform secure behaviors, such as anti-spyware usage or backing up data in a cross-
sectional manner, may have flawed findings since the behavior may have been repeated 
many times previously in a successful manner (Crossler 2010; Johnston and Warkentin 
2010; Lee 2011; Malimage and Warkentin 2010). The influence of behavioral intentions 
are weakened when habits are strong, thus the prior studies have not accounted for the 
influence of habit. While most of the extant IS literature including IS security research 
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has used behavioral intentions as a proxy for actual behavior (D’Arcy et al. 2009),  the 
studies that measured actual behaviors have usually ignored the direct influence of habit 
on actual behavior. Mittal (1988) found that habit and behavioral intentions directly 
influenced actual behavior of wearing seatbelts. In a research related to food 
consumption, Tuorila and Pangborn (1988) found that both habit and behavioral 
intentions were predictors of actual behavior. Saba et al. (2000) and Towler and Shepherd 
(1991) had similar findings in their research studies related to food consumption.  
Limayem and Hirt (2003), in a research that explored WebBoard usage found that 
habit directly influenced actual usage behavior of WebBoard. They also found that 
habit’s influence on behavioral intention was mediated by affect. Although Limayem et 
al. (2007) focused primarily on the suppression effect of habit, in a comparison model 
they found that habit had a significant direct influence on actual behavior as well. The 
direct effect of habit has scarcely been explored in IS and has never been explored in the 
context of information security. When habits are present, it is important to note that it can 
be a major predictor of actual behavior along with behavioral intentions. With that 
argument it is hypothesized that: 
H7a: Habit will have a positive effect on secure end user behavior. 
Once an individual repeats the same behavior satisfactorily over and over again, 
the increasing automaticity of the behavior is known to suppress the need for an 
individual to engage in cognitive processing (James 1890). Therefore, when the previous 
studies measured behavioral intention to perform a certain behavior, the behavior may 
have already been habitual and the intentions may have been attenuated. Wood et al. 
(2002) found that when strong habits were present, behavioral intentions had a weak 
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influence on actual behavior and it was the opposite when habits were weak. The widely 
accepted definition of habit by Verplanken et al. (1998) implies that the automatic nature 
of habit creates a moderating effect on the intention-behavior relationship as well.  
Limayem et al. (2007) suggested that while habit has been utilized as a mediator and a 
direct effect, in order to capture the true essence of habit, it has to be positioned as a 
suppressor variable of the intention-behavior relationship. In extreme circumstances, 
habitual behavior may become very strong to the point that intention will not have any 
influence on the actual behavior. In such instances, behavioral intention becomes 
influential only when the threat-response becomes unsatisfactory or when behavioral 
conditions change such as when a fear appeal is introduced. Moreover, behavioral 
intention will regain its influence on actual behavior by reducing the effect of habit 
(Limayem et al. 2007).  
This type of suppression relationship has not been studied in the context of IS 
security and sparsely tested in IS continuance literature. Limayem et al. (2007) and 
Limayem and Cheung (2011b) found that habits significantly moderated the relationship 
between behavioral intentions and actual behavior consistent with the widely accepted 
definition on habit. Based on this argument, it is hypothesized that: 
H7b: Habit will negatively moderate (suppress) the relationship between 
behavioral intention and behavior. 
Summary 
From the literature review, it can be concluded that there is a significant gap in 
behavioral IS security research in terms of exploring the role of habit in security 
behaviors. The extant study that investigated the role of habit in IS security behaviors did 
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not take into account, the automatic nature of habit. Using PMT, which is commonly 
applied in many behavioral security researches, a conceptual research model was 
developed which served to explain the influence of threat and coping appraisals on 
behavioral intention and the moderating influence of habit on the intention-behavior 
relationship. From this model, hypotheses were developed that articulate the relationships 
among the different variables in the model. The next chapter will explain the method 





Chapter III provides a detailed discussion of the methods that was employed in 
this study for analyzing the research model. The chapter begins with a review of the 
independent and dependent variables included in the proposed conceptual model. The 
review of the variables includes their definitions, original source and scale items for each 
of the variables. Next, a description of this study’s data collection instrument design is 
followed by a description of data collection method. An overview of the study’s two-
phase investigation procedure is initiated with the description of the preliminary 
investigative procedure which includes details of tests of validity and reliability and the 
pilot test. Finally, the plan used for the primary investigation phase of this study is 
provided, including details of the data collection procedure and sampling frame. 
Variables 
The Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), the Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) and the Habit Theory literature provides the theoretical foundation for our 
study. TTAT, which is developed as a process model and tested as a variance model, 
provides the early insights into how habits can be formed when a certain secure behavior 
is performed repetitively. PMT, which has been extensively studied in an information 
security context, provides the theoretical basis to test the role of habit on information 
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security behaviors. Previous information security research studies that utilized PMT did 
not take into account that certain security behaviors, when performed repetitively in a 
stable context, may become habitual. Our study aims to fill this research gap by 
investigating the role of habit in information security behaviors by utilizing PMT. As 
discussed in Chapter II, PMT consists of two main components: threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal. The threat appraisal process consists of perceived threat severity and 
vulnerability and the coping appraisal consists of self-efficacy, response efficacy and 
response cost (Floyd et al. 2000). Perceived threat severity refers to the level of the 
potential impact of the threat. When an individual believes the consequences of exposure 
to the threat (when not adopting the intended actions) are severe, he or she is more likely 
to perform secure behaviors to prevent the threat. Perceived threat vulnerability is defined 
as the perceived probability of encountering the threat or the degree to which an 
individual believes the threat is possible. A person is increasingly likely to adopt the 
recommended behavior if the individual assesses a high probability of exposure to the 
adverse threat (Witte et al. 1996). 
In the coping appraisal, individuals evaluate the effects or efficacy of adopting the 
recommended behavior. Response efficacy refers to an individual’s belief that the act of 
adopting the recommended behavior will prevent or avert the threat (Rogers 1975; Witte 
1992). Self-efficacy is defined as the degree to which an individual believes he or she is 
able to perform the recommended secure behavior to avert the threat (Bandura and 
Adams 1977; Rogers 1983). Response cost refers to the perceived costs associated with 
performing a secure behavior (Floyd et al. 2000). Some individuals may perceive that 
performing secure behavior such as backing up data, scanning the computer for viruses or 
 
98 
spyware, changing passwords regularly and logging off the computers as an 
inconvenience, thus skipping on those secure actions. 
Apart from the PMT threat and coping appraisal variables, which are independent 
variables predicting behavioral intention in the conceptual model, habit is another 
independent variable included in the conceptual model that predicts actual secure 
behavior and suppresses the relationship between behavioral intention and actual 
behavior. There is an ongoing debate about the definition of habit where certain scholars 
define it as the frequency of past behavior and other scholars define it as the automaticity 
of behavior. For the context of this study, habit is defined as “learned sequences of acts 
that become automatic responses to specific situations, which may be functional in 
obtaining certain goals or end states” (Verplanken et al. 1997). Therefore, it can be 
assumed that when individuals develop habits, they are more likely to perform certain 
secure behaviors automatically. It can also be assumed that when habits are developed, 
behavioral intentions will not be the major driver of actual behavior because the 
automaticity aspect of habit reduces cognitive processing.  
In summary, this study measured six independent variables that are used in the 
main conceptual model. These variables are Perceived Severity (PSEV), Perceived 
Vulnerability (PVUL), Response Efficacy (REFF), Self-Efficacy (SEFF), Response Cost 
(RCST) and Habit (HABT).  All the independent variables including habit were 
measured through pre-validated self-reported scales. Habits by definition are unconscious 
or automatic. Therefore, utilizing self-reports to measure habit has been questioned by 
some critics (Klockner and Matthies 2012). However, Verplanken and Orbell (2003) state 
that if appropriately measured, the degree to which an individual perceives a certain 
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behavior they perform to be habitual can be obtained. Use of self-reports to measure 
habits will be discussed later in this chapter. Table 3.1 lists each of the independent 
variables used in the conceptual model along with their definitions within the context of 
this study.  
Table 3.1 Independent Variables and Their Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Perceived Threat Severity 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 
2010) 
The degree to which an individual believes a 
threat to be severe. 
Perceived Threat 
Vulnerability 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 
2010) 
The degree to which an individual believes a 
threat to be probable. 
Response Efficacy 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 
2010) 
The degree to which an individual believes a 
recommended response will efficiently and 
effectively avert a threat. 
Self-efficacy 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 
2010) 
The degree to which an individual believes he 
or she is able to perform a recommended 
action. 
Response Cost 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010) 
The degree to which an individual believes 
performing a behavior would result in 
unfavorable consequences.  
Habit 
(Verplanken et al. 1998) 
The degree to which an individual believes he 
or she performs a recommended response 
automatically. 
 
One of the dependent variables used in this study is behavioral intention, which is 
an individual’s intention to perform the recommended response to avert the potential 
threat. Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) posits attitude as 
one of the most significant predictors of behavioral intention. However, technology 
acceptance models and other behavioral models have refrained from including attitude as 
a main predictor of intentions due to lack of predictive power (Davis 1989; Venkatesh et 
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al. 2003, 2012). Herath and Rao (2009) ascertained that attitude was not a significant 
predictor of intentions to comply with security policies when tested with PMT variables. 
Most of the prior research across all disciplines that utilized PMT has modeled the threat 
and coping appraisal to directly predict behavioral intention but not mediate attitude. 
Similarly, this study also hypothesizes that threat and coping appraisal variables will 
directly influence behavioral intention.  
Most extant IS security literature utilizing PMT has measured behavioral intention 
rather than actual behavior as the ultimate dependent variable. This study measured both 
intention and actual behavior in order to test the relationship between the two variables. 
These variables also assisted in measuring the suppressing effect of habit on the 
intention-behavior link and the direct effect of habit on actual behavior. Although 
behavioral intentions have been measured through self-reports, measuring actual behavior 
in a similar manner has been criticized by researchers. Actual behavior is usually difficult 
to measure and in the information security context, it is almost impossible to collect 
actual data related to secure behaviors (Crossler et al. 2013; Warkentin et al. 2012). 
Recent information security studies that utilized actual behavior as a dependent variable 
have operationalized it using self-reported scales (Crossler 2010; Gurung et al. 2009; Lee 
and Larsen 2009; Lee 2011; Liang and Xue 2010; Ng et al. 2009; Pahnila et al. 2007; 
Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). This is an indication that self-reports for actual 
usage is gaining acceptance in the information security research, especially due to the 
challenges of measuring actual secure behaviors. Therefore, actual behavior for our study 
is measured utilizing self-reported scales which were previously validated. Table 3.2 
provides the two dependent variables included in this study. 
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Table 3.2 Dependent Variables 
Construct Definition 
Behavioral Intention 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 
2010) 
An individual’s intention to perform the recommended 
response. 
Actual Behavior 
(Myyry et al. 2009) 
The self-report of performing a recommended behavior. 
 
Instrument Design 
A total of eight constructs were measured in this study using an online survey 
methodology: actual behavior, behavioral intention, habit, perceived threat severity, 
perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. The 
constructs were be measured using multi-item scales adopted from validated measures 
used in IS security research and extant literature on habit. These items were adopted to 
reflect the context of this study.  Table 3.3 summarizes the scale items used for each 
variable. All these items except for habit were reflective and were measured using a five-
point likert scale. The automaticity nature of habit is represented as a second-order 
formative and first-order reflective scale (Polites and Karahanna 2012; Verplanken and 
Orbell 2003). The formative habit construct consists of three dimensions: lack of 
awareness, mental efficiency and uncontrollability. The anchors for the Likert scales 
range from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” It is also important to note that the 
dependent variable “actual behavior” was measured using a self-reported scale. The items 
that are listed in Table 3.3 have been deemed to possess content validity by a panel of 
instrument experts.  
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(Witte et al. 1996) 
 
PSEV1: If an unauthorized individual accesses my computer, it 
will be a severe problem. 
PSEV2: It would be a significant problem for me if an 
unauthorized individual accesses my computer. 
PSEV3: If an unauthorized individual accesses my computer, it 
will be serious. 
Perceived Threat 
Vulnerability (PVUL) 
(Witte et al. 1996) 
 
PVUL1: Chances of an unauthorized individual accessing my 
computer are high. 
PVUL2: It is likely that an unauthorized individual may 
accesses my computer. 
PVUL3: There is a possibility that an unauthorized individual 
may access my computer. 
Response Efficacy 
(REFF) 
(Witte et al. 1996) 
 
REFF1: Locking the computer will successfully prevent an 
unauthorized individual accessing my computer. 
REFF2: Locking the computer is an effective solution to 
prevent an unauthorized individual accessing my computer. 
REFF3: I can prevent an unauthorized individual accessing my 
computer by locking it. 
Self-efficacy (SEFF) 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2012) 
SEFF1: I am confident that I have the skills to lock the 
computer. 
SEFF2: I know I can successfully lock the computer. 
SEFF3: I believe that I have the knowledge necessary to lock 
the computer. 
Response Cost (RCST) 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2012) 
RCST1: Locking the computer is a burden. 
RCST2: Locking the computer is inconvenient. 
RCST3: Locking the computer is time consuming. 
Behavioral Intention 
(BINT) 
(Venkatesh et al. 2003) 
BINT1: I intend to log off the computer every time I leave it 
unattended. 
BINT2: I predict that I would log off the computer every time I 
leave it unattended. 
BINT3: I plan to log off the computer every time I leave it 
unattended. 
Actual Behavior (BEHV) 
(Myyry et al. 2009; 
Workman et al. 2008) 
BEHV1: I always log off the computer every time I leave it 
unattended. 
BEHV1: I make sure that the computer is locked every time I 
leave it unattended. 
BEHV1: Locking the computer is something I do, every time I 





Previous research studies have operationalized habit using different methods. 
Some studies have measured habit by measuring the self-reported frequency of past 
behavior. This operationalization has been criticized for several reasons. Although the 
history of repetition may be a key component of habit formation, repetition itself does not 
habituate behaviors. It is also unlikely that a linear relationship between habits and 
behavioral frequency exists, since that would imply that the more times an individual 
have repeated a behavior, the more habitual it would be (Chiu et al. 2012). Self-reported 
frequency measures can also be unreliable since respondents are required to recall 
performances of their past behavior. For example, respondents may not be able to 
remember how many times they locked the computer when it was left unattended. 
Response frequency (RF) measure has also been utilized by researchers to 
measure habit (Verplanken et al. 1994). Using this measure, respondents are presented 
with hypothetical choice situations and within a limited time period (e.g. 10 seconds), 
they are required to choose behavioral options (Verplanken 2006). This measure also has 
its limitations. It is not practical to employ self-administered questionnaires in a 
controlled environment where the respondents are under time pressure and it requires 
pretesting for every new habit (Chiu et al. 2012). The RF measure strains the respondents 
due to the limited time frame which biases the results (Klockner and Matthies 2012). 
Other methods to measure habit such as experiments, Electroencephalogram (EEG) and 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have been suggested (Dimoka 2012), 
but all these methods have limitations such as lack of realism. Behaviors are habituated 
when they are performed successfully and repetitively in a stable context. When habit is 
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measured with any of the above mentioned methods, the behavior will be measured in a 
controlled and unrealistic environment (Dennis and Valacich 2001),  which removes the 
stable context required for habits to be performed. 
With the given limitations of alternate methods and a highly validated self-report 
scale, operationalizing habit as a self-reported perception appears to be gaining 
acceptance in the IS discipline (Limayem and Cheung 2011; Limayem et al. 2007; Polites 
and Karahanna 2012; Vance et al. 2012; Venkatesh et al. 2012). Self-report habit index 
(SHRI) is a 12-item instrument scale developed by Verplanken and Orbell (2003), that 
has been used by many researchers to measure habit. The SHRI has been revalidated by 
many scholars showing excellent internal reliability and convergent validity. For the 
purposes of this study, a scale developed by Polites and Karahanna (2012), which is 
based on the SHRI, is utilized to measure habit. As mentioned previously, habit is 
positioned as a second-order formative and first-order reflective scale. By the definition 
and the automatic nature of habit, it constitutes of the following three dimensions which 
are measured as the first-order reflective constructs (Polites and Karahanna 2012). Figure 
3.1 illustrates this multi-dimensional nature of habit. 
1. Lack of awareness - The behavior is performed automatically or without much 
awareness. (e.g., I lock the computer every time I leave it unattended, without being 
aware of doing it) 
2. Mental efficiency - The behavior is performed without thinking or using less 




3. Uncontrollability - The behavior is hard to control. (e.g., I would find it hard 
not to lock the computer, every time I leave it unattended) 
 
Figure 3.1 Multi-dimensional Nature Of Habit 
 
Although there are several validated scales to measure habit through self-reports 
such as the self-report habit index (SHRI) by Verplanken and Orbell (2003), the 
developed habit scale by (Limayem et al. 2007) and the UTAUT2 habit scale by 
Venkatesh et al. (2012), items to measure habit were primarily adopted from Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) since they capture the multidimensional nature of habit. Habit is 
conceptualized as a second-order formative and first-order reflective construct similar to 
Polites and Karahanna (2012). Habit was also conceptualized and validated as a three-
item reflective scale by Limayem et al. (2007). Although the multi-dimensional scale of 
habit was primarily utilized in this study, items from the reflective scale of habit were 
also measured to increase the validity of the research model.  The items from Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) and Limayem et al. (2007) were modified to fit the context of IS 
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security and to reflect the behavior that was being measured. These items are shown in 
Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Measures of The Habit Variable 
Construct Items 
Lack of Awareness 
(AWAR) 
(Polites and Karahanna 
2012) 
AWAR1: Every time I leave my computer unattended, I 
choose to lock it without even being aware of doing it. 
AWAR2: Every time I need to leave my computer unattended, 
I unconsciously lock it. 
AWAR3: Locking the computer every time I leave it 
unattended is something I do without being aware. 
AWAR4: Locking the computer every time I leave it 
unattended is something I do unconsciously. 
Uncontrollability (CTRL) 
(Polites and Karahanna 
2012) 
CTRL1: I (would) find it difficult to overrule my impulse to 
lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
CTRL 2: I (would) find it difficult to overcome my tendency 
to lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
CTRL 3: It would be difficult to control my tendency to lock 
the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
CTRL 4: It is [would be] hard to restrain my urge to lock the 
computer every time I leave it unattended. 
Mental Efficiency  
(EFFCH) 
(Polites and Karahanna 
2012) 
EFFCH1: I do not need to devote a lot of mental effort to 
decide to lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
EFFCH 2: It would require effort not to lock the computer 
every time I leave it unattended. 
EFFCH 3: Choosing to lock the computer every time I leave it 
unattended requires little mental energy. 
EFFCH 4: I have no need to think about locking the computer 
every time I leave it unattended. 
Habit (HBT) 
 
(Limayem et al. 2007) 
HBT1: Locking the computer every time I leave it unattended 
has become automatic to me. 
HBT2: Locking the computer every time I leave it unattended 
is natural to me. 
HBT3: When leaving the computer unattended, locking it is an 
obvious choice for me. 
 
Habit is conceptualized as a second-order formative and first-order reflective 
construct similar to Polites and Karahanna (2012). Habit was also conceptualized and 
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validated as a three-item reflective scale by Limayem et al. (2007). Although the multi-
dimensional scale of habit was primarily utilized in this study, items from the reflective 
scale of habit were also measured to increase the validity of the research model.  The 
items from Polites and Karahanna (2012) and Limayem et al. (2007) were modified to fit 
the context of IS security and to reflect the behavior that is being measured. 
Habit and Inertia 
Polites & Karahanna (2012) investigated how incumbent system usage negatively 
impacted new system perceptions and usage intentions, using status quo bias and habit 
literature to theoretically guide their study. One of the key constructs in their research 
model is inertia. Inertia is defined as the “attachment to, and persistence of, existing 
behavioral patterns (i.e., the status quo), even if there are better alternatives or incentives 
to change” (Polites and Karahanna 2012, p. 24).  They hypothesize that habitual use of an 
incumbent system, rationalization due to perceived transition costs, and psychological 
commitment due to perceived sunk costs, influence the development of inertia.  
While incumbent system habit may lead to inertia, and inertia may negatively 
influence the adoption of a new system in the context of a post-adoption setting, there is a 
clear distinction between the motivation and context of Polites & Karahanna and this 
dissertation. Polites & Karahanna (2012) investigates the role of habit in inhibiting 
change while this dissertation investigates the role of habit in information security 
behaviors in the workplace. Another distinction between the two studies is that Polites & 
Karahanna (2012) test the influence of inertia of an ‘old’ behavior (using email) in 
inhibiting the adoption of a ‘new’ behavior (using GoogleDocs), while this dissertation 
study simply focused on three current secure behaviors performed by employees. These 
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three behaviors are recommended responses to three different threats and the sole purpose 
of investigating different behaviors is to identify if habit impacts these behaviors 
differently. Each of the response behaviors is related to a specific threat. These behaviors 
are not interchangeable and not presented with another alternative behavior in mind. 
Polites & Karahanna (2012) have hypothesized that habit will positively influence 
inertia and that inertia will negatively influence intention to use a new system. While they 
recognized that habitual behaviors occur outside of awareness, they have modeled inertia 
to mediate the habit-intention relationship. Limayem et al. (2007, p. 717) posits that 
modeling habit as an indirect effect of actual behavior has both “theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings.” This dissertation modeled habit as an antecedent of actual behavior while 
it is hypothesized that habit negatively moderates the intention-behavior relationship, 
which reflects the automatic nature of habit. Polites & Karahanna (2012, p. 38) 
recognized this limitation in their study and suggested that future studies examine the 
impact of habit “on actual new system usage, via the intention-behavior link.” They 
suggest that there would be a stronger direct link between habit and actual behavior than 
the habit-intention relationship being mediated though inertia. This dissertation tested the 
habit-behavior relationship as recommended by Polites & Karahanna (2012). 
This dissertation study is a cross-sectional study that focused on existing habits or 
current habitual behaviors. Habit is a process; therefore, it is ideally investigated through 
a longitudinal study. When a new behavior is performed, behavioral intentions play a 
significant part in the performance of that behavior. Once this behavior is performed 
successfully and repetitively in a stable context, over time it will become habitual and the 
power of intentions dissipates. Polites & Karahanna (2012) suggested that inertia is more 
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evident in the persistence of inefficient practices. In terms of secure behaviors, 
investigation of inertia in the context of breaking habits or forming habits would be 
applicable in a longitudinal study, especially when it concerns negative habits (inefficient 
practices).  
Polites & Karahanna (2012) also identified that habit and inertia are clearly 
distinct constructs while criticizing the use of these two constructs interchangeably by 
past literature. The definition of inertia as "attachment to, and persistence of, existing 
behavioral patterns," however, may imply a relationship with habit. Habits are also 
routine behaviors or behavioral patterns that are carried out repetitively. Polites & 
Karahanna (2012, p. 25) clearly defines habit as automatic but states that "inertia may 
have both conscious and subconscious origins." They also state that the existence of 
better alternatives is not a necessary condition for the existence of inertia. Although 
inertia may not be applicable in the context of this dissertation, considering the possible 
relationship between inertia and habit, inertia was be measured and utilized for post hoc 
analysis of this study. Polites and Karahanna (2012) measures inertia from three different 
aspects: behavior-based, cognitive-based and affective-based. Behavior-based inertia is 
defined as the continuance of a behavior without giving it much thought, simply because 
it is part of a routine. Cognitive-based inertia is defined as the conscious decision to 
continue performing a behavior even when an individual is aware that the behavior is not 
the most effective way of doing things. Affective-based inertia is defined as the 
continuance of a behavior since it is stressful to chance, enjoyable and an emotional 
attachment exists to that behavior. However, only behavior-based inertia and affective-
based inertia will be measured since cognitive-based inertia construct is not applicable in 
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the context of this study.However, only behavior-based inertia and affective-based inertia 
will be measured since cognitive-based inertia construct is not applicable in the context 
of this study. 
During the post hoc analysis, the influence of habit on inertia and the influence of 
inertia on a current behavior in an information security context can be tested. Moreover, 
tests can be performed to investigate the moderating influence of habit on the intention-
behavior relationship, in the presence of inertia as an antecedent of behaviors intentions. 
The items to measure inertia are shown below. The language was modified to 
reflect the secure behavior of locking the computer when leaving it unattended. 
Table 3.5 Measures of Inertia 
Construct Items 
Inertia – Affective Based  
(Polites and Karahanna 
2012) 
I continue to lock my computer whenever I leave it 
unattended 
INAF1: because it would be stressful to change. 
INAF2: because I am comfortable doing so. 
INAF3: because I enjoy doing so. 
Inertia – Behavioral Based  
(Polites and Karahanna 
2012) 
I continue to lock my computer whenever I leave it 
unattended 
INBB1: simply because it is what I have always done. 
INBB2: simply because it is part of my normal routine. 
INBB3: simply because I have done so regularly in the past. 
 
Identification of Habitual Secure Behaviors 
Information security behaviors can be routine and repetitive and when they are 
performed successfully in a stable context they can become automatic, therefore habitual. 
As discussed in chapter II, repetition or frequency itself does not make a certain behavior 
habitual. Habit formation requires a repetition of a certain behavior successfully, in a 
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stable context where the behavior is initiated through environmental triggers. If all these 
factors are not present, habits may not be formed. Therefore, it can be assumed that not 
all secure behaviors are habitual. Even when certain behaviors can be habitual, the 
strength of habit can significantly vary between different individuals. Due to the lack of 
previous information security research that investigated habits, it is challenging to 
identify behaviors to test the role of habit. Vance et al. (2012) investigated the top five 
security violations utilizing PMT and habit. They derived a list from security experts and 
management on the basis of security policy violations and did not consider whether those 
behaviors were habitual. In terms of behaviors that are investigated, our study differs 
from the study by Vance et al. (2012) in two important ways. First, our study focused 
only on positive habitual behaviors related to information security. Vance et al. (2012) 
followed a hypothetical scenario-based method due to the context of policy violations in 
their study. Scenario based methods are commonly used in criminology to assess 
unethical or criminal behavior since it allows the respondents to disassociate themselves 
from the unethical or non-compliance behavior tested in the instrument (Hovav and 
D’Arcy 2012; Taylor 2006). The other study which utilized habit in an information 
security context (Pahnila et al. 2007), collected their data using a web-based survey. Our 
study focused on positive habits, thus a survey methodology would be able to capture  
generalizable perceptions of the respondents successfully, although potential limitations 
such as acquiescence bias exists (Dennis and Valacich 2001; McGrath 1982, 1995; Wyatt 
2000). Second, an alternative process was followed to identify information security 
behaviors that can be habitual from which three behaviors are selected to explore the role 
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of habit. Figure 3.2 illustrates this exhaustive process which will be discussed in the 
subsequent pages.  
 
Figure 3.2 Selection of Habitual Behaviors  
 
Due to the lack of extant literature investigating habitual secure behaviors, it was 
challenging to identify habitual information security behaviors among employees, which 
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Benbasat (1991) recommended conducting a step-by-step procedure to select which items 
to be used in a research instrument. Their recommendations were followed in selecting 
the behaviors that are relevant to this study. Whereas there are many behaviors that can 
be investigated, in order to have a parsimonious research design, three behaviors were 
identified to be utilized for testing the research model. Strength of habits can differ 
among respondents, thus selecting just one behavior does not provide generalizable 
results when investigating the role of habit in information security behaviors. The 
measurement panel was asked to select three secure behaviors, which were deemed to 
have sufficient range of properties to provide a generalizable and an accurate 
representation on the role of habit. This rigorous process as recommended by Moore & 
Benbasat (1991) follows five steps starting from generating a pool of positive secure 
behaviors and ending with the development of the research instrument. The procedure 
followed in each step is discussed below.  
Step 1: Generation of a pool of behaviors 
Churchill (1979) and Moore & Benbasat (1991) recommended compiling a list of 
items from an exhaustive literature review as the initial stage of instrumentation. Their 
recommendations were applied in the context of secure behaviors for this study. The first 
step of the procedures to identify the habitual secure behaviors relevant to this study 
involved two phases. The first phase was to conduct a thorough literature review of all 
the information security research studies and identify information security behaviors 
performed at the workplace that have been explored. The review included articles in 
prominent journals and research presentations at AMCIS, ICIS and security workshops 
such as the Dewald Roode Workshop on Information Systems Security Research. The 
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secure behaviors identified from these articles were utilized extensively for the 
compilation of the list of secure behaviors. The second phase involved a review of 
practitioner articles on information security such as whitepapers. Secure behaviors that 
are recommended for corporations by industry experts to be integrated into company-
wide security policies were also considered. The behaviors compiled in the two lists were 
combined which totaled to 129 secure behaviors. A list of secure behaviors and their 
academic and practitioner sources can be found on Appendix B. After eliminating similar 
and overlapping behaviors, a final list of 49 secure behaviors was identified. The list of 
49 secure behaviors selected to be presented to an expert panel and an employee panel 
review is shown in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6 List of Behaviors For Expert Panel 
# Behavior 
01 Avoid sharing passwords with co-workers. 
02 Use anti-spyware software. 
03 Backup data regularly. 
04 Set up strong passwords to login to systems. 
05 Verify regularly that anti-virus and/or anti-spyware software is auto updated. 
06 Change passwords often. 
07 Locking the computer when leaving it unattended. 
08 Always encrypt sensitive information. 
09 Immediately apply software updates when they become available. 
10 Logoff or shutdown the computer when leaving the office for the day. 
11 Shred sensitive documents. 
12 Complying with information security policies. 
13 Being cautions of emails from unknown sources. 
14 Avoid coping sensitive data to portable media (e.g., USB, portable HDD). 
15 Avoid revealing sensitive information to outsiders. 
16 Avoid installing unauthorized software on your computer. 
17 Avoid reading confidential documents that does not belong to you. 
18 Report a computer virus immediately. 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
 
19 Avoid using a laptop for personal use. 
20 Avoid writing down sensitive information on paper. 
21 Avoid visiting unknown/suspicious websites. 
22 Avoid opening email attachments from unknown senders. 
23 Avoid posting sensitive information on social networking sites. 
24 Encrypt corporate data before copying to portable media. 
25 Avoid leaving sensitive documents at the printer. 
26 Avoid clicking URLs on social media links. 
27 Always use the most updated version of the browser. 
28 Encrypt emails with sensitive data. 
29 Regularly verify that the firewall on the computer is active. 
30 Always lock the office door when leaving for the day. 
31 Avoid leaving important documents at the working area/desk. 
32 Avoid responding to emails from unknown sources. 
33 Avoid inserting portable media that is not yours into the computer. 
34 Keep all sensitive information secure to prevent loss or theft. 
35 Avoid using public networks to connect to corporate servers remotely. 
36 Avoid discussing sensitive information in public areas (e.g., hallway, elevator). 
37 Avoid connecting personal devices (e.g., laptop, tablet) to company network. 
38 Ensuring sensitive data entered into the system is accurate. 
39 Use corporate email only for work-related activities. 
40 Always verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 
41 Set computer file permissions to prevent unauthorized access. 
42 Avoid leaving active computers unattended. 
43 Always lock sensitive physical documents in a secure location when not in use. 
44 Immediately inform authorities if you discover an information security problem. 
45 Do not perform work on a computer under a co-worker’s login session. 
46 Always verify with the sender if the email content seem suspicious. 
47 Document any changes made in the computer system. 
48 Avoid downloading files from unknown websites. 




Step 2: Expert Panel Review & Employee Panel Review 
Step two involved identifying security behaviors that may be habitually 
performed in the workplace. Churchill (1979) has recommended using experts or focus 
groups to identify items/behaviors to be used in an instrument. Verplanken and Orbell 
(2003), used a similar method, where they distributed a list of behaviors to a sample of 
respondents to identify which of those behaviors are more habitual. This study followed a 
similar procedure but complemented the primary data with views of an expert panel on 
which behaviors of their employees were habitual. In order to initiate this step, an online 
survey that presented the forty-nine secure behaviors was sent to a panel of security 
experts and information security managers. They were asked to select the behaviors 
which they thought are performed habitually by their employees. The survey was sent to 
18 experts and a total of 12 experts responded.  
A similar survey was sent to some selected employees or end users across 
different corporations who used a computer to complete their daily job tasks. The 
employee responses were gathered through personal contacts and through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. The behaviors that were most selected by the respondents were 
considered to be habitual and in turn were selected to become candidates for the 
behaviors to be measured in the final instrument. Utilizing feedback from both a subject-
matter expert review panel and an employee panel provides better insights in to habitual 
behaviors in the workplace and differentiates our study from Vance et al. (2012), where 
they utilized only an expert panel to select their behaviors. The responses from the expert 
panel and employee panel are included in Appendix B.  
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Step 3: Refinement of the list of behaviors 
Using the data from the expert panel and employee panel reviews, twenty positive 
secure behaviors that were most selected by the panelists were identified. The respondent 
scores for each behavior by the expert panel and employee panel was used for this 
procedure. The identification of several behaviors that varied in habitual strength was 
similar to the study conducted by Verplanken and Orbell (2003).  
From the twenty selected behaviors, information security behaviors that had 
overlapping similarities in terms of the security context were grouped together as 
suggested by Petter et al. (2007). For example, the behaviors of locking the door, locking 
the computer, and logging off the computer were similar and served the same purpose, 
thus were grouped together.  
Expert researchers and members of the committee reviewed the list of behaviors 
and based on their recommendations the “avoidance” behaviors were rephrased to reflect 
positive behaviors. The rationale for this change was that an avoidance of a certain 
behavior did not necessarily constitute habit. By avoiding a certain behavior, an 
individual may perform an opposite behavior which may be habitual. For example, 
instead of the behavior “avoid opening email attachments from unknown senders,” it was 
rephrased with “open email attachments only from known/verified senders.” The twenty 
behaviors identified from the two panels and the modified language for the behaviors can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Step 4: Feasibility of behavior measurement 
Step four involved presenting the twenty behaviors, which were grouped in the 
previous stage, to a measurement panel. The measurement panel consisted of three 
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professors with several years of experience in conducting research and data collection 
utilizing different methodologies. Some of the behaviors which were deemed to be 
habitual by an expert panel and an employee panel could not have been measured 
accurately through a survey. Therefore, certain behaviors that were impractical to be 
measured through a survey needed to be removed. Although it would have been ideal to 
select several behaviors for the study, members of the measurement panel were asked to 
select the top three behaviors from the list of twenty that were practical to be measured 
through a self-reported method such as a survey. The panel was also requested to ensure 
that no two behaviors from the same group were selected in order to avoid any 
overlapping behaviors being selected. The measurement panel suggested removing 
certain behaviors such as ‘being cautious not to discuss sensitive information in public 
areas’ as being more relevant to healthcare organizations and not relevant in corporate 
environments where the data for this study would be collected. They also suggested 
removing certain behaviors which they believed were not practical to be measured 
through a survey. Finally, they agreed on three behaviors that they thought were practical 
to be measured through a survey. The three behaviors selected were not the top behaviors 
identified by the respondents, instead the measurement panel selected behaviors that are 
feasible and varied in habit strength such that there would be sufficient variance for data 
analysis. Table 3.7 lists the three behaviors selected, along with the percentage of 





Table 3.7 Behaviors Selected For The Study 
# Behavior Expert Panel Employee Panel 
7 Lock the computer when leaving it unattended. 64% 67% 
40 Verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 45% 63% 
21 Visit only known/verified websites. 55% 56% 
 
Step 5: Instrument Development 
After the three behaviors appropriate to be measured for this study were selected, 
an initial draft of the three instruments was created. The instrument consists of pre-
validated scales for each of the constructs included in the research model. The items were 
modified to fit the context and the behavior studied. Existing literature recommends that 
content validity, reliability and discriminant validity tests to be conducted even when pre-
validated scales are utilized (Netemeyer et al. 2003). Content validity was established 
through an instrument panel that consisted of four doctoral students from Information 
Systems, one professor from the Department of Management & Information Systems and 
one professor from the School of Accountancy. The panel was guided through the content 
validation process and each panelist analyzed the language and accuracy of the items and 
whether all the items were reflective of the construct they measured. This approach is 
suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) as a proactive method to minimize Common Method 
Variance. Based on the recommendations of the panel, several items in the threat and 
coping appraisal scales were modified. A second panel was convened to verify whether 
the changes were accurate. A few more adjustments to the language of the items were 
made. The revised instrument was again reviewed by the panel and they agreed on the 




Prior to the main data collection, a preliminary investigation consisting of 
instrument content validity was conducted. This was followed by a pilot test to measure 
construct validity and reliability as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) . Although this 
study utilized previously validated and well established scales, it was necessary to ensure 
that the construct validity and reliability still holds after modifications were made to the 
items to reflect the context of this study.  
Instrument Content Validity 
According to Straub et al. (2004), content validity of the instrument needs to be 
investigated in order to confirm that the instrument completely and accurately represents 
the behavioral domain. The content validity assessment will also reduce the chances of 
measurement error in the instrument since such occurrences will be identified and 
corrected. The scale of habit has scarcely been utilized in the IS security context along 
with the scale of actual behavior. Thus, it is important that content validity is assessed to 
make sure the scales were adopted accurately to reflect the IS security domain. 
As mentioned in step 5, content validity was established through an instrument 
panel that consisted of several doctoral students and professors. Each panelist analyzed 
the language and accuracy of the items and whether all the items were reflective of the 
construct it measured. Several items in the threat and coping appraisal scales were 
modified upon recommendations of the instrument panel. The instrument panel was 
reconvened to verify whether the changes were applied accurately. A few more 
adjustments to the language of the items were made. The revised instrument was 
reviewed by the panel again and they came to a consensus that the measures properly 
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reflected the constructs being measured. These steps ensured that a highly valid 
instrument was developed prior to the data collection being initiated (Netemeyer et al. 
2003; Straub et al. 2004). Following the decision rules recommended by Petter et al. 
(2007), it was also concluded that all the constructs except habit was reflective. Habit is 
included in the research model as a first-order reflective and second-order formative 
construct. 
Construct Validity and Reliability 
In order to assess construct validity and reliability, a pilot test was conducted with 
a sample from the same pool of respondents that is used for the full-scale study. 
Conducting a pilot test from the same population significantly increases the initial 
construct validity and reliability and to some degree would be reflective of the responses 
of the final study as well. This would provide the opportunity to understand the accuracy 
of the scale items and if the measurement model reflects the expected findings.   
The data was be analyzed through principal component analysis (PCA). All the 
items used in this proposed study were previously validated items and were reflective. 
First a measurement model analysis was conducted to examine the psychometric 
properties of all the constructs included in the research model. There are three processes 
generally used for assessing reliability of reflective scales. The first is Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient (Cronbach 1951; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994), where alpha scores that 
exceed 0.70 would indicate reliability. Another method is the measurement of internal 
consistency developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) and preferred in Partial Least 
Square (PLS) analysis (Chin 1998). The goal of this method is to achieve a composite 
reliability score of above 0.70 which demonstrates reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981; 
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Gefen and Straub 2005). Finally, reflective items were tested for scale reliability by 
examining the item loadings of at least 0.70.  
Convergent validity is demonstrated when (1) the item loadings exceed 0.70 on 
their respective constructs and (2) Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each construct 
is above 0.50 (Gefen and Straub 2005), which suggests that the principal constructs 
capture a much higher construct-related variance than error variance. Discriminant 
validity, which is the extent to which different constructs diverge from each other, can be 
demonstrated if the square root of each construct’s AVE is greater than the absolute value 
of the inter-construct correlations (Gefen and Straub 2005). If the square roots of the 
AVEs of all constructs are found to be larger than all cross-correlations of the other 
constructs, it will demonstrate discriminant validity of the constructs used in this study. 
Common Method Variance (CMV) Tests 
This research used an online survey to collect self-reported data which presents 
the potential to introduce common method variance (CMV) that might bias the results of 
this study. Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggests proactive methods to minimize CMV and 
statistical methods to test for CMV after the data is collected. Proactive measures that can 
reduce CMV include random selection of subjects, random organization of items in the 
questionnaire, expert panels, pilot tests and anonymity. All the recommended proactive 
measures to reduce CMV as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), are utilized for the full-
scale study. Statistical analysis using two tests will be conducted to check for the 
presence of and severity of CMV in the collected data. For the first test, the Harmon one-
factor test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; Podsakoff et al. 2003) can be used, where an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on all variables used in the research 
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model and the un-rotated factor solution was examined. It is assumed that CMV exists if 
a single factor emerges from un-rotated factor solutions or a first factor explains the 
majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). In this study, 
ideally ten factors emerged with no single factor accounting for a majority of the 
variance. 
For the second test, a more rigorous statistical approach suggested by Podsakoff 
et al. (2003) to check for common method bias was utilized. This approach was first 
applied using PLS by Liang et al. (2007) and was replicated recently by Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010). The same procedure was used to test for common method bias in this study. To 
use this technique, a single-indicator construct for each indicator in the measurement 
model was created. Each major construct is then linked with their appropriate single-
indicator constructs. A common method construct that contains all the indicators of the 
model is created and linked to each single-indicator constructs. This allows the major 
constructs and the common method constructs to become second-order reflective 
constructs. This approach compares the influence of a common method factor on each 
indicator used in our model against the influence of the constructs on their respective 
indicators. The average of the substantive factor variance explained was compared to the 
method factor variance explained. Moreover, the method factor loadings can be 
inspected, to test if common method bias was unlikely a serious concern in the data 
(Williams et al. 2003). 
Main Investigation 
The main investigation of this study was conducted subsequent to the pilot study 
and after ensuring the validity and reliability of the measures. The survey instrument was 
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developed on Qualtrics and panels of respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk were 
utilized. Qualtrics is a company that allows researchers to create powerful surveys online 
(Qualtrics 2013). Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) is a popular crowdsourcing website 
that is gaining in popularity among researchers as a cheaper alternative to Qualtrics and 
other survey panel providers (Mason and Suri 2012). AMT respondents are 
demographically diverse and majority of the respondents are located in the United States 
or India (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Using the AMT, researchers can collect reliable and 
high quality data at a range of $0.20-$1 per survey compared to the survey panel 
providers who charge $5-20 per survey. Researchers have found that, even though the 
respondents are willing to accept a low payment for each survey completed, the quality of 
the data did not vary depending on the reward offered (Paolacci et al. 2010). In a 
comparative study, where an identical survey was distributed to different sources such as 
the AMT, students at a Midwestern university and visitors of online discussion boards. 
The results indicate that the data collected from AMT do not differ significantly from the 
other sources and are reliable providing evidence that AMT is a suitable source to collect 
data for behavioral research (Berinsky et al. 2012; Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci et al. 
2010).  
Initial power analysis using the G-power software indicated that a sample size of 
308 would be required for each behavior to achieve a medium effect size (0.15), an alpha 
of 0.05 and a power of 0.95. Three separate surveys that reflect each of the three 
behaviors selected for the study was developed. The respondents were randomly 
presented with one of those surveys. The data were collected from respondents who were 
employed in different organizations across different industries, compared to Vance et al. 
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(2012), who collected their data only from one organization. Collecting data from 
multiple companies may introduce some biases to the collected data since different 
organizations have different organizational cultures, information security policies and 
sanctions. These factors needed to be controlled during the data analysis stage to alleviate 
any biases previously mentioned. However, collecting data from multiple organizations 
across different industries makes the findings more generalizable (Compeau et al. 2012). 
The full-scale study for our study was conducted from the same pool of respondents as 
the pilot study, which also increased the validity of the data. 
After the data collection procedure was completed, survey sets that reflected each 
of the three distinct behaviors were analyzed separately. Compared to Vance et al. 
(2012), this separate analysis informed us on how each distinct behavior differs in habit 
strength and if differences that exist on how habit influences each behavior in the context 
of information security. Similar to the pilot study, construct reliability and validity tests 
were conducted followed by CMV tests. SPSS and Partial Least Squares (PLS) software 
tool SmartPLS were used to analyze the data as they provided tools to conduct 
confirmatory factor analysis, path analysis and provided the ability to measure structural 
and measurement models simultaneously (Chin 1998).  
Similar to Limayem et al. (2007), three different models were tested to identify 
the role of habit in the three information security behaviors selected. First a baseline 
model was tested that includes only the PMT variables, behavioral intention and actual 
behavior. Second, habit was tested as a direct effect on actual behavior. Finally, habit was 
tested as a moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. By comparing the variance 
explained in the dependent variable which is self-reported secure behavior, the overall 
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effect sizes of the three models were calculated. Cohen (1988) has suggested different 
thresholds to determine if the effect size is small, medium or large. Depending on the 
effect size, the impact of habit on the intention-behavior relationship can be identified. 
Our study differs significantly from Vance et al. (2012) in the expected findings. 
While they found empirical support for their research model, they do not capture the 
automaticity nature of habit. Our study theorized that habit will negatively moderate the 
intention-behavior relationship while directly influencing behavior. When habits are 
strong, influence of threat appraisal and coping appraisal would not drive the actual 
behavior. Our study was the first attempt to utilize a second-order formative and first-
order reflective scale to measure habit in an information security context.  Practitioners 
can use the findings of our study to foster positive habits in their employees, such as the 
recommended secure behaviors which are performed automatically. They can also use the 
findings to break negative habits through the use of fear appeals and increase of threat 
appraisals. Researchers can use the findings of our study to further investigate the role of 
habit on an information security context and identify factors that contribute to the 
forming and breaking of habits. 
Summary 
This chapter described the variables used, methodology implemented and an 
exhaustive process followed to select three information security behaviors investigated 





DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
This chapter first reports the analyses and results for the preliminary study, then 
those for the main study and finally interpretation of the findings. It is important to note 
that there are three different behaviors that are investigated in this study and the 
methodology and analyses are similar for all three. Each behavior is considered 
separately, but greater detail is given with the first one and not repeated for the 
subsequent behaviors.  
The pilot study was conducted to test the validity and reliability of the survey 
instrument. An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted to perform validity 
and reliability tests for each measurement scale. The main investigation with a larger 
sample size was conducted by a repeat of the EFA and testing of the measurement model 
with the use of SmartPLS software. 
Preliminary Investigation (Pilot Study) 
As discussed on Chapter III, the purpose of the preliminary investigation was to 
test the validity and reliability of the constructs and their respective items that were part 
of the survey instrument. The data were collected using the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
service. Each behavior was investigated with a separate survey. The demographics and 
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the results of the tests conducted to assess the validity and reliability of the scales used in 
the instruments are reported separately for each behavior. 
Behavior 1: Locking the PC 
The first behavior investigated was locking the PC when leaving it unattended. 
The survey was taken by 141 respondents, and after removing incomplete responses, 123 
usable responses remained for the pilot test. Over half (61.8 percent) of the respondents 
were male, nearly half (48.8 percent) were in 25-34 age category, about half (50.4 
percent) had a 4-year College Degree, and the most prevalent industry classification was 
information (24.4 percent). The complete demographic information in the pilot study for 
this behavior is shown in Table 4.1.  
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to test the validity and 
reliability of the items and their respective constructs. A principal component analysis 
(PCA) with a Varimax rotation was conducted to complete the EFA (Hair et al. 2010; 
Netemeyer et al. 2003; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). The initial EFA analysis revealed 
cross-loadings for items BINT3, AWAR1, BEHV1, BEHV2 and BEHV3. According to 
TPB and most behavioral research, intentions and actual behavior are highly correlated. 
Therefore, these cross-loadings are not surprising. After removing BINT3 and AWAR1 
from the analysis, behavioral intention and actual behavior items loaded cleanly on their 
separate constructs. However, some items for response efficacy and self-efficacy also 
cross-loaded. This was surprising as the items were pre-validated by many studies in the 
past. SEFF1 and SEFF2, which cross-loaded significantly with response efficacy, were 
removed, significantly improving the loadings of the two constructs. The loadings are 
shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Lock PC: Demographics of Pilot Study 
Demographic Frequency 
Gender Male 76 (61.8%) 
  Female 47 (38.2%) 
Age 18-24 34 (27.6%) 
  25-34 60 (48.8%) 
  35-44 22 (17.9%) 
  45-54 4 (3.3%) 
  55-64 2 (1.6%) 
  65 and older 1 (0.8%) 
Education High School 4 (3.3%) 
  Some College 16 (13%) 
  2-year College Degree 7 (5.7%) 
  4-year College Degree 62 (50.4%) 
  Masters Degree 32 (26.0%) 
  Doctoral Degree 1 (0.8%) 
  Professional Degree 1 (0.8%) 
Industry Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 1 (0.81%) 
  Mining 1 (0.81%) 
  Utilities 0 (0%) 
  Construction 3 (2.44%) 
  Manufacturing 15 (12.2%) 
  Wholesale trade 1 (0.81%) 
  Retail trade 8 (6.5%) 
  Transportation or warehousing 1 (0.81%) 
  Information 30 (24.39%) 
  Finance or insurance 12 (9.76%) 
  Real estate or rental and leasing 3 (2.44%) 
  Professional, scientific or technical services 11 (8.94%) 
  Management of companies or enterprises 5 (4.07%) 
  Admin, support, waste management or remediation serv 4 (3.25%) 
  Educational services 10 (8.13%) 
  Health care or social assistance 9 (7.32%) 
  Arts, entertainment or recreation 2 (1.63%) 
  Accommodation or food services 1 (0.81%) 




Table 4.2 Lock PC: EFA Results of Pilot Study 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR2 .771                  
AWAR3 .808                  
AWAR4 .831                  
BEHV1   .837                
BEHV2   .789                
BEHV3   .857                
BINT1    .756               
BINT2    .780               
CTRL1      .835             
CTRL2       .871            
CTRL3       .883            
CTRL4       .835            
EFFC1         .632          
EFFC2         .760          
EFFC3        .710           
EFFC4        .794           
PSEV1          .886         
PSEV2          .689         
PSEV3           .789         
PVUL1            .844       
PVUL2            .791       
PVUL3            .904       
RCST1              .818     
RCST2              .780     
RCST3              .812     
RCST4              .799    
REFF1                .741  
REFF2               .729   
REFF3               .734   
REFF4                .817    
SEFF3          .704 
SEFF4                  .620 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
  Correlations lower than 0.4 in absolute value were suppressed.  
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Table 4.3 Lock PC: Construct Reliability of Pilot Study 
Construct Construct Name 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.796 
BEHV Self-Reported Actual Behavior 0.910 
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.856 
CTRL Lack of Control 0.910 
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.754 
PSEV Perceived Threat Severity 0.833 
PVUL Perceived Threat Vulnerability 0.866 
RCST Response Cost 0.903 
REFF Response Efficacy 0.884 
SEFF Self-efficacy 0.847 
 
Once the items that cross-loaded were removed, all the items of each construct 
loaded on a separate factor without any cross-loadings above 0.4, with majority of the 
items loading above 0.7. Convergent validity of the items was demonstrated with all the 
items loading significantly on each of their respective factors. Discriminant validity was 
demonstrated by all items loading on their respective constructs without cross-loadings 
above the 0.40 threshold. This meets the threshold recommended by Hair et al. (2010), to 
demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity of the instrument items and their 
respective scales. Some of the items, such as PSEV2, EFFC1, and SEFF4 had loadings 
slightly below 0.7. These items did not load on any other factors and had loadings very 
close to the recommended threshold. Therefore, they were retained since they did not 
pose a threat to the discriminant and convergent validity of the items. Cronbach’s Alpha 
values exceeded the 0.70 threshold for each of the constructs demonstrating good scale 
reliability for all measurement scales. Item loadings that exceeded the 0.70 threshold for 
each constructs without cross-loadings demonstrated discriminant validity. 
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Behavior 2: Verify Email Recipients 
The first behavior investigated was the lock computer behavior. The survey was 
taken by 170 respondents, and, after removing incomplete responses, 154 usable 
responses remained for the pilot test. Over half (63.6 percent) of the respondents were 
male, about half (50.6 percent) were in the 25-34 age category, about half (46.8 percent) 
had a 4-year College Degree, and the most prevalent Industry classification was 
Information (24 percent). The complete demographic information in the pilot study for 
this behavior is shown in Table 4.4.  
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to test the validity and 
reliability of the items and their respective constructs. A principal component analysis 
(PCA) with a Varimax rotation was conducted to complete the EFA (Hair et al. 2010; 
Netemeyer et al. 2003; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  
The initial EFA analysis revealed cross-loadings for items REFF1, REFF2, 
SEFF1, SEFF2 and SEFF4. It seems that the respondents were not able to distinguish 
between the response efficacy and self-efficacy items. REFF2 with the lowest loading 
was removed and the loadings for REFF improved significantly. However, REFF1 
continued to cross-load with SEFF. The cross-loading was only slightly above 0.4, thus 
REFF1 was retained. SEFF1 and SEFF2 items still cross-loaded and were removed from 
the analysis.SEFF1 and SEFF2 items had cross-loading issues in the first behavior as 
well, indicating that those items have issues. The languages of the two items were slightly 




Table 4.4 Verify Email Recipients: Demographics of Pilot Study 
Demographic Frequency 
Gender Male 98 (63.6%) 
  Female 56 (36.4%) 
Age 18-24 42 (27.3%) 
  25-34 78 (50.6%) 
  35-44 22 (14.3%) 
  45-54 7 (4.5%) 
  55-64 3 (1.9%) 
  65 and older 2 (1.3%) 
Education High School 9 (5.8%) 
  Some College 19 (12.3%) 
  2-year College Degree 7 (4.5%) 
  4-year College Degree 72 (46.8%) 
  Masters Degree 44 (28.6%) 
  Doctoral Degree 0 (0.0%) 
  Professional Degree 3 (1.9%) 
Industry Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 1 (0.6%) 
  Mining 1 (0.6%) 
  Utilities 0 (0.0%) 
  Construction 3 (1.9%) 
  Manufacturing 13 (8.4%) 
  Wholesale trade 1 (0.6%) 
  Retail trade 5 (3.2%) 
  Transportation or warehousing 3 (1.9%) 
  Information 37 (24.0%) 
  Finance or insurance 14 (9.1% 
  Real estate or rental and leasing 1 (0.6%) 
  Professional, scientific or technical services 7 (4.5%) 
  Management of companies or enterprises 7 (4.5%) 
  Admin, support, waste management or remediation serv 17 (11.0%) 
  Educational services 6 (3.9%) 
  Health care or social assistance 1 (0.6%) 
  Arts, entertainment or recreation 1 (0.6%) 
  Accommodation or food services 15 (9.7%) 





Table 4.5 Verify Email Recipients: EFA results of Pilot Study 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR1 .737          
AWAR2 .780                  
AWAR3 .803                  
AWAR4 .843                  
BEHV1   .793                
BEHV2   .727                
BEHV3   .805                
BINT1    .745               
BINT2    .687               
BINT3    .707        
CTRL1      .835             
CTRL2       .871            
CTRL3       .883            
CTRL4       .835            
EFFC1         .770          
EFFC2         .606          
EFFC3        .708           
EFFC4        .646           
PSEV1          .767         
PSEV2          .739         
PSEV3           .886         
PVUL1            .809       
PVUL2            .863       
PVUL3            .846       
RCST1              .766     
RCST2              .764     
RCST3              .780     
RCST4              .750    
REFF1                .614  
REFF3               .751 .421  
REFF4                .776    
SEFF3          .753 
SEFF4                  .632 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
  Correlations lower than 0.4 in absolute value were suppressed. 
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Table 4.6 Verify Email Recipients: Construct Reliability of Pilot Study 
Construct Construct Name 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.867 
BEHV Self-Reported Actual Behavior 0.869 
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.812 
CTRL Lack of Control 0.933 
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.774 
PSEV Perceived Threat Severity 0.856 
PVUL Perceived Threat Vulnerability 0.907 
RCST Response Cost 0.871 
REFF Response Efficacy 0.826 
SEFF Self-efficacy 0.856 
 
Once the items that cross-loaded were removed, all the items of each construct 
loaded on a separate factor with only one cross-loading above 0.4. As illustrated in Table 
4.5, majority of the items loaded above the 0.7. This meets the threshold recommended 
by Hair et al. (2010), to demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity of the 
instrument items and their respective scales. Items such as BINT2, EFFC2, EFFC4, 
REFF1 and SEFF4 indicated loadings slightly below the recommended threshold, they 
did not pose a threat to the discriminant and convergent validity of the other items. 
Therefore, those items were retained. Convergent validity of the items was demonstrated 
with all the items loading significantly on each of their respective factors. Discriminant 
validity was demonstrated by all items loading on their respective constructs without any 
major cross-loadings above the 0.40 threshold. As shown in Table 4.6, Cronbach’s Alpha 
values exceeded the 0.70 threshold for each of the constructs demonstrating good scale 
reliability for all measurement scales. 
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Behavior 3: Visit Verified Websites 
The third behavior investigated was visiting only verified websites. The survey 
was taken by 165 respondents, and after removing incomplete responses, 143 usable 
responses remained for the pilot test. Over half (60.8 percent) of the respondents were 
male, about half (45.5 percent) were in 35-44 age category, about half (44.1 percent) had 
a 4-year College Degree, and the most prevalent industry classification was information 
(23.8 percent). The complete demographic information in the pilot study for this behavior 
is shown in Table 4.7.  
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to test the validity and 
reliability of the items and their respective constructs. A principal component analysis 
(PCA) with a Varimax rotation was conducted to complete the EFA (Hair et al. 2010; 
Netemeyer et al. 2003; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). The initial EFA analysis revealed 
cross-loadings for items EFFC4, BINT1, SEFF2 and REFF4. EFFC4 was removed 
eliminating the cross-loading with BINT1. After removing SEFF2 from the analysis, all 
the items loaded cleanly on their separate constructs. Majority of the items loaded above 
0.7 and the loadings are shown in Table 4.8. This meets the threshold recommended by 
Hair et al (2010), to demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity of the instrument 
items and their respective scales. Items such as AWAR1, EFFC2, PVUL1 and REFF2 
indicated loadings below the recommended threshold, but they were retained since they 





Table 4.7 Visit Verified Websites: Demographics of Pilot Study 
Demographic Frequency 
Gender Male 87 (60.8%) 
  Female 56 (39.2%) 
Age 18-24 0 (0.0%) 
  25-34 42 (29.4%) 
  35-44 65 (45.5%) 
  45-54 29 (20.3%) 
  55-64 7 (4.8%) 
  65 and older 0 (0.0%) 
Education High School 7 (4.8%) 
  Some College 18 (12.6%) 
  2-year College Degree 6 (4.2%) 
  4-year College Degree 63 (44.1%) 
  Masters Degree 47 (32.9%) 
  Doctoral Degree 0 (0.0%) 
  Professional Degree 2 (1.4%) 
Industry Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 3 (2.1%) 
  Mining 1 (0.7%) 
  Utilities 4 (2.8%) 
  Construction 2 (1.4%) 
  Manufacturing 16 (11.2%) 
  Wholesale trade 1 (0.7%) 
  Retail trade 1 (0.7%) 
  Transportation or warehousing 1 (0.7%) 
  Information 34 (23.8%) 
  Finance or insurance 12 (8.4%) 
  Real estate or rental and leasing 2 (1.4%) 
  Professional, scientific or technical services 13 (9.1%) 
  Management of companies or enterprises 8 (5.6%) 
  Admin, support, waste management or remediation serv 6 (4.2%) 
  Educational services 15 (10.5%) 
  Health care or social assistance 8 (5.6%) 
  Arts, entertainment or recreation 4 (2.8%) 
  Accommodation or food services 1 (0.7%) 




Table 4.8 Visit Verified Website: EFA Results of Pilot Study 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR1 .605          
AWAR2 .794                  
AWAR3 .773                  
AWAR4 .739                  
BEHV1   .848                
BEHV2   .844                
BEHV3   .858                
BINT1    .864               
BINT2    .810               
BINT3    .836        
CTRL1      .861             
CTRL2       .855            
CTRL3       .806            
CTRL4       .777            
EFFC1         .769          
EFFC2         .657          
EFFC3        .729           
PSEV1          .770         
PSEV2          .734         
PSEV3           .770         
PVUL1            .684       
PVUL2            .810       
PVUL3            .775       
RCST1              .841     
RCST2              .815     
RCST3              .824     
RCST4              .830    
REFF1                .691  
REFF2               .773  
REFF3               .819  
REFF4                .726    
SEFF1          .792 
SEFF3          .789 
SEFF4                  .759 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
  Correlations lower than 0.4 in absolute value were suppressed. 
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Convergent validity of the items was demonstrated with all the items loading 
significantly on each of their respective factors. Discriminant validity was demonstrated 
by all items loading on their respective constructs without cross-loadings above the 0.40 
threshold. As shown in Table 4.9, Cronbach’s Alpha values except for EFFC exceeded 
the 0.70 threshold for each of the constructs demonstrating good scale reliability. EFFC 
showed an alpha value of 0.677 which is still acceptable since it is quite close to the 
minimum threshold of 0.7. 
Table 4.9 Visit Verified Websites: Construct Reliability of Pilot Study 
Construct Construct Name 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.789 
BEHV Self-Reported Actual Behavior 0.916 
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.901 
CTRL Lack of Control 0.897 
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.677 
PSEV Perceived Threat Severity 0.719 
PVUL Perceived Threat Vulnerability 0.771 
RCST Response Cost 0.884 
REFF Response Efficacy 0.806 
SEFF Self-efficacy 0.829 
 
Power Analysis 
A power analysis was conducted using the G-power software to identify a suitable 
sample size for this study. A priori type of power analysis was used to compute the 
required sample size with an effect size (f2) of 0.15 (medium effect), alpha of 0.05 and a 
power of 0.95. It was calculated that a sample size of 308 would be required for each of 
the behaviors with the number of predictors as 45 (total number of items). The results of 




This section describes the results of the main study with a larger sample size than 
used in the pilot study and the support of the hypothesized relationships. Following the 
format for the pilot study results, results for each of the three studied behaviors are 
reported separately, but with some details given only for the first one and omitted in the 
other two for brevity. Each behavior is tested according to the proposed research model 
followed by post hoc analyses that test the alternative models. It is also important to note 
that data for all three behaviors were collected using the Amazon Mechanical-Turk. The 
reward amount paid to the respondents per each survey completed during the pilot study 
phase and the main investigation phase was the same. Restrictions were placed to limit 
each respondent from completing more than one survey. 
Behavior 1: Locking the PC (n=421) 
The first behavior tested was “locking the PC when leaving it unattended” and 
from now on will be referred to as the ‘Lock PC’ behavior. A total of 500 responses were 
collected for this behavior, and the surveys were completed in an average time of four 
minutes. Responses that were incomplete or failed the response validity check item were 
removed. This resulted in a usable sample of 421 responses, which exceeded required 




Table 4.10 Lock PC: Demographics of Main Investigation 
Demographic Category Frequency 
Gender 
Male 254 (60.3%) 
Female 167 (39.7%) 
Age 
18-24 105 (24.9%) 
25-34 214 (50.8%) 
35-44 73 (17.3%) 
45-54 18 (4.3%) 
55-64 8 (1.9%) 
65 and older 3 (0.7%) 
Education 
Less than High School 1 (0.2%) 
High School / GED 17 (4%) 
Some College 68 (16.2%) 
2-year College Degree 25 (5.9%) 
4-year College Degree 199 (47.3%) 
Masters Degree 102 (24.2%) 
Doctoral Degree 4 (1%) 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 5 (1.2%) 
Industry 
Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 2 (0.5%) 
Mining 2 (0.5%) 
Utilities 2 (0.5%) 
Construction 7 (1.7%) 
Manufacturing 43 (10.2%) 
Wholesale trade 6 (1.4%) 
Retail trade 25 (5.9%) 
Transportation or warehousing 4 (1%) 
Information 83 (19.7%) 
Finance or insurance 42 (10%) 
Real estate or rental and leasing 6 (1.4%) 
Professional, scientific or technical services 48 (11.4%) 
Management of companies or enterprises 17 (4%) 
Admin, support, waste management or 
remediation services 17 (4%) 
Educational services 39 (9.3%) 
Health care or social assistance 31 (7.4%) 
Arts, entertainment or recreation 7 (1.7%) 
Accommodation or food services 3 (0.7%) 
Other services (except public administration) 31 (7.4%) 




Of the usable responses, 254 (60.3%) were male and 167 (39.7%) were female. 
There were 105 (24.9%) respondents who were between the ages of 18 and 24, 214 
(50.8%) were between the ages of 25 and 34, 73 (17.3%) were between the ages of 35 
and 44, 18 (4.3%) were between the ages of 45 and 54, 8 (1.9%) were between the ages 
of 55 and 64 and 3 (0.7%) were age 65 or above. In terms of the education of the 
respondents, 111 (26.37%) had a 2-year college degree or lesser, 199 (47.3%) had a 4-
year college degree, 102 (24.2%) had a master’s degree and 9 (2.2%) had a doctoral 
degree or a professional degree. The respondents were employed in various industries 
and the majority of the respondents belonged to the categories of information (19.7%), 
professional, scientific or technical services (11.4%) and manufacturing (10.2%).  Table 
4.10 provides the demographic details of the respondents who participated in this study. 
Many scholars believe that if an Exploratory Factory Analysis (EFA) is conducted 
during a preliminary investigation phase, a repeat of the EFA is not required during the 
data analysis of the full scale study. However, since minor language changes were made 
to a few items in the instrument after the pilot study, an EFA was repeated for the full 
scale study. The results confirm the pilot study findings. The items demonstrated an 
acceptable response spread with no unusual patterns in the means or standard deviations. 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant at 0.000 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy was 0.897, indicating that factor analysis was appropriate 
for this sample (Hair et al. 2010).  
The EFA was conducted using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
technique with a Varimax rotation. Ten factors with an eigenvalues of one or greater 
were extracted, and those factors explained a total of 78% of the variance, which is above 
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the minimum of 65% recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The communalities of the items 
were well above the accepted minimum threshold of 0.03. All the items loaded cleanly on 
their respective factors except AWAR1 and BINT1, which cross-loaded with the items of 
BEHV. This was not a surprise as the items in the formative habit construct, behavioral 
intentions, and behavior were quite similar. After the preliminary study, wording of 
AWAR1 was slightly modified for the main investigation. However, it was removed from 
the analysis again since it continued to cross-load with a value of 0.619. EFFC2, which 
loaded cleanly along with other EFFC items, had a loading of less than 0.5 and was 
removed as well. This improved the factor loadings, and all remaining items loaded 
cleanly on their respective factors. The results of the EFA are shown in Table 4.11 with 
the correlations than 0.4 in absolute value suppressed for clarity. 
The EFA factor loadings for the main study were very similar to those of the pilot 
study. All the items loaded cleanly on their respective constructs. The results provide 
strong evidence that the measurement scales were reliable and we can move to the 




Table 4.11 Lock PC: EFA Results of Main Investigation 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR2 .796                  
AWAR3 .762                  
AWAR4 .842                  
BEHV1   .779                
BEHV2   .762                
BEHV3   .786                
BINT1     .680              
BINT2     .765              
BINT3     .722              
CTRL1       .857             
CTRL2       .870             
CTRL3       .866             
CTRL4       .846             
EFFC1         .738          
EFFC3         .795          
EFFC4         .773          
PSEV1          .843         
PSEV2          .803         
PSEV3          .833         
PVUL1            .830       
PVUL2            .810       
PVUL3            .883       
RCST1              .871     
RCST2              .834     
RCST3               .826    
RCST4               .839    
REFF1                 .778  
REFF2                .780   
REFF3                .767   
REFF4                .745   
SEFF1                   .767 
SEFF2                   .805 
SEFF3                   .823 
SEFF4                   .831 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 




SmartPLS was used to test both the measurement model and structural model 
(Ringle et al. 2005). As mentioned in Chapter III, partial least squares (PLS) allows the 
simultaneous testing of both the measurement and structural models. PLS is frequently 
used in IS research, especially in IS security research, and is the preferred tool of data 
analysis when formative scales are included (Limayem et al. 2007).  PLS is also better 
suited to test moderation effects than covariance based tools such as LISREL or AMOS 
(Limayem et al. 2007) since those methods  use a grouping technique without considering 
the complete data set together. The research model of this study is fairly complex with 
habit conceptualized as a first-order reflective and a second-order formative construct. 
Moreover, the core of this study is based on detecting the moderating effects of habit. 
Therefore, SmartPLS was the best tool for the data analysis of this study. 
A measurement model analysis was conducted to examine the psychometric 
properties of all the reflective constructs included in the research model. PLS validation 
procedures outlined by Gefen and Straub (2005) were followed to establish the validity 
and reliability of the measurement model. Reliability of reflective scales can be tested 
with three different analyses. The most commonly used method to test reliability is to 
examine the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. According to Cronbach (1951) and Nunnally 
and Bernstein (1994), when the alpha score of a scale  exceeds 0.70, it would indicate 
reliability. All the scales had alpha values larger than the recommended threshold with 
the lowest alpha value being 0.723 for EFFC. Composite reliability scores of 0.70 for 
each of the scales would indicate good reliability as well (Fornell and Larcker 1981; 
Gefen and Straub 2005). All the scales demonstrated composite reliability values much 
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higher than the recommended values with the lowest reliability being 0.860 for the scale 
PVUL. The values of the reliability tests such as composite reliability and Cronbach’s 
alpha are shown in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12 Lock PC: Reliability Statistics   
Construct AVE C-alpha CREL 
Mean  
(St. dev) Min/Max 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.825 0.894 0.934  3.29 (1.084) 1.00/5.00  
BEHV Actual Behavior 0.885 0.935 0.959  3.65 (1.160)  1.00/5.00 
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.860 0.919 0.949  3.75 (1.050)    1.00/5.00 
CTRL Uncontrollability 0.833 0.933 0.952  3.09 (1.117)    1.00/5.00 
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.643 0.723 0.844  3.47 (0.908)   1.00/5.00 
PSEV Perceived Severity 0.797 0.873 0.922  3.75 (0.973)    1.00/5.00 
PVUL Perceived Vulnerability 0.781 0.860 0.915  2.83 (1.091)    1.00/5.00 
RCST Response Cost 0.781 0.907 0.935  2.55 (1.108)    1.00/5.00 
REFF Response Efficacy 0.730 0.877 0.915  4.08 (0.731)    1.00/5.00 
SEFF Self-Efficacy 0.755 0.892 0.925  4.27 (0.724)    1.00/5.00 
 
Convergent validity indicates the “extent to which the items of a scale that are 
theoretically related are also related in reality” (Gefen and Straub 2005; Limayem et al. 
2007, p. 724). Convergent validity can be demonstrated when (1) the item loadings 
exceed 0.70 on their respective constructs and (2) Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for 
each construct is above 0.50 (Gefen and Straub 2005), which suggests that the principal 
constructs capture a much higher construct-related variance than error variance. As 
shown in Table 4.14 all the item loadings exceeded 0.70 on their respective constructs. 
Table 4.12 shows that all the scales demonstrated AVE values well above 0.5. Therefore, 





Table 4.13 Lock PC: Inter-Construct Correlations  
      AWAR    BEHV    BINT    CTRL    EFFC    PSEV    PVUL    RCST    REFF    SEFF 
AWAR 0.908                   
 BEHV 0.610 0.941                 
 BINT 0.562 0.732 0.927               
 CTRL 0.479 0.409 0.404 0.913            
 EFFC 0.333 0.217 0.288 0.338 0.802           
 PSEV 0.374 0.440 0.470 0.265 0.169 0.893        
 PVUL 0.251 0.106 0.118 0.342 0.080 0.105 0.884      
 RCST -0.070  -0.293 -0.304 0.147 0.030 -0.211 0.329 0.884    
 REFF 0.170 0.307 0.417 0.005 0.201 0.435 -0.180 -0.341 0.855  
 SEFF 0.084 0.218 0.326 0.051 0.204 0.291 -0.235 -0.357 0.607 0.869 
* The highlighted diagonal elements are square-roots of the AVE 
Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which different constructs diverge 
from each other. This can be demonstrated if the square root of each construct’s Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) is greater than the absolute values of the inter-construct 
correlations (Gefen and Straub 2005). As it is shown in Table 4.13, the square roots of 
the AVEs of all constructs were found to be larger than all cross-correlations of the other 
constructs, demonstrating discriminant validity of the constructs used in this study. 
Discriminant validity is also demonstrated when items load on their respective constructs 
and substantially less on all other constructs. Although all the items load significantly 
higher on their respective constructs, a few cross-loadings above 0.60 are present. BEHV 
and BINT items cross-load, with BINT1 having the highest cross-loading of 0.711 on 
BEHV. PLS loadings and cross-loadings for all the items are shown in Table 4.14.  
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Table 4.14 Lock PC: PLS loadings for the Main Investigation 
         Aware    BEHV    BINT    CTRL    EFFC    PSEV    PVUL    RCST    REFF    SEFF 
AWAR2 0.914 0.578 0.507 0.449 0.324 0.368 0.207 -0.081 0.154 0.091 
AWAR3 0.886 0.551 0.506 0.425 0.277 0.350 0.248 -0.052 0.166 0.079 
AWAR4 0.925 0.532 0.518 0.430 0.306 0.301 0.229 -0.055 0.144 0.060 
 BEHV1 0.566 0.945 0.681 0.387 0.207 0.414 0.102 -0.275 0.302 0.224 
 BEHV2 0.567 0.931 0.689 0.372 0.186 0.414 0.109 -0.283 0.277 0.180 
 BEHV3 0.589 0.947 0.697 0.396 0.220 0.414 0.088 -0.269 0.289 0.210 
 BINT1 0.560 0.711 0.939 0.393 0.290 0.457 0.108 -0.287 0.398 0.322 
 BINT2 0.494 0.667 0.915 0.379 0.256 0.398 0.129 -0.233 0.336 0.271 
 BINT3 0.507 0.659 0.928 0.353 0.255 0.452 0.091 -0.322 0.424 0.314 
 CTRL1 0.440 0.370 0.370 0.917 0.319 0.250 0.338 0.150 -0.005 -0.033 
 CTRL2 0.435 0.369 0.373 0.918 0.297 0.238 0.298 0.128 -0.013 -0.030 
 CTRL3 0.410 0.384 0.348 0.913 0.319 0.237 0.311 0.144 0.020 -0.047 
 CTRL4 0.462 0.372 0.386 0.904 0.301 0.245 0.301 0.116 0.017 -0.075 
 EFFC1 0.267 0.277 0.334 0.292 0.802 0.224 0.016 -0.032 0.273 0.238 
 EFFC3 0.273 0.198 0.241 0.272 0.815 0.145 0.068 0.012 0.174 0.151 
 EFFC4 0.262 0.036 0.108 0.249 0.789 0.028 0.114 0.098 0.025 0.095 
 PSEV1 0.341 0.381 0.385 0.237 0.134 0.883 0.101 -0.176 0.360 0.214 
 PSEV2 0.310 0.400 0.418 0.226 0.184 0.880 0.082 -0.203 0.411 0.306 
 PSEV3 0.350 0.396 0.452 0.247 0.135 0.914 0.099 -0.185 0.393 0.257 
 PVUL1 0.265 0.089 0.110 0.344 0.082 0.114 0.901 0.312 -0.173 -0.226 
 PVUL2 0.203 0.084 0.104 0.288 0.070 0.061 0.862 0.307 -0.163 -0.216 
 PVUL3 0.192 0.109 0.097 0.269 0.060 0.103 0.889 0.249 -0.139 -0.176 
 RCST1 -0.090 -0.274 -0.306 0.131 0.028 -0.225 0.281 0.926 -0.310 -0.343 
 RCST2 -0.098 -0.285 -0.247 0.127 0.054 -0.174 0.260 0.859 -0.306 -0.251 
 RCST3 -0.008 -0.248 -0.218 0.101 -0.010 -0.175 0.345 0.855 -0.315 -0.314 
 RCST4 -0.041 -0.232 -0.288 0.156 0.028 -0.167 0.289 0.893 -0.282 -0.345 
 REFF1 0.139 0.248 0.362 0.010 0.166 0.379 -0.164 -0.300 0.863 0.491 
 REFF2 0.159 0.249 0.338 -0.036 0.145 0.380 -0.202 -0.275 0.860 0.537 
 REFF3 0.178 0.281 0.356 0.051 0.224 0.338 -0.085 -0.270 0.851 0.548 
 REFF4 0.107 0.270 0.368 -0.010 0.151 0.390 -0.167 -0.318 0.845 0.500 
 SEFF1 0.060 0.181 0.263 -0.057 0.198 0.244 -0.233 -0.307 0.548 0.848 
 SEFF2 0.064 0.184 0.284 -0.040 0.166 0.262 -0.212 -0.308 0.540 0.873 
 SEFF3 0.089 0.207 0.305 -0.047 0.182 0.245 -0.169 -0.308 0.517 0.882 




The BINT2, BINT3, BEHV1, BEHV2, and BEHV3 items cross-loaded at values 
of 0.6 or higher. Language of BINT3 was slightly modified following the cross-loadings 
during the pilot study phase. However, similar issues with the behavior and intention 
items exist in the main study as well. Behavior and behavioral intention constructs, which 
stem from TRA and TPB, are highly correlated in nature and the measurement scales 
have items that are quite similar. Therefore, cross-loadings among the intention and 
behavior items were not a complete surprise. However, it can be argued that these cross-
loadings are not sufficiently high to negate the validity of the items and constructs. While 
it is recommended to have no cross-loadings among items of separate constructs, some 
researchers suggest that discriminant validity is still demonstrated if the cross-loadings 
are at least 0.2 less than the loading on the correct construct, as is the case with this study. 
Although BINT1 cross-load with BEHV at 0.711, the factor loading of BINT1 on its 
intended construct BINT is 0.939. Therefore, the cross-loadings differ by more than 0.2, 
which still demonstrates discriminant validity.  
Gefen and Straub (2005), suggests that discriminant validity is demonstrated 
when an item loads higher on its intended construct by at least 0.10 more than any of the 
loadings on other constructs. Their suggestion is similar to Chin (1998), who suggested 
that, if the item loadings are higher on the intended construct than the items that were 
used to measure other constructs, it is a good indication of discriminant validity. 
Limayem et al. (2007), who investigated the role of habit in IS continuance, found much 
higher cross-loadings of their items than in this study, but they retained those items in 
their data analyses citing Chin (1998). The correlations between BINT and BEHV are 
evident in the inter-construct correlations table as well (0.732). However, the square root 
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of the AVE is well above the inter-construct correlations, demonstrating high 
discriminant validity. Overall, the results of the reliability and validity tests provide 
strong empirical support of the scales used in this study.   
Tests for Common Method Variance 
This study utilized an online survey that collected self-reported data at one point 
in time with similar Likert scales, which has the potential to introduce common method 
variance (CMV). Podsakoff et al. (2003) defines CMV as “variance that is attributable to 
the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent.” If CMV is 
high, it may lead to incorrect inferences about the relationships among constructs. To 
reduce the possibility of common method variance, proactive measures such as random 
selection of subjects and random organization of items in the questionnaire were utilized 
in the survey. However, there is still a possibility of CMV being introduced to the data 
because the dependent variables and independent variables were measured using the 
same instrument and at the same time (Siponen and Vance 2010). We conducted 
statistical analysis using three tests to check for the presence of and severity of CMV in 
our data. 
For the first test, we used the Harmon single-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ 
1986; Podsakoff et al. 2003), where an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted 
on all the variables used in our model and the unrotated factor solution was examined. It 
is assumed that CMV exists if a single factor emerges from unrotated factor solutions or a 
first factor explains the majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff and Organ 
1986). Ten factors emerged from the EFA, which accounted for 78.41% of the variance. 
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The greatest variance explained by one factor was 27.33%, demonstrating that common 
method variance is unlikely to bias the results. 
The Harmon single-factor test is increasingly questioned on its ability to detect 
common method bias and often criticized by scholars if used as the sole method to test 
for CMV (Podsakoff et al. 2003). A second test suggested by Pavlou et al. (2007) 
recommends the examination of the inter-construct correlation matrix to determine 
whether any of the constructs correlate extremely high, defined as being above 0.90, with 
such “extremely high” correlations indicative of potential CMV. Extremely high 
correlations indicate potential CMV. Examining the inter-construct correlations in Table 
4.13, the highest correlation among constructs is 0.732 which does not exceed the 
threshold of 0.9 suggested by Pavlou et al. (2007). This rules out the potential for CMV 
in this study. 
For the third test, we used the rigorous statistical approach suggested by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to check for common method bias. This approach was first 
applied using PLS by (Liang et al. 2007) and the same procedure was used to test for 
common method bias in this study. To use this technique, we created a single-indicator 
construct for each indicator in the measurement model resulting in 36 single indicator 
constructs. The major constructs then linked with their appropriate single-indicator 
constructs. A common method construct that contained all the indicators of the model 
was created and linked to each single-indicator constructs, transforming the major 
constructs and the common method constructs to second-order reflective constructs. This 
approach compares the influence of a common method factor on each indicator used in 
our model against the influence of the constructs on their respective indicators.  
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Table 4.15 Lock PC: CMV Test Results  

















Awareness AWAR2 0.893 0.797 0.030 0.001 
  AWAR3 0.874 0.764 0.018 0.000 
  AWAR4 0.957 0.916 -0.047 0.002 
Behavior BEHV1 0.945 0.893 0.000 0.000 
  BEHV2 0.943 0.889 -0.015 0.000 
  BEHV3 0.935 0.874 0.014 0.000 
Behavioral Intention BINT1 0.866 0.749 0.085** 0.007 
  BINT2 1.008 1.016 -0.107** 0.011 
  BINT3 0.912 0.831 0.019 0.000 
Uncontrollability CTRL1 0.918 0.842 -0.001 0.000 
  CTRL2 0.920 0.847 -0.005 0.000 
  CTRL3 0.918 0.842 -0.008 0.000 
  CTRL4 0.896 0.802 0.014 0.000 
Mental Efficiency EFFC1 0.734 0.539 0.143*** 0.020 
  EFFC3 0.812 0.659 0.013 0.000 
  EFFC4 0.863 0.744 -0.160*** 0.026 
Perceived Severity PSEV1 0.921 0.849 -0.045 0.002 
 
PSEV2 0.853 0.728 0.037 0.001 
 
PSEV3 0.904 0.816 0.008 0.000 
Perceived Vulnerability PVUL1 0.896 0.802 0.011 0.000 
 
PVUL2 0.859 0.738 -0.018 0.000 
 
PVUL3 0.897 0.805 0.006 0.000 
Response Cost RCST1 0.909 0.826 -0.026 0.001 
  RCST2 0.863 0.745 0.000 0.000 
  RCST3 0.875 0.765 0.013 0.000 
  RCST4 0.890 0.791 0.014 0.000 
Response Efficacy REFF1 0.872 0.760 -0.015 0.000 
  REFF2 0.884 0.781 -0.029 0.001 
  REFF3 0.827 0.684 0.038 0.001 
  REFF4 0.835 0.697 0.006 0.000 
Self-Efficacy SEFF1 0.855 0.732 -0.003 0.000 
  SEFF2 0.875 0.765 -0.002 0.000 
  SEFF3 0.871 0.759 0.008 0.000 
  SEFF4 0.874 0.765 -0.004 0.000 
Average   0.8868 78.9% -0.0002 0.2% 
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Table 4.15 shows the factor loadings for each major construct and factor loadings 
for the common method construct captured through this procedure. The results explain 
that the average loading of the indicators is 0.887 while the average loading of the 
method indicators is -0.0002. The average variance explained by the substantive 
constructs is 78.9 percent compared to the 2 percent average variance explained by the 
method construct. Moreover, all the method factor loadings were statistically non-
significant, except for four indicators that had small loadings all less than 0.160 in 
absolute value (although statistically different from zero). Items that indicated significant 
method factor loadings are shown with ‘**’ for p<0.01 and ‘***’ for p<0.001. It is 
important to note that BINT1 and BINT2, which had small but statistically significant 
method factor loadings, also had cross-loading issues in the CFA. This may indicate 
some problems with those items. Since almost all of the method factor loadings are 
statistically not significant and the indicators’ substantive variances are substantially 
greater than their method variances, it can be concluded that common method bias is 
unlikely to be a serious concern in the data of this study (Williams et al. 2003). 
Therefore, based on the three separate tests to measure CMV, we concluded that common 
method bias was not a concern for this study.  
Structural Model 
The structural models were tested with the SmartPLS software as well. Habit was 
conceptualized as a first-order reflective and a second-order formative construct. 
Therefore, before the final structural model was tested, we generated factor scores for 
each of the first-order dimensions of Habit: Lack of Awareness, Uncontrollability and 
Mental Efficiency. These factors scores were used as formative measures of the second-
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order aggregate construct of Habit (Chin et al. 2003; Polites and Karahanna 2012). To 
achieve this, we followed the two-stage approach for formative hierarchical constructs as 
recommended by Ringle et al. (2012). The first stage was to run the full research model 
on SmartPLS with the constructs disaggregated. The resulting PLS latent scores for each 
dimension were used as the formative measures of the Habit construct (Polites and 
Karahanna 2012). 
Reliability and validity tests performed on the first-order reflective dimensions of 
Habit were described previously. However, these tests do not apply to formative scales 
because “the measurement model does not predict that the sub-dimensions will be 
correlated” (Bollen and Lennox 1991; Edwards 2003; MacKenzie et al. 2011, p.314). 
This view has also been suggested by prominent marketing research articles as well 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Jarvis et al. 2003). Item weights of the formative 
constructs can be examined to identify their individual influence in forming each 
construct (Chin 1998; Petter et al. 2007). The weights for the three habit dimensions were 
0.866 for Lack of Awareness, 0.249 for Uncontrollability and -0.025 for Mental 
Efficiency. The weight for Mental Efficiency was not significant while Lack of 
Awareness and Uncontrollability were significant at p<0.001.  
The formative dimensions of the habit construct were tested for multicollinearity 
next. Although multicollinearity between construct items is preferred in reflective scales, 
“excessive multicollinearity in formative constructs can destabilize the model” (Petter et 
al. 2007, p.641). To test for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics 
for the three dimensions of habit were examined. VIF values higher than 10 are 
considered indicative of multicollinearity, but Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) 
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recommended VIF values of 3.3 or lesser to indicate no issues with multicollinearity. As 
shown in Table 4.16, all the VIF values are well below the recommended threshold value 
of 3.3, which indicates no serious multicollinearity issues with the formative dimensions 
of Habit. Individual weights of the formative dimensions of Habit also indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Table 4.16 Lock PC: Weights of the Formative Habit Construct  
Construct Dimension Weight VIF 
Habit Lack of Awareness 0.866 (****) 1.129 
  Uncontrollability 0.249 (****) 1.125 
  Mental Efficiency -0.025 (n.s.) 1.297 
Note: ****p<0.001 
Although two of the formative dimensions of Habit are significant, the dimension 
of mental efficiency is not significant. There is an ongoing debate among researchers 
whether formative indicators with non-significant weights should be removed from the 
analysis. MacKenzie et al. (2011, p. 316) recommend that sub-dimensions should be 
eliminated only if “all of the essential aspects of the focal construct domain are captured 
by the remaining sub-dimensions” and suggest that such instances are rare. Content 
validity of formative scales is affected if one of the indicators that represent one of the 
formative dimensions is removed. Therefore, it is recommended that removal of any 
indicators from a formative construct should be theoretically justified rather than relying 
only on empirical results (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006; Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer 2001; MacKenzie et al. 2011; Petter et al. 2007; Polites and Karahanna 
2012). Since mental efficiency is one of the three dimensions that constitute habit, it was 
retained for the structural model analysis although its weight was not significant. The 
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model was reanalyzed without the non-significant Mental Efficiency dimension yielded 
similar results. To test the role of habit in information security behaviors, data analyses 
were performed in three stages, following the recommendations by Limayem et al. 
(2007). First, we ran a baseline research model with only the PMT variables. The next 
model added habit as a direct effect on behavior. The final model added the possibility of 
habit moderating the relationship between behavioral intention and behavior. 
Lock PC Behavior: Baseline Model 
A baseline model without the incorporation of the habit construct was tested first 
and the results are shown in Figure 4.1. All the hypothesized relationships were 
significant at p<0.01 or better except self-efficacy, which was significant at p<0.10.  
 
Figure 4.1 Lock PC: Baseline Model (Without Habit) 
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This model accounts for 53.6 percent of the variance of self-reported actual 
behavior and 34 percent of the variance in behavioral intention to perform a secure 
behavior. The p-value for self-efficacy was slightly more than 0.05 (p=0.0539) and the 
majority of the previous PMT related studies have found self-efficacy to significantly 
influence behavioral intentions. Therefore, we looked for a suppressor effect, which is 
defined as a situation where “one independent variable hides or suppresses the true effect 
of another” (Vance et al. 2012). We found that both response efficacy and response cost 
acted as suppressors for self-efficacy in our model. When self-efficacy was considered 
without the suppressor variables, it positively influenced intention with a path coefficient 
of 0.246 at p<0.001, which is consistent with PMT.       
Lock PC Behavior: Habit as a Direct Effect 
In the second research model, habit is hypothesized to have a direct effect on 
secure behavior. The results for this model are shown on Figure 4.2. Similar to the first 
model, self-efficacy was significant at the 0.10 level with a p-value of 0.06, while all of 
the other hypothesized relationships significant at p<0.001. 
The introduction of habit as a direct effect on behavior increased variance 
explained from 53.6 percent to 59.6 percent, with a path coefficient of 0.301, supporting 
H7a. The path coefficient between behavioral intention and secure behavior decreased 
from 0.732 to 0.558, but remained significant. These values confirm the definition of 
habit adopted by this study, such that when habit is established, it reduces the importance 




Figure 4.2 Lock PC: Habit as a Direct Effect 
 
Lock PC Behavior: Habit as a Moderator and a Direct Effect 
In the third and final research model, habit is included as a direct effect on secure 
behavior and in addition as moderating the relationship between behavioral intention and 




Figure 4.3 Lock PC: Habit as a Moderator 
 
The introduction of habit as a moderator increased the total variance explained by 
secure behavior slightly from 59.6 percent to 60.9 percent. The moderating effect of habit 
on the relationship between behavioral intention and secure behavior had a path 
coefficient of -0.226 at p<0.001 supporting H7b. The path coefficient between behavioral 
intention and secure behavior also decreased slightly from 0.558 to 0.524, but the 
relationship was still significant. A summary of the results for the third (complete) 
research model is shown in Table 4.17. It is also evident that when the moderation effect 
is taken into account, the direct effects of habit and behavioral intention on actual 
behavior are nearly equal for the Lock PC behavior. Tests for significance of control 
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variables indicated that education significantly influenced habit such that higher educated 
individuals demonstrated higher habits. However, education did not have significant 
effects behavioral intention or behavior. Other control variables such as age, gender and 
industry had non-significant effects on habit, behavioral intention or behavior. 






T Value P-Value Support 
H1:  PSEV  BINT (+) 0.288 3.895 p < 0.001 Supported 
H2:  PVUL  BINT (+) 0.215 3.937 p < 0.001 Supported 
H3:  REFF  BINT (+) 0.200 2.616 p < 0.001 Supported 
H4:  SEFF  BINT (+) 0.097 1.598 p <0.100 (p=0.06) Supported 
H5:  RCST  BINT (-) -0.211 3.696 p < 0.001 Supported 
H6:  BINT  BEHV (+) 0.524 11.245 p < 0.001 Supported 
H7a: HBT   BEHV (+) 0.515 8.636 p < 0.001 Supported 
H7b: HBT * INT (-) -0.226 4.821 p < 0.001 Supported 
 
To test for moderation using PLS, Chin et al. (1996) suggested comparing the R-
square values of a model that includes the interaction construct with a model that does 
not include the interaction construct. The overall effect size f² for the moderation can be 
calculated from the difference in R-squares of the two models. Cohen (1988) has 
suggested that overall effect size for the interaction of 0.02 or below to be a small effect, 
0.02-0.15 to be a medium effect and 0.15 or above to be a large effect. However, “it is 
important to understand that a small f² does not necessarily imply an unimportant effect” 
(Limayem et al. 2007, p. 729) . The overall effect size of the moderation (f²) can be 
calculated by the following formula: 
 f² = (R2included - R2excluded) / 1 - R2included (4.1) 
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Based on the R-square difference tests between the models with habit modeled as 
only a direct effect and habit additionally modeled as a moderator, the additional 
moderation effect was found to have a value of 0.033, which is a medium effect (Chin et 
al. 2003; Cohen 1988). It is also evident that the third (complete) model demonstrates 
higher explanatory power than previous two models. Therefore, the research model 
where habit is hypothesized to moderate the relationship between behavioral intentions 
and secure behavior and the model where habit is hypothesized to have only a direct 
effect on secure behaviors have significantly higher explanatory power than the baseline 
model that does not consider habit. The research model also has slightly better 
explanatory power than the model in which habit is hypothesized to have only a direct 
effect on secure behavior. The results of the R-square difference tests are shown in Table 
4.18. 
Table 4.18 Lock PC: Effect Size Calculations 
Model R2 f-statistics 
Baseline Model (Without Habit) 0.536 0.187   
Research Model (Habit as a Moderator) 0.609 0.033 
Habit as a Direct Effect 0.596   
 
Post hoc Analyses 
To further test the validity of using habit as a formative measure, several 
alternative models were analyzed as a post hoc step. Scholars suggest that post hoc 
analysis could be performed to test alternative models that may strengthen the statistical 
findings or assist in developing a model that has better explanatory power. The construct 
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of habit has been a topic of much debate among scholars, and has been modeled in 
different ways, which we review next and compare our research model.  
Habit conceptualized as Limayem et al. 2007 
Habit has not yet received much attention in IS research and has received even 
less attention in information security research. Limayem et al. (2007) investigated the 
role of habit as a moderator of the intention-behavior relationship in the context of IS 
continuance. While they tested a research model similar to our study, they tested habit 
with a reflective scale that failed to capture the true multi-dimensional nature of habit. 
However, as a part of this study, data were collected for the reflective scale of Limayem 
et al. (2007) which allows comparison of the research model of this study using both 
formative and reflective scales for habit.  
The two models for habit were tested using SmartPLS, and the results are shown 
in Table 4.19. The path coefficients of the PMT variables of both models remained the 
same and are not displayed in the table. The magnitude of the path coefficient of the 
intention-behavior relationship was higher (0.524) in our research model with the 
formative scale, compared to the same model tested with the reflective scale (0.275).   
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in Limayem et 
al. 2007 
H6: BINT  BEHV (+) 0.524****  (t=11.245) 0.275**** (t=3.379)  
H7a: HBT  BEHV (+) 0.515****  (t=8.636) 0.750**** (t=11.019) 
H7b: HBT  INT-BEHV (-) -0.226****  (t=4.821) -0.143*      (t=1.386) 
R2 of BINT 0.340 0.340 
R2 of BEHV 0.609 0.710 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Base Model) 
0.187 0.600 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Direct Effect) 
0.033 0.003 
Note:  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
Habit demonstrated a higher direct impact on secure behavior when tested with 
reflective scales, even though both relationships were significant at p<0.001. Both models 
demonstrated that habit was a significant negative moderator of the intention-behavior 
relationship. However, with the formative construct, the moderation coefficient was 
higher (-0.226) and highly significant (p<0.001) compared with the reflective the 
reflective scale results (0.143, and p<0.01). This indicates that when habit is 
conceptualized as a formative construct, which accurately captures the habit domain, the 
negative moderating effect of habit is stronger compared to the 3-item reflective scale. 
The R-square value of secure behavior was higher with the reflective scale, 
demonstrating better explanatory power. One of the reasons for the higher explanatory 
power may be due to the language of the reflective items being closely related to the 
items that measure behavioral intention and behavior. The fact that the respondents could 
not distinguish between the different constructs, may have caused the correlations to 
increase resulting in a higher R-square value. The formative habit scale contains 
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measurement items that are clearly different from the behavioral intention and behavior 
scale items. 
The effect sizes of the moderation were compared between the two models. Both 
models had a large effect size when comparing the baseline model to the model with 
habit has a moderator. However, the effect size, when comparing the model of habit as a 
direct effect to the model with habit as a moderator, was medium when tested with the 
formative scale and was very small when tested with the reflective scale. This provides 
further evidence that the negative moderating effect of habit is stronger when habit is 
conceptualized as a second-order formative construct. 
Habit as a Mediator of the PMT-Intention Relationship 
Vance et al. (2012), one of the few studies in information security that has 
explored the role of habit, modeled PMT variables as mediators of the relationship 
between habit and behavioral intention. As mentioned previously, any indirect 
relationship of habit towards actual behavior does not reflect the definition of habit, 
where habit is defined to be a form of automaticity. However, since the Vance et al. 
(2012) study is closely related to our study, we decided to test their model in the post hoc 
analysis. It is important to note that Vance et al. (2012) measured habit with a 12-item 
self-report habit index (SRHI), which was a reflective scale developed by (Verplanken 
and Orbell 2003). We tested the Vance et al. (2012) research model with both the 
formative and the reflective habit measures separately. 
 First we tested the Vance et al. (2012) research model with the first-order 
reflective and second-order formative habit scale and the results are shown in Figure 4.4. 
Path coefficients of the PMT-intention and intention-behavior relationships remained the 
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same as the previous models. The formative habit construct demonstrated significant 
influence on the threat appraisal variables: perceived threat severity and perceived threat 
vulnerability. However, none of the coping appraisal variables were significantly 
influenced by the formative habit construct.  
 
Figure 4.4 Lock PC: Habit (Formative) as an Indirect Influence  
 
Next, we tested the Vance et al. (2012) research model with the 3-item reflective 
scale developed by Limayem et al. (2007) and the results are shown in Figure 4.5. The 
test results were identical to the findings of the Vance et al.'s (2012) study. Habit 
significantly influenced all the PMT variables with the highest path coefficient being 
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0.470 (p<0.001) between habit and perceived threat severity. It is also important to note 
that habit negatively influenced response cost, which demonstrates that habitual secure 
behaviors decreases the perceived response costs associated with the behavior. This was 
consistent with the findings of Vance et al. (2012). However, the research model of 
Vance et al. (2012) demonstrated a higher explanatory power with an R-square of 44 
percent compared to 34 percent in each of our research models where habit was measured 
formatively and reflectively. 
 




This may indicate that the language of the reflective items may be similar and 
highly correlated to behavioral intention and PMT variables. However, when the 
formative items are used to test the same model, several paths were not supported. The 
formative habit construct makes the language of different dimension items more distinct 
such that respondents may be more likely to recognize the distinction from the behavioral 
intention items. 
Inertia as a mediator of Habit-Intention Relationship 
This study adopted the first-order reflective and second-order habit construct scale 
from Polites and Karahanna (2012). Inertia is defined as the “attachment to, and 
persistence of, existing behavioral patterns (i.e., the status quo), even if there are better 
alternatives or incentives to change” (Polites and Karahanna 2012, p. 24). They 
hypothesized that habit will positively influence inertia and that inertia will negatively 
influence intention to use a new system. Although the applicability of inertia to this study 
was not immediately evident, it seemed fruitful to consider the possible relationship 
between inertia and habit. Accordingly, inertia was measured as part of the data 
collection and an alternative model was tested as a part of the post hoc analysis. As 
discussed in Chapter III, inertia was considered to be a first-order reflective and second-
order formative construct. However, only the behavior-based inertia and affective-based 
inertia components were measured here, since the cognitive-based inertia component is 
not applicable in the context of this study.  
Similar to the formative habit construct, a two stage approach was followed where 
the PLS latent scores for each dimensions were used as weights for the formative 
measures of the inertia construct (Polites and Karahanna 2012). Affective-based inertia 
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demonstrated a weight of 0.262 (p<0.01) and behavior-based inertia demonstrated a 
weight of 0.786 (p<0.001), and thus were suitable to be included in the data analysis. 
Habit was modeled as positively influencing inertia and inertia was modeled as positively 
influencing behavioral intention, which corresponds to the research model of Polites and 
Karahanna (2012).  
The results of the data analysis are shown in Figure 4.6. All the PMT variables 
significantly influenced behavioral intention except perceived threat vulnerability. Habit 
significantly influenced inertia with a path coefficient of 0.645 (p<0.001) and inertia 
significantly influenced behavioral intention with a coefficient of 0.570 (p<0.001). Habit 
also explained 41.6 percent of the variance in inertia. Inertia was hypothesized to 
negatively influence behavioral intentions by Polites and Karahanna (2012) and they 
found support for their hypothesis. However, the results of this alternative model found 
that path to be significant, but positive, which means that increased levels of inertia leads 
to increased behavioral intention to perform secure behavior. R-square of the behavioral 
intention was 57.9 percent. Mediation tests revealed that inertia partially mediated the 
relationship between habit and behavioral intention. Another research model where a 
reflective habit construct was utilized yielded similar results with similar explanatory 
power.  
A research model that included direct paths to behavioral intention from both 
habit and inertia demonstrated an R-square value of 61 percent, slightly increasing the 
explanatory power of the model due to the direct influence of habit on behavioral 
intention. The results suggest that inertia increased the explanatory power of the research 
model, indicating that it may play a role in the performance of secure behaviors, although 
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the path was significant in the opposite direction compared to the results of Polites and 
Karahanna (2012). This discrepancy of the results will be discussed in detail on Chapter 
V. 
 
Figure 4.6 Lock PC: Inertia as a Mediator of Habit and Intention 
 
Habit as a Direct Influence of Behavioral Intention 
Several IS research studies that investigated the role of habit on information 
systems usage modeled habit as a direct influence on behavioral intention (Gefen 2003; 
Lankton et al. 2012; Wu and Kuo 2008). This is rather contradictory to the definition of 
habit where it is defined as a form of automaticity (Verplanken et al. 1997). This 
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dissertation also defines habit as a form of automaticity. Therefore, modeling habit as a 
direct influence on behavioral intention is contradictory. However, since previous IS 
studies have modeled habit as a direct influence of behavioral intention, a similar 
alternative model was tested as a part of the post hoc analysis.  
First, the path between habit and behavioral intention was tested with the first-
order reflective and second-order formative habit construct. The results of this analysis 
are shown in Figure 4.7. The path from habit to behavioral intention was significant with 
a path coefficient of 0.474 (p<0.001). All the paths from PMT variables to behavioral 
intention were significant with the lowest significant path being self-efficacy and 
behavioral intention (p<0.01). R-square value of behavioral intention was 51.5 percent 




Figure 4.7 Lock PC: Direct Influence of Habit on Behavioral Intention 
 
Next, the same model was tested with the reflective habit scale. The paths from 
perceived severity to behavioral intention and response cost to behavioral intention were 
non-significant. Paths from perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy 
to behavioral intention were significant. The path from habit to behavioral intention was 
significant with a path coefficient of 0.673 (p<0.001). R-square of behavioral intention 
was 65.5 percent compared to the R-square of 51.5 percent when the model was tested 
with the formative habit scale. Therefore, the model with a reflective habit scale 
demonstrated higher explanatory power than the model with a formative habit scale when 
habit was modeled as a direct influence of behavioral intention. 
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Habit as a Moderator of the PMT-Behavior Relationship 
Information security literature suggests that measuring actual behavior is 
preferred rather than intentions (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler et al. 2013; 
Mahmood et al. 2010; Warkentin et al. 2012). As discussed previously, actual behaviors 
are of more importance in information security since behavioral intentions do not 
necessarily lead to actual secure behavior. Therefore, it is recommended that researchers 
collect data on actual behavior whenever possible since most information security studies 
utilize behavioral intention as a proxy for actual behaviors (Crossler et al. 2013).  
As a part of the post hoc study, an alternative model where PMT variables 
directly influenced actual behavior was tested. Habit was hypothesized to directly 
influence secure behavior while moderating the relationships between the PMT variables 
and actual behavior. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 4.8.  
Paths from perceived threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response 
cost, and habit to secure behavior were significant. Path from perceived threat 
vulnerability to secure behavior were insignificant. Similarly, habit did not significantly 
moderate the paths from perceived threat vulnerability and response efficacy to secure 
behavior. Habit significantly moderated the paths from perceived threat severity, self-
efficacy and response cost to secure behavior. It is important to note that habit negatively 
moderated the path between perceived threat severity and secure behavior demonstrating 
that when a certain behavior is habitual, the perceived severity of the threat is lesser. 
Similarly, when a certain behavior is habitual, self-efficacy and response cost increases. 
This is demonstrated in habit significantly moderating the paths between response cost 




Figure 4.8 Lock PC: Habit as a Moderator of PMT Behavior  
 
Behavior 2: Verify Email Recipients (n=443) 
The second behavior tested was “verifying the email recipient addresses before 
sending email.” A total of 500 responses were collected for this behavior, and the surveys 
were completed in an average of four minutes and twenty-one seconds. Responses that 
were incomplete or failed the response set item were removed. This resulted in a usable 
sample of 443 responses, which exceeded the required sample size of 308 as calculated 
through the power analysis. 
Of the usable responses, 288 (65%) were male and 155 (35%) were female. There 
were 117 (26.4%) respondents who were between the ages of 18 and 24, 216 (48.8%) 
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were between the ages of 25 and 34, 74 (16.7%) were between the ages of 35 and 44, 20 
(4.5%) were between the ages of 45 and 54, 15 (3.4%) were between the ages of 55 and 
64 and 1 (0.2%) were age 65 or above. In terms of the education of the respondents, 142 
(32.1%) had a 2-year college degree or lesser, 201 (45.4%) had a 4-year college degree, 
94 (21.2%) had a master’s degree and 6 (1.35%) had a doctoral degree or a professional 
degree.The respondents were employed in various industries and the majority of the 
respondents belonged to the categories of Information (18.5%), professional, scientific or 
technical services (12.0%) and educational services (10.4%).  Table 4.20 provides the 




Table 4.20 Verify Email Recipients: Demographics of Main Investigation 
Demographic Category Frequency 
Gender 
Male 288 (65.0%) 
Female 155 (35.0%) 
Age 
18-24 117 (26.4%) 
25-34 216 (48.8%) 
35-44 74 (16.7%) 
45-54 20 (4.5%) 
55-64 15 (3.4%) 
65 and older 1 (0.2%) 
Education 
Less than High School 2 (0.5%) 
High School / GED 29 (6.5%) 
Some College 72 (16.3%) 
2-year College Degree 39 (8.8%) 
4-year College Degree 201 (45.4%) 
Masters Degree 94 (21.2%) 
Doctoral Degree 2 (0.5%) 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 4 (0.9%) 
Industry 
Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 2 (0.5%) 
Mining 3 (0.7%) 
Utilities 4 (0.9%) 
Construction 15 (3.4%) 
Manufacturing 32 (7.2%) 
Wholesale trade 7 (1.6%) 
Retail trade 22 (5.0%) 
Transportation or warehousing 8 (1.8%) 
Information 82 (18.5%) 
Finance or insurance 37 (8.4%) 
Real estate or rental and leasing 7 (1.6%) 
Professional, scientific or technical services 53 (12.0%) 
Management of companies or enterprises 16 (3.6%) 
Admin, support, waste management or 
remediation services 15 (3.4%) 
Educational services 46 (10.4%) 
Health care or social assistance 30 (6.8%) 
Arts, entertainment or recreation 13 (2.9%) 
Accommodation or food services 5 (1.1%) 
Other services (except public administration) 37 (8.4%) 




As with the previous behavior, an EFA was repeated for the main investigation 
with a sample size of 443, since minor changes were made to the language of certain 
items following the preliminary investigation phase. The items demonstrated an 
acceptable response spread and no unusual patterns in the means and standard deviations 
were found. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant at 0.000 and Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy test result of 0.883 indicated that factor 
analysis was appropriate for this sample (Hair et al. 2010).  
The EFA was conducted using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
technique with a Varimax rotation. Ten factors with an Eigenvalue of one or greater, 
were extracted and those factors explained a total of 74.66% of the variance, which is 
above the 65% recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The communalities of the items were 
well above the accepted threshold of 0.30. 
All the items loaded cleanly on their respective factors except EFFC2, which had 
a loading of 0.437. EFFC2 had a similar cross-loading issue during the EFA of behavior 
1 as well, indicating that it may be a problematic item. EFFC2 was removed, and the 
EFA was re-run. This improved the factor loadings, and the remaining items loaded 
cleanly on their respective factors. The results of the EFA are shown in Table 4.21. 
Correlations lower than 0.40 in absolute value were suppressed for clarity. BINT1 had a 
loading of 0.599, which is lower than the recommended 0.70 loadings. However, BINT1 
did not cross-load with any other factors and the removal of BINT1 from the EFA did not 
contribute to better loadings. Therefore, BINT1 was retained for the data analysis.  
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Table 4.21 Verify Email Recipients: EFA results of Main Investigation  
Rotated Component Matrixa 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR1 .809                  
AWAR2 .797                  
AWAR3 .802                  
AWAR4 .842                  
BEHV1   .799                
BEHV2   .825                
BEHV3   .704                
BINT1     .599               
BINT2     .787               
BINT3     .707               
CTRL1       .859            
CTRL2      .870            
CTRL3      .866            
CTRL4      .848            
EFFC1       .799           
EFFC3        .719           
EFFC4        .704           
PSEV1         .829         
PSEV2          .777         
PSEV3          .875         
PVUL1           .804       
PVUL2            .827       
PVUL3            .808       
RCST1              .844     
RCST2              .842     
RCST3              .788     
RCST4              .819     
REFF1                .728   
REFF2                .785   
REFF3                 .717  
REFF4                 .767  
SEFF1                   .731 
SEFF2                  .685 
SEFF3                  .784 
SEFF4                  .723 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  




SmartPLS was used again to test both the measurement model and structural 
model similar to the previous behavior that was tested. A measurement model analysis 
was conducted to examine the psychometric properties of all the reflective constructs 
included in the research model. PLS validation procedures outlined by Gefen and Straub 
(2005) were followed to establish the validity and reliability of the measurement model. 
All the scales except EFFC had alpha values larger than the recommended threshold. 
EFFC had an alpha value of 0.669, which was still acceptable. All the scales 
demonstrated composite reliability values much higher than the recommended ones with 
the lowest value being 0.819 for the scale EFFC.  
Table 4.22 Verify Email Recipients: Reliability Statistics 
Construct AVE C-Alpha CREL 
Mean  
(St. dev) Min/Max 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.707 0.862 0.906 3.44 (0.888)  1.0/5.0  
BEHV Actual Behavior 0.802 0.877 0.924 4.00 (0.782)   1.0/5.0 
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.742 0.827 0.896  3.91 (0.771)  1.0/5.0 
CTRL Uncontrollability 0.797 0.915 0.940  3.22 (0.988)  1.0/5.0 
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.602 0.669 0.819  3.44 (0.774)  1.0/5.0 
PSEV Perceived Severity 0.753 0.836 0.901  3.76 (0.853)  1.0/5.0 
PVUL Perceived Vulnerability 0.767 0.858 0.908  2.84 (1.123)  1.0/5.0 
RCST Response Cost 0.762 0.897 0.928  2.80 (1.035)  1.0/5.0 
REFF Response Efficacy 0.707 0.863 0.906  4.00 (0.725)  1.0/5.0 
SEFF Self-Efficacy 0.683 0.845 0.896  4.13 (0.685)  2.0/5.0 
 
All the items demonstrated loadings well above 0.7 showing above acceptable 
reliability. The values of the reliability tests such as composite reliability and Cronbach’s 
alpha are shown in Table 4.22 and item loadings are shown in Table 4.23. These values 
indicate that the scales satisfy the reliability requirements.  
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Convergent validity requirements such as item loadings that exceed 0.70 on their 
respective constructs and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.50 (Gefen and 
Straub 2005) for each construct were examined. As shown in Table 4.24 all the item 
loadings exceeded 0.70 on their respective constructs. Table 4.22 shows that all the scales 
demonstrated AVE values well above 0.5. Therefore, all the scales of this study 
demonstrate convergent validity values that are beyond the recommended thresholds. 
Table 4.23 Verify Email Recipients: Inter-Construct Correlations  
      AWAR    BEHV    BINT    CTRL    EFFC    PSEV    PVUL    RCST    REFF    SEFF 
AWAR 0.841                  
 BEHV 0.313 0.895                
 BINT 0.272 0.646 0.861              
 CTRL 0.347 0.208 0.281 0.893            
 EFFC 0.252 0.219 0.276 0.321 0.776          
 PSEV 0.185 0.349 0.337 0.242 0.090 0.868        
 PVUL 0.138 -0.163 -0.151 0.171 0.020 0.055 0.876      
 RCST 0.113 -0.225 -0.233 0.136 0.107 -0.004 0.555 0.873    
 REFF 0.156 0.510 0.539 0.087 0.163 0.369 -0.266 -0.311 0.841  
 SEFF 0.085 0.440 0.491 0.029 0.179 0.295 -0.318 -0.348 0.638 0.826 
* The highlighted diagonal elements are square-roots of the AVE 
Discriminant validity can be demonstrated if the square root of each construct’s 
AVE is greater than the absolute value of the inter-construct correlations. As it is shown 
in Table 4.23, the square roots of the AVEs of all constructs were found to be larger than 
all cross-correlations of the other constructs, demonstrating discriminant validity of the 
constructs used in this study (Gefen and Straub 2005). Discriminant validity is also 
demonstrated when items load on their respective constructs more than any other 
construct, as it did in this study. PLS loadings and cross-loadings for all the items are 
shown in Table 4.24. 
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Table 4.24 Verify Email Recipients: PLS loadings for the Main Investigation  
         AWAR    BEHV    BINT    CTRL    EFFC    PSEV    PVUL    RCST    REFF    SEFF 
AWAR1 0.826 0.276 0.272 0.255 0.175 0.130 0.104 0.074 0.157 0.083 
AWAR2 0.833 0.293 0.232 0.309 0.215 0.164 0.065 0.091 0.148 0.075 
AWAR3 0.835 0.242 0.207 0.301 0.253 0.188 0.152 0.126 0.133 0.079 
AWAR4 0.869 0.245 0.206 0.302 0.202 0.140 0.142 0.087 0.090 0.051 
 BEHV1 0.272 0.895 0.575 0.179 0.170 0.302 -0.138 -0.237 0.429 0.386 
 BEHV2 0.276 0.898 0.556 0.188 0.170 0.298 -0.136 -0.170 0.460 0.352 
 BEHV3 0.292 0.894 0.603 0.192 0.244 0.334 -0.163 -0.197 0.479 0.441 
 BINT1 0.250 0.610 0.882 0.225 0.191 0.315 -0.154 -0.269 0.531 0.463 
 BINT2 0.231 0.521 0.825 0.249 0.278 0.244 -0.100 -0.134 0.382 0.376 
 BINT3 0.221 0.532 0.876 0.257 0.256 0.306 -0.131 -0.185 0.466 0.423 
 CTRL1 0.317 0.213 0.247 0.888 0.259 0.201 0.171 0.125 0.043 -0.043 
 CTRL2 0.309 0.186 0.276 0.902 0.292 0.245 0.137 0.103 0.126 0.016 
 CTRL3 0.328 0.182 0.241 0.902 0.300 0.221 0.162 0.131 0.085 -0.026 
 CTRL4 0.285 0.161 0.240 0.878 0.295 0.198 0.141 0.125 0.056 -0.054 
 EFFC1 0.191 0.191 0.249 0.259 0.815 0.068 -0.088 -0.041 0.176 0.197 
 EFFC3 0.158 0.296 0.311 0.220 0.746 0.118 -0.065 -0.003 0.261 0.269 
 EFFC4 0.233 0.039 0.097 0.265 0.765 0.029 0.187 0.280 -0.038 -0.031 
 PSEV1 0.153 0.316 0.313 0.235 0.088 0.880 0.059 -0.008 0.327 0.223 
 PSEV2 0.181 0.283 0.292 0.208 0.069 0.840 0.073 0.015 0.304 0.298 
 PSEV3 0.148 0.308 0.268 0.184 0.075 0.882 0.008 -0.017 0.331 0.249 
 PVUL1 0.135 -0.107 -0.116 0.168 0.022 0.072 0.875 0.515 -0.225 -0.310 
 PVUL2 0.205 -0.093 -0.072 0.173 0.059 0.093 0.825 0.465 -0.217 -0.241 
 PVUL3 0.080 -0.193 -0.173 0.132 -0.003 0.016 0.924 0.490 -0.252 -0.283 
 RCST1 0.089 -0.240 -0.233 0.108 0.094 -0.028 0.513 0.911 -0.296 -0.303 
 RCST2 0.063 -0.173 -0.213 0.114 0.042 -0.012 0.414 0.860 -0.249 -0.294 
 RCST3 0.119 -0.129 -0.137 0.104 0.116 0.094 0.500 0.820 -0.188 -0.267 
 RCST4 0.133 -0.220 -0.210 0.147 0.133 -0.031 0.524 0.899 -0.327 -0.347 
 REFF1 0.095 0.412 0.446 0.072 0.147 0.288 -0.261 -0.307 0.835 0.561 
 REFF2 0.150 0.407 0.417 0.055 0.087 0.306 -0.191 -0.242 0.838 0.514 
 REFF3 0.172 0.452 0.519 0.101 0.161 0.357 -0.222 -0.251 0.863 0.561 
 REFF4 0.102 0.441 0.420 0.058 0.149 0.283 -0.220 -0.247 0.828 0.504 
 SEFF1 0.050 0.392 0.387 -0.025 0.165 0.220 -0.296 -0.343 0.527 0.829 
 SEFF2 0.088 0.377 0.445 -0.039 0.170 0.239 -0.265 -0.228 0.560 0.835 
 SEFF3 0.074 0.334 0.379 0.000 0.106 0.251 -0.264 -0.316 0.469 0.813 




Tests for Common Method Bias 
Similar to the previous behavior, CMV tests were performed to assess any biases 
resulting from the use of the same method to collect data. We conducted statistical 
analysis using three tests to check for the presence of and severity of CMV in our data. 
For the first test, we used the Harmon one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003), where an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on all 
the variables used in our model and the unrotated factor solution was examined. It is 
assumed that CMV exists if a single factor emerges from unrotated factor solutions or a 
first factor explains the majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff and Organ 
1986). Ten factors emerged from the EFA, which accounted for 74.66% of the variance. 
The greatest variance explained by one factor was 24.38%, demonstrating that common 
method variance is unlikely to bias the results. A second test suggested by Pavlou et al. 
(2007) was conducted. Examining the inter-construct correlations in Table 4.23, the 
highest correlation among constructs is 0.646, which is not extremely high as suggested 
by Pavlou et al. (2007), thus ruling out CMV in this study.  
For the third test, we used a more rigorous statistical approach suggested by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to check for common method bias. Table 4.25 shows the factor 
loadings for each major construct and factor loadings for the common method construct 





Table 4.25 Verify Email Recipients: CMV Test Results 


















Awareness AWAR1 0.831 0.692 0.031 0.001 
  AWAR2 0.822 0.676 -0.007 0.000 
  AWAR3 0.834 0.696 -0.033 0.001 
  AWAR4 0.878 0.771 -0.052 0.003 
Behavior BEHV1 0.915 0.837 -0.024 0.001 
  BEHV2 0.951 0.903 -0.065 0.004 
  BEHV3 0.821 0.674 0.089** 0.008 
Behavioral Intention BINT1 0.762 0.580 0.139 0.019 
  BINT2 0.928 0.861 -0.118** 0.014 
  BINT3 0.903 0.815 -0.030 0.001 
Uncontrollability CTRL1 0.892 0.796 -0.015 0.000 
  CTRL2 0.892 0.795 0.041 0.002 
  CTRL3 0.902 0.813 -0.002 0.000 
  CTRL4 0.885 0.783 -0.025 0.001 
Mental Efficiency EFFC1 0.804 0.646 0.058 0.003 
  EFFC3 0.726 0.527 0.154** 0.024 
  EFFC4 0.803 0.645 -0.235** 0.055 
Perceived Severity PSEV1 0.873 0.762 0.002 0.000 
  PSEV2 0.829 0.688 0.012 0.000 
  PSEV3 0.901 0.811 -0.013 0.000 
Perceived Vulnerability PVUL1 0.891 0.795 -0.002 0.000 
  PVUL2 0.908 0.824 0.060 0.004 
  PVUL3 0.849 0.720 -0.059 0.003 
Response Cost RCST1 0.885 0.782 -0.034 0.001 
  RCST2 0.849 0.720 0.001 0.000 
  RCST3 0.889 0.791 0.083* 0.007 
  RCST4 0.875 0.766 -0.045 0.002 
Response Efficacy REFF1 0.798 0.637 0.046 0.002 
  REFF2 0.923 0.852 -0.095 0.009 
  REFF3 0.762 0.580 0.106** 0.011 
  REFF4 0.885 0.783 -0.059 0.003 
Self-Efficacy SEFF1 0.814 0.663 0.0268 0.001 
  SEFF2 0.798 0.637 0.0301 0.001 
  SEFF3 0.866 0.750 -0.0577 0.003 
  SEFF4 0.828 0.686 0.0292 0.001 




The results explain that the average loading of the indicators is 0.8571 while the 
average loading of the method indicators is -0.0028. The average variance explained by 
the substantive constructs is 73.7 percent compared to the 0.5 percent average variance 
explained by the method construct. Moreover, except for six indicators, all the method 
factor loadings were insignificant. Since the most of the method factor loadings are 
insignificant and the indicators’ substantive variances are substantially greater than their 
method variances, it can be concluded that common method bias is unlikely to be a 
serious concern in the data of this study (Williams et al. 2003). Therefore, based on the 
three separate tests to measure CMV, we concluded that common method bias was not a 
concern for this study. 
Structural Model 
The structural models were then tested with the SmartPLS software. Factor scores 
for each of the first-order dimensions of habit were generated. These factors scores were 
used as formative measures of the second-order aggregate construct of habit (Chin et al. 
2003; Polites and Karahanna 2012).  
Reliability and validity tests that were performed on the first-order reflective 
dimensions of habit previously do not apply to formative scales because “the 
measurement model does not predict that the sub-dimensions will be correlated” (Bollen 
and Lennox 1991; Edwards 2003; MacKenzie et al. 2011, p.314). Item weights of the 
formative constructs can be examined to identify their individual influence in forming 
each construct (Chin 1998; Petter et al. 2007). The weights for the three habit dimensions 
were 0.719 for Lack of Awareness, 0.223 for Uncontrollability and 0.368 for Mental 
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Efficiency. The weight for Uncontrollability was not significant while Lack of Awareness 
and Mental Efficiency were significant at p<0.001.  
The formative dimensions of the habit construct were tested for multicollinearity 
next. To test for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics for the 
three dimensions of habit were examined. As shown in Table 4.26, VIF values are well 
below the recommended threshold value of 3.3 Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006), 
which indicates no serious multicollinearity issues with the formative dimensions of 
habit. Individual weights of the formative dimensions of habit also indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Table 4.26 Verify Email Recipients: Weights of the Formative Habit Construct 
Construct Dimension Weight VIF 
Habit Lack of Awareness 0.719 (****) 1.115 
  Uncontrollability 0.223 (n.s.) 1.068 
  Mental Efficiency 0.368 (****) 1.137 
Note: ****p<0.001 
Although two of the formative dimensions of habit are significant, the dimension 
of Uncontrollability is not significant. Content validity of formative scales is affected if 
one of the indicators that represent one of the formative dimensions is removed. Since 
uncontrollability is one of the three dimensions that constitute habit, it was retained for 
the structural model analysis although its weight was not significant.  
To test the role of habit in information security behaviors, data analyses were run 
in three stages, following the recommendations by Limayem et al. (2007). First, we ran a 
baseline research model with only the PMT variables. The next model added habit as a 
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direct effect on behavior. The final model added the possibility of habit moderating the 
relationship between behavioral intention and behavior.  
Verify Email Recipient Behavior: Baseline Model 
A baseline model, without the incorporation of the habit construct was tested first 
and the results are shown on Figure 4.9. Paths from perceived threat severity, response 
efficacy and self-efficacy to behavioral intention were significant (p<0.001) while paths 
from perceived threat vulnerability and response cost were not significant. The path from 
behavioral intention to secure behavior was also significant at p<0.001.  
 




This model accounts for 41.7 percent of the variance of self-reported actual 
behavior and 34.9 percent of the variance in behavioral intention to perform a secure 
behavior. Perceived threat vulnerability was not found to have a significant influence on 
behavioral intention, indicating that the respondents perceived the possibility of sending 
an email with sensitive company information to a wrong recipient as low. However, the 
results indicate that the respondents perceive it to be a severe problem, if an unintended 
recipient receives an email with sensitive company information. The non-significant path 
from perceived threat vulnerability to behavioral intention is was similar to the results of 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Malimage and Warkentin (2010) and Woon et al. 
(2005). The non-significant path from response cost and behavioral intention also 
indicates that the perceived costs of verifying the recipient email addresses before 
sending email are not significant enough to influence their intentions to perform that 
behavior.   
Verify Email Recipient Behavior: Habit as a Direct Effect 
In the second research model, habit is hypothesized to have a direct effect on 
secure behavior. The results for this model are shown on Figure 4.10. Similar to the first 
model, paths from perceived threat vulnerability and response cost were non-significant 
while the remaining paths were significant. 
The introduction of habit as a direct effect on secure behavior increased variance 
explained by the self-reported behavior from 41.7 percent to 43.4 percent. Habit 
significantly influenced secure behavior with a path coefficient of 0.137 at p<0.01, 
supporting H7a. The path coefficient between behavioral intention and secure behavior 




Figure 4.10 Verify Email Recipients: Habit as a Direct Effect  
 
Verify Email Recipient Behavior: Habit as a Moderator and Direct Effect 
In the third and final research model, habit is included as a direct effect on secure 
behavior and in addition as moderating the relationship between behavioral intention and 
behavior. The results for this model are shown in Figure 4.11. 
The introduction of habit as a moderator increased the total variance explained by 
secure behavior slightly from 43.4 percent to 44.5 percent. The moderating effect of habit 
on the relationship between behavioral intention and secure behavior had a path 
coefficient of -0.114 at p<0.01 supporting H7b. The path coefficient between behavioral 
intention and secure behavior also reduced marginally from 0.597 to 0.551, but the 
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relationship was still significant. Tests for significance of control variables indicated that 
none of the control variables of age, gender, education and industry significantly 
influenced habit, behavioral intention or behavior. A summary of the results for the third 
(complete) research model is shown in Table 4.27.  
 











T Value P-Value Support 
H1: PSEV  BINT (+) 0.146 3.179 p < 0.001 Supported 
H2: PVUL  BINT (+) 0.041 0.800 p < 0.10 Not Supported 
H3: REFF  BINT (+) 0.329 4.380 p < 0.001 Supported 
H4: SEFF  BINT (+) 0.225 2.791 p < 0.001 Supported 
H5: RCST  BINT (-) -0.075 1.259 p < 0.10 Not Supported 
H6: BINT  BEHV (+) 0.551 11.669 p < 0.001 Supported 
H7a: HBT  BEHV (+) 0.161 3.258 p < 0.001 Supported 
H7b: HBT  INT-BEHV (-) -0.114 2.974 p < 0.001 Supported 
 
Based on the R-square difference tests between the models with habit modeled as 
a direct effect and habit additionally modeled as a moderator, the additional moderation 
effect was found to have a value of 0.019, which is a small effect (Chin et al. 2003; 
Cohen 1988). It is also evident that the third (complete) model demonstrates higher 
explanatory power than previous two models. Therefore, the research model where habit 
is hypothesized to moderate the relationship between behavioral intentions and secure 
behavior and the model where habit is hypothesized to only have a direct effect on secure 
behaviors have significantly higher explanatory power than the baseline model that does 
not consider habit. The results of the R-square difference tests are shown in Table 4.28. 
Table 4.28 Verify Email Recipients: Effect Size Calculations  
Model R2 f-statistics 
Baseline Model (Without Habit) 0.417 0.050   
Research Model (Habit as a Moderator) 0.445 0.019 




Post hoc Analyses 
To further test the validity of using habit as a formative measure, several alternate 
models were analyzed as a post hoc step. The construct of habit has been a topic of much 
debate among scholars, and has been modeled in many different ways. We compare our 
research model to some of these models that tested habit.  
Habit conceptualized as Limayem et al. 2007 
Data were collected for the reflective scale of Limayem et al. (2007) as a part of 
this study, which allowed comparison of the research model of this study using both 
formative and reflective scales of habit. The two models were tested using SmartPLS and 
the results are shown in Table 4.29. The path coefficients of the PMT variables of both 
models remained the same and are not displayed in the table. The magnitude of the path 
coefficient of the intention-behavior relationship was higher (0.551) in our research 
model that tested habit as a second-order formative construct, compared to the alternate 
research model where habit was conceptualized using the reflective scale from Limayem 
et al. (2007).  
Habit demonstrated a higher direct impact on secure behavior when tested with 
reflective scales, even though both relationships were significant at p<0.001. Only the 
model tested with the formative scales demonstrated that habit was a significant negative 
moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. Although the path coefficient was 
higher (-0.242) in the model tested with reflective scales, the moderation effect was non-
significant. This indicates that when habit is conceptualized as a formative construct, 
which accurately captures the habit domain, the negative moderating effect of habit is 
stronger compared to the 3-item reflective scale. The R-square value of secure behavior 
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was higher in the research model with the reflective scale demonstrating that when habit 
was tested using the reflective scale of Limayem et al. (2007), the model had better 
explanatory power. As discussed previously, this may be due to the higher correlations 
between habit and other constructs due to the language of the reflective items being 
closely related to the items that measure behavioral intention and behavior. 








in Limayem et 
al. 2007 
H6: BINT  BEHV (+) 0.551 ****  (t=11.669) 0.452 ***   (t=2.935) 
H7a: HBT  BEHV (+) 0.161 ****  (t=3.258) 0.616 **** (t=4.561) 
H7b: HBT  INT-BEHV (-) -0.114 ***    (t=2.974) -0.242 n.s.  (t=1.024) 
R2 of BINT 0.349  0.349 
R2 of BEHV 0.445 0.550 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Base Model) 
0.050 0.300 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Direct Effect) 
0.019 0.002 
Note:  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
The effect sizes of the moderation were compared between the two models. The 
model tested with the formative scale had a small effect size compared to the model with 
reflective scales, which had a large effect size when comparing the baseline model to the 
model with habit has a moderator. However, the effect size, when comparing the model 
of habit as a direct effect to the model with habit as a moderator was medium when tested 
with the formative scale and the effect size was very small in when tested with the 
reflective scale. This provides further evidence that the negative moderating effect of 
habit is stronger when habit is conceptualized as a second-order formative construct. 
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Habit as a Mediator of the PMT-Intention Relationship 
As an alternative model, we tested Vance et al. (2012) research model with both 
the formative and the reflective habit measures separately. First we tested the Vance et al. 
(2012) research model with the first-order reflective and second-order formative habit 
scale and the results are shown on Figure 4.12. Perceived threat severity and response 
cost had non-significant relationships with behavioral intention while the remaining PMT 
variables had significant relationships. The formative habit construct demonstrated 
significant influence on the threat appraisal variables: perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability and coping appraisal variables: response efficacy and 
response cost.  
 
Figure 4.12 Verify Email Recipients: Habit (Formative) as an Indirect Influence 
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Next, we tested the Vance et al. (2012) research model with the 3-item reflective 
scale developed by Limayem et al. (2007) and the results are shown on Figure 4.13. Habit 
significantly influenced all the PMT variables, with the highest path coefficient being 
0.496 (p<0.001) between habit and perceived threat vulnerability. The support for the 
hypotheses are consistent with the findings of Vance et al. (2012). However, the research 
model of Vance et al. (2012) demonstrated a higher explanatory power with a R-square 
of behavioral intention at 44 percent compared to the R-square value of 35 percent in 
each of our research models where habit was measured formatively and reflectively. 
 




Inertia as a mediator of Habit-Intention Relationship 
An alternative model, where habit directly influenced inertia and inertia directly 
influenced behavioral intention, was tested. Similar to the formative habit construct, a 
two stage approach was followed where the PLS latest scores for each dimensions were 
used as the formative measures of the inertia construct (Polites and Karahanna 2012). 
Affective-based inertia demonstrated a weight of 0.349 (p<0.01) and behavior-based 
inertia demonstrated a weight of 0.741 (p<0.001), thus were suitable to be included in the 
data analysis. Habit was modeled as positively influencing inertia and inertia was 
modeled as positively influencing behavioral intention, which reflects the research model 
of Polites and Karahanna (2012).  
The results of the data analysis are shown on Figure 4.14. All the PMT variables 
significantly influenced behavioral intention except perceived threat vulnerability and 
response cost. Habit significantly influenced inertia with a path coefficient of 0.440 
(p<0.001) and inertia significantly influenced behavioral intention with a coefficient of 
0.445 (p<0.001). Habit also explained 19.4 percent of the variance in inertia. The 
relationship between inertia and behavioral intention was positive for the verify email 
recipient behavior too, which is in contrast to the hypothesis by Polites and Karahanna 
(2012). This means that increased levels of inertia leads to increased behavioral intention 
to perform secure behavior. R-square of the behavioral intention was 50.4 percent. 
Mediation tests revealed that inertia partially mediated the relationship between habit and 
behavioral intention. Another research model where a reflective habit construct was 




Figure 4.14 Verify Email Recipients: Inertia as a Mediator of Habit and Intention 
 
A research model that included direct paths to behavioral intention from both 
habit and inertia demonstrated a R-square value of 52.2 percent, slightly increasing the 
explanatory power of the model due to the direct influence of habit on behavioral 
intention. The results suggest that inertia increased the explanatory power of the research 
model indicating that it may play a role in the performance of secure behaviors, although 
the path was significant in the opposite direction compared to the results of Polites and 




Habit as a Direct Influence of Behavioral Intention 
An alternative model where habit was modeled as a direct influence of behavioral 
intention was tested as a part of the post hoc analysis. First, the path between habit and 
behavioral intention was tested with the first-order reflective and second-order formative 
habit construct. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 4.15. The path from habit to 
behavioral intention was significant with a path coefficient of 0.298 (p<0.001). All the paths 
from PMT variables to behavioral intention were significant except for perceived threat 
vulnerability. R-square value of behavioral intention was 42.6 percent explaining 
considerably more explanatory power than the baseline model without habit.  
 




Next, the same model was tested with the reflective habit scale. The paths from 
perceived severity, perceived threat vulnerability and response cost to behavioral intention 
were non-significant. Only the paths from response efficacy and self-efficacy to behavioral 
intention were shown to be significant. The path from habit to behavioral intention was 
significant with a path coefficient of 0.499 (p<0.001). R-square of behavioral intention was 
52 percent compared to the R-square of 42.6 percent when the model was tested with the 
formative habit scale. Therefore, the model with a reflective habit scale demonstrated higher 
explanatory power than the model with a formative habit scale when habit was modeled as a 
direct influence of behavioral intention. 
Habit as a Moderator of the PMT-Behavior Relationship 
As a part of the post hoc study, an alternative model where PMT variables 
directly influenced actual behavior was tested. Habit was hypothesized to directly 
influence secure behavior while moderating the relationships between the PMT variables 
and actual behavior. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 4.16.  
Paths from perceived threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
cost to secure behavior were significant. Paths from perceived threat vulnerability and 
habit to secure behavior were insignificant. Similarly, habit did not significantly 
moderate the paths from the PMT variables to secure behavior except for the paths 
between perceived threat severity and response cost with secure behavior. It is important 
to note that habit negatively moderated the path between perceived threat severity and 
secure behavior demonstrating that when a certain behavior is habitual, the perceived 
severity of the threat is lesser. Similarly, when a certain behavior is habitual, response 
 
198 
cost increases. This is demonstrated in habit significantly moderating the path between 
response cost and secure behavior.  
 
Figure 4.16 Verify Email Recipients: Habit as a Moderator of PMT-Behavior   
 
Behavior 3: Visit Verified Websites (N=395) 
The third behavior tested was “visiting only verified websites.” A total of 500 
responses were collected for this behavior, and the surveys were completed in an average 
of four minutes and twenty seconds. Responses that were incomplete or failed the 
response set item were removed. This resulted in a usable sample of 395 responses, 
which exceeded the required sample size of 308 as calculated through the power analysis. 
 
199 
Of the usable responses, 241 (61%) were male and 154 (39%) were female. There 
were 120 (30.4%) respondents who were between the ages of 18 and 24, 185 (46.8%) 
were between the ages of 25 and 34, 54 (13.7%) were between the ages of 35 and 44, 25 
(6.3%) were between the ages of 45 and 54, 9 (2.3%) were between the ages of 55 and 64 
and 2 (0.5%) were age 65 or above. In terms of the education of the respondents, 110 
(27.8%) had a 2-year college degree or lesser, 174 (44.1%) had a 4-year college degree, 
102 (25.8%) had a masters degree and 9 (2.27%) had a doctoral degree or a professional 
degree. 
The respondents were employed in various industries and the majority of the 
respondents belonged to the categories of Information (20.3%), finance and insurance 
(11.6%) and professional, scientific or technical services (8.6%).  Table 4.30 provides the 




Table 4.30 Visit Verified Websites: Demographics of Main Investigation 
Demographic Category Frequency 
Gender 
Male 241 (61.0%) 
Female 154 (39.0%) 
Age 
18-24 120 (30.4%) 
25-34 185 (46.8%) 
35-44 54 (13.7%) 
45-54 25 (6.3%) 
55-64 9 (2.3%) 
65 and older 2 (0.5%) 
Education 
Less than High School 0 (0%) 
High School / GED 28 (7.1%) 
Some College 57 (14.4%) 
2-year College Degree 25 (6.3%) 
4-year College Degree 174 (44.1%) 
Masters Degree 102 (25.8%) 
Doctoral Degree 5 (1.3%) 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 4 (1.0%) 
Industry 
Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 3 (0.5%) 
Mining 0 (0%) 
Utilities 2 (0.5%) 
Construction 5 (1.3%) 
Manufacturing 28 (7.1%) 
Wholesale trade 6 (1.5%) 
Retail trade 14 (3.5%) 
Transportation or warehousing 9 (2.3%) 
Information 80 (20.3%) 
Finance or insurance 46 (11.6%) 
Real estate or rental and leasing 2 (0.5%) 
Professional, scientific or technical services 34 (8.6%) 
Management of companies or enterprises 12 (3.0%) 
Admin, support, waste management or 
remediation services 18 (4.6%) 
Educational services 41 (10.4%) 
Health care or social assistance 24 (6.1%) 
Arts, entertainment or recreation 11 (2.8%) 
Accommodation or food services 3 (0.8%) 
Other services (except public administration) 36 (9.1%) 




As with the previous behavior, an EFA was repeated for the main investigation 
with a sample size of 395, since minor changes were made to the language of certain 
items following the preliminary investigation phase. The items demonstrated an 
acceptable response spread and no unusual patterns in the means and standard deviations 
were found. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant at 0.000 and Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy test result of 0.791 indicated that factor 
analysis was appropriate for this sample (Hair et al. 2010).  
The EFA was conducted using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
technique with a Varimax rotation. Ten factors with an Eigenvalue of one or greater, 
were extracted and those factors explained a total of 71.90% of the variance, which is 
above the 65% recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The communalities of the items were 
well above the accepted threshold of 0.30. 
All the items loaded cleanly on their respective factors except EFFC2 and EFFC4, 
which had loadings of 0.532 and 0.599. EFFC2 had a similar cross-loading issue during 
the EFA of behavior 1 as well, indicating that it may be a problematic item. EFFC2 was 
removed, and the EFA was re-run. This improved the factor loadings, but EFFC4 still had 
low loadings. Once EFFC4 was removed, the remaining items loaded cleanly on their 
respective factors. The results of the EFA are shown in Table 4.31. Correlations lower 
than 0.40 in absolute value were suppressed for clarity. BINT1 had a loading of 0.653 
and PSEV3 had a loading of 0.695, which were marginally lower than the recommended 
0.70 loadings. However, both the items did not cross-load with any other factors, thus 




Table 4.31 Visit Verified Websites: EFA Results of Main Investigation 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AWAR1 .816                  
AWAR2 .803                  
AWAR3 .817                  
AWAR4 .844                  
BEHV1   .804                
BEHV2   .798                
BEHV3   .804                
BINT1     .653              
BINT2     .704              
BINT3     .724              
CTRL1      .846             
CTRL2      .858             
CTRL3      .867             
CTRL4      .823             
EFFC1        .788           
EFFC3        .780           
PSEV1          .790         
PSEV2          .854         
PSEV3           .695         
PVUL1            .733       
PVUL2            .823       
PVUL3             .788      
RCST1               .832    
RCST2               .833    
RCST3              .801     
RCST4              .836     
REFF1                .709   
REFF2                .810   
REFF3                .729   
REFF4                .745   
SEFF1                  .754 
SEFF2                  .785 
SEFF3                   .744 
SEFF4                   .739 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 




SmartPLS was used again to test both the measurement model and structural 
model similar to the previous behavior that was tested. A measurement model analysis 
was conducted to examine the psychometric properties of all the reflective constructs 
included in the research model. PLS validation procedures outlined by Gefen and Straub 
(2005) were followed to establish the validity and reliability of the measurement model. 
All the scales except EFFC had alpha values larger than the recommended threshold. 
EFFC had an alpha value of 0.645, which was still acceptable. All the scales 
demonstrated composite reliability values much higher than the recommended ones with 
the lowest value being 0.753 for the scale RCST.  
Table 4.32 Visit Verified Websites: Reliability Statistics 
Construct AVE C-Alpha CREL 
Mean  
(St. dev) Min/Max 
AWAR Lack of Awareness 0.727 0.875 0.914 3.22 (0.988)  1.0/5.0  
BEHV Actual Behavior 0.817 0.888 0.930 3.76 (0.853)  1.0/5.0   
BINT Behavioral Intention 0.689 0.774 0.869 3.91 (0.771)   1.0/5.0  
CTRL Uncontrollability 0.767 0.899 0.929 3.22 (0.988)   1.0/5.0  
EFFC Mental Efficiency 0.697 0.645 0.815 2.84 (1.123)   1.0/5.0  
PSEV Perceived Severity 0.702 0.787 0.876 3.76 (0.853)   1.0/5.0  
PVUL Perceived Vulnerability 0.712 0.797 0.881 2.80 (1.035)   1.0/5.0  
RCST Response Cost 0.527 0.831 0.753 4.00 (0.725)   1.0/5.0  
REFF Response Efficacy 0.637 0.811 0.875 4.13 (0.685)   1.0/5.0  
SEFF Self-Efficacy 0.668 0.835 0.890 3.84 (0.984)   1.0/5.0  
 
Almost all the items demonstrated loadings well above 0.7 showing above 
acceptable reliability. The values of the reliability tests such as composite reliability and 
Cronbach’s alpha are shown in Table 4.32 and item loadings are shown in Table 4.34. 
These values indicate that the scales satisfy the reliability requirements.  
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Convergent validity requirements such as item loadings that exceed 0.70 on their 
respective constructs and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.50 (Gefen and 
Straub 2005) for each construct were examined. As shown in Table 4.34 all the item 
loadings exceeded 0.70 on their respective constructs. Table 4.32 shows that all the scales 
demonstrated AVE values well above 0.5. Therefore, all the scales of this study 
demonstrate convergent validity values that are beyond the recommended thresholds. 
Table 4.33 Visit Verified Websites: Inter-Construct Correlations 
      AWAR    BEHV    BINT    CTRL    EFFC    PSEV    PVUL    RCST    REFF    SEFF 
AWAR 0.853                  
 BEHV 0.434 0.904                
 BINT 0.323 0.497 0.830              
 CTRL 0.220 0.283 0.233 0.876            
 EFFC 0.284 0.125 0.219 0.247 0.829          
 PSEV 0.188 0.100 0.315 0.134 0.105 0.838        
 PVUL 0.129 0.047 0.255 0.206 0.087 0.468 0.844      
 RCST 0.084 0.057 0.078 0.238 -.001 0.147 0.246 0.726    
 REFF 0.188 0.335 0.497 0.110 0.104 0.329 0.135 0.094 0.798  
 SEFF 0.268 0.517 0.534 0.093 0.219 0.171 0.059 0.036 0.477 0.817 
* The highlighted diagonal elements are square-roots of the AVE. 
Discriminant validity can be demonstrated if the square root of each construct’s 
AVE is greater than the absolute value of the inter-construct correlations. As it is shown 
in Table 4.33, the square roots of the AVEs of all constructs were found to be larger than 
all cross-correlations of the other constructs, demonstrating discriminant validity of the 
constructs used in this study (Gefen and Straub 2005). Discriminant validity is also 
demonstrated when items load on their respective constructs more than any other 
construct, as it did in this study. PLS loadings and cross-loadings for all the items are 
shown in Table 4.34. 
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Table 4.34 Visit Verified Websites: PLS loadings for the Main Investigation  
       
  
AWAR 
   
BEHV 
   
BINT 
   
CTRL 
   
EFFC 
   
PSEV 
   
PVUL 
   
RCST 
   
REFF 
   
SEFF 
AWAR1 0.871 0.415 0.281 0.185 0.258 0.197 0.134 0.056 0.191 0.259 
AWAR2 0.836 0.359 0.312 0.211 0.219 0.139 0.094 0.074 0.157 0.248 
AWAR3 0.847 0.359 0.250 0.198 0.242 0.160 0.128 0.008 0.133 0.196 
AWAR4 0.857 0.345 0.260 0.156 0.249 0.143 0.082 0.046 0.159 0.211 
 BEHV1 0.399 0.910 0.444 0.258 0.109 0.081 0.011 0.062 0.290 0.464 
 BEHV2 0.396 0.915 0.470 0.271 0.136 0.102 0.073 0.035 0.349 0.497 
 BEHV3 0.381 0.886 0.431 0.237 0.092 0.087 0.042 0.084 0.266 0.439 
 BINT1 0.226 0.414 0.856 0.162 0.215 0.306 0.220 0.092 0.472 0.501 
 BINT2 0.345 0.454 0.806 0.228 0.169 0.212 0.199 0.068 0.363 0.387 
 BINT3 0.240 0.370 0.827 0.195 0.156 0.261 0.214 0.099 0.397 0.434 
 CTRL1 0.148 0.259 0.198 0.869 0.227 0.095 0.177 0.181 0.074 0.078 
 CTRL2 0.189 0.223 0.216 0.887 0.235 0.131 0.183 0.146 0.059 0.058 
 CTRL3 0.181 0.220 0.188 0.881 0.225 0.120 0.181 0.161 0.121 0.076 
 CTRL4 0.249 0.288 0.214 0.865 0.179 0.123 0.180 0.167 0.130 0.112 
 EFFC1 0.255 0.102 0.116 0.209 0.846 0.010 0.089 0.017 0.049 0.155 
 EFFC3 0.214 0.106 0.253 0.200 0.812 0.171 0.054 0.038 0.126 0.211 
 PSEV1 0.188 0.074 0.260 0.152 0.105 0.833 0.391 0.149 0.311 0.170 
 PSEV2 0.150 0.145 0.270 0.117 0.045 0.874 0.380 0.148 0.296 0.163 
 PSEV3 0.135 0.030 0.260 0.069 0.116 0.805 0.405 0.062 0.219 0.097 
 PVUL1 0.165 0.034 0.224 0.240 0.091 0.438 0.860 0.203 0.077 0.018 
 PVUL2 0.098 0.055 0.208 0.170 0.053 0.351 0.861 0.185 0.161 0.062 
 PVUL3 0.059 0.030 0.212 0.107 0.075 0.392 0.809 0.079 0.105 0.070 
 RCST1 0.072 0.005  -.008 0.294 0.098 0.101 0.277 0.519 0.076 0.005 
 RCST2 0.110 0.003 -.026 0.205 0.070 0.066 0.229 0.995 0.032 -.038 
 RCST3 0.087 0.054 0.072 0.256 0.011 0.149 0.261 0.565 0.097 0.035 
 REFF1 0.154 0.255 0.367 0.066 0.108 0.283 0.100 0.033 0.769 0.422 
 REFF2 0.077 0.222 0.362 0.072 0.075 0.167 0.079 0.044 0.784 0.301 
 REFF3 0.192 0.296 0.407 0.118 0.090 0.301 0.118 0.070 0.813 0.439 
 REFF4 0.169 0.290 0.443 0.091 0.063 0.289 0.127 0.146 0.827 0.363 
 SEFF1 0.176 0.404 0.451 0.087 0.198 0.147 0.040 0.070 0.406 0.824 
 SEFF2 0.225 0.390 0.400 0.072 0.138 0.172 0.055 0.081 0.401 0.797 
 SEFF3 0.232 0.433 0.474 0.102 0.176 0.192 0.073 0.054 0.386 0.827 




Tests for Common Method Bias 
Similar to the previous behavior, CMV tests were performed to assess any biases 
resulting from the use of the same method to collect data. We conducted statistical 
analysis using three tests to check for the presence of and severity of CMV in our data. 
For the first test, we used the Harmon one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003), where an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on all 
the variables used in our model and the unrotated factor solution was examined. It is 
assumed that CMV exists if a single factor emerges from unrotated factor solutions or a 
first factor explains the majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff and Organ 
1986). Ten factors emerged from the EFA, which accounted for 71.9% of the variance. 
The greatest variance explained by one factor was 17.24%, demonstrating that common 
method variance is unlikely to bias the results. A second test suggested by Pavlou et al. 
(2007) was conducted. Examining the inter-construct correlations in Table 4.23, the 
highest correlation among constructs is 0.497, which is not extremely high as suggested 
by Pavlou et al. (2007), thus ruling out CMV in this study.  
For the third test, we used a more rigorous statistical approach suggested by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to check for common method bias. Table 4.35 shows the factor 
loadings for each major construct and factor loadings for the common method construct 





Table 4.35 Visit Verified Websites: CMV Test Results 

















Awareness AWAR1 0.872 0.692 0.000 0.001 
  AWAR2 0.816 0.676 0.028 0.000 
  AWAR3 0.861 0.696 -0.026 0.001 
  AWAR4 0.888 0.771 -0.048 0.003 
Behavior BEHV1 0.925 0.837 -0.021 0.001 
  BEHV2 0.951 0.903 0.060 0.004 
  BEHV3 0.918 0.674 -0.041 0.008 
Behavioral Intention BINT1 0.832 0.580 0.021 0.019 
  BINT2 0.780 0.861 0.036 0.014 
  BINT3 0.878 0.815 -0.058 0.001 
Uncontrollability CTRL1 0.884 0.796 -0.022 0.000 
  CTRL2 0.898 0.795 -0.022 0.002 
  CTRL3 0.889 0.813 -0.013 0.000 
  CTRL4 0.831 0.783 -0.058 0.001 
Mental Efficiency EFFC1 0.845 0.646 -0.045 0.003 
  EFFC3 0.814 0.645 0.045 0.055 
Perceived Severity PSEV1 0.819 0.762 0.036 0.000 
  PSEV2 0.873 0.688 0.009 0.000 
  PSEV3 0.820 0.811 -0.047 0.000 
Perceived Vulnerability PVUL1 0.849 0.795 0.024 0.000 
  PVUL2 0.870 0.824 0.003 0.004 
  PVUL3 0.813 0.720 -0.028 0.003 
Response Cost RCST1 0.851 0.782 0.015 0.001 
  RCST2 0.850 0.720 -0.036 0.000 
  RCST3 0.810 0.791 0.058 0.007 
  RCST4 0.867 0.766 -0.035 0.002 
Response Efficacy REFF1 0.766 0.637 0.013 0.002 
  REFF2 0.869 0.852 -0.115** 0.009 
  REFF3 0.764 0.580 0.072* 0.011 
  REFF4 0.796 0.783 -0.027 0.003 
Self-Efficacy SEFF1 0.823 0.637 -0.003 0.000 
  SEFF2 0.807 0.580 -0.002 0.002 
  SEFF3 0.783 0.766 0.048 0.000 
  SEFF4 0.857 0.762 -0.043 0.000 




The results explain that the average loading of the indicators is 0.8461 while the 
average loading of the method indicators is -0.0065. The average variance explained by 
the substantive constructs is 71.8 percent compared to the 0.2 percent average variance 
explained by the method construct. Moreover, except for two indicators, all the method 
factor loadings were insignificant. Since the most of the method factor loadings are 
insignificant and the indicators’ substantive variances are substantially greater than their 
method variances, it can be concluded that common method bias is unlikely to be a 
serious concern in the data of this study (Williams et al. 2003). Therefore, based on the 
three separate tests to measure CMV, we concluded that common method bias was not a 
concern for this study. 
Structural Model 
The structural models were then tested with the SmartPLS software. Factor scores 
for each of the first-order dimensions of habit were generated. These factors scores were 
used as formative measures of the second-order aggregate construct of habit (Chin et al. 
2003; Polites and Karahanna 2012).  
Reliability and validity tests that were performed on the first-order reflective 
dimensions of habit previously do not apply to formative scales because “the 
measurement model does not predict that the sub-dimensions will be correlated” (Bollen 
and Lennox 1991; Edwards 2003; MacKenzie et al. 2011, p.314). Item weights of the 
formative constructs can be examined to identify their individual influence in forming 
each construct (Chin 1998; Petter et al. 2007). The weights for the three habit dimensions 
were 0.840 for Lack of Awareness, 0.430 for Uncontrollability and -0.082 for Mental 
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Efficiency. The weight for Mental Efficiency was not significant while Lack of 
Awareness and Mental Efficiency were significant at p<0.001.  
The formative dimensions of the habit construct were tested for multicollinearity 
next. To test for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics for the 
three dimensions of habit were examined. As shown in Table 4.36, VIF values are well 
below the recommended threshold value of 3.3 Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006), 
which indicates no serious multicollinearity issues with the formative dimensions of 
habit. Individual weights of the formative dimensions of habit also indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Table 4.36 Visit Verified Websites: Weights of the Formative Habit Construct 
Construct Dimension Weight VIF 
Habit Lack of Awareness 0.840 (****) 1.121 
  Uncontrollability 0.430 (****) 1.092 
  Mental Efficiency -0.082 (n.s.) 1.312 
Note: ****p<0.001 
Although two of the formative dimensions of habit are significant, the dimension 
of mental efficiency is not significant. Content validity of formative scales is affected if 
one of the indicators that represent one of the formative dimensions is removed. Since 
mental efficiency is one of the three dimensions that constitute habit, it was retained for 
the structural model analysis although its weight was not significant.  
To test the role of habit in information security behaviors, data analyses were run 
in three stages, following the recommendations by Limayem et al. (2007). First, we ran a 
baseline research model with only the PMT variables. The next model added habit as a 
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direct effect on behavior. The final model added the possibility of habit moderating the 
relationship between behavioral intention and behavior.  
Visit Verified Websites: Baseline Model 
A baseline model, without the incorporation of the habit construct was tested first 
and the results are shown on Figure 4.17. Paths from perceived threat severity, perceived 
threat vulnerability, response efficacy and self-efficacy to behavioral intention were 
significant (p<0.10 or higher) while the paths from response cost was not significant. The 
path from behavioral intention to secure behavior was also significant at p<0.001.  
 




This model accounts for 27.7 percent of the variance of self-reported actual 
behavior and 40.3 percent of the variance in behavioral intention to perform a secure 
behavior. Response cost was found to have a non-significant influence on behavioral 
intention, indicating that the respondents’ intentions to visit only verified websites were 
not affected by any costs or inconvenience involved with that behavior . In the contrary, 
individuals perceive that a threat of their computers getting infected with malware is 
severe and they are vulnerable to it infection. They also perceive that if they visit only 
verified or known websites, the threat of malware infections can be reduced. 
Visit Verified Websites: Habit as a Direct Effect 
In the second research model, habit is hypothesized to have a direct effect on 
secure behavior. The results for this model are shown on Figure 4.18. Similar to the first 





Figure 4.18 Visit Verified Websites: Habit as a Direct Effect  
 
The introduction of habit as a direct effect on secure behavior increased variance 
explained by the self-reported behavior from 24.7 percent to 34.9 percent. Habit 
significantly influenced secure behavior with a path coefficient of 0.343 at p<0.001, 
supporting H7a. The path coefficient between behavioral intention and secure behavior 
reduced marginally from 0.497 to 0.375, but the relationship remained significant. 
Visit Verified Websites: Habit as a Moderator and a Direct Effect 
In the third and final research model, habit is included as a direct effect on secure 
behavior and in addition as moderating the relationship between behavioral intention and 
behavior. The results for this model are shown in Figure 4.19. 
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The introduction of habit as a moderator increased the total variance explained by 
secure behavior slightly from 34.9 percent to 36 percent. The moderating effect of habit 
on the relationship between behavioral intention and secure behavior had a path 
coefficient of -0.273 at p<0.001 supporting H7b. The path coefficient between behavioral 
intention and secure behavior remained the same at 0.375, while still being significant. 
Tests for significance of control variables indicated that none of the control variables of 
age, gender, education and industry significantly influenced habit, behavioral intention or 
behavior. A summary of the results for the third (complete) research model is shown in 
Table 4.37.  






T Value P-Value Support 
H1: PSEV  BINT (+) 0.090 1.683 p < 0.05 Supported 
H2: PVUL  BINT (+) 0.157 3.126 p < 0.01 Supported 
H3: REFF  BINT (+) 0.264 4.560 p < 0.001 Supported 
H4: SEFF  BINT (+) 0.383 7.217 p < 0.001 Supported 
H5: RCST  BINT (-) -0.013 0.183 p < 0.10 Not Supported 
H6: BINT  BEHV (+) 0.375 6.534 p < 0.001 Supported 
H7a: HBT  BEHV (+) 0.596 6.089 p < 0.001 Supported 





Figure 4.19 Visit Verified Websites: Habit as a Moderator 
 
Based on the R-square difference tests between the models with habit modeled as 
a direct effect and habit additionally modeled as a moderator, the additional moderation 
effect was found to have a value of 0.017, which is a small effect (Chin et al. 2003; 
Cohen 1988). It is also evident that the third (complete) model demonstrates higher 
explanatory power than previous two models. Therefore, the research model where habit 
is hypothesized to moderate the relationship between behavioral intentions and secure 
behavior and the model where habit is hypothesized to only have a direct effect on secure 
behaviors have significantly higher explanatory power than the baseline model that does 
not consider habit. The results of the R-square difference tests are shown in Table 4.38. 
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Table 4.38  Visit Verified Websites: Effect Size Calculations 
Model R2 f-statistics 
Baseline Model (Without Habit) 0.247 0.177   
Research Model (Habit as a Moderator) 0.360 0.017 
Habit as a Direct Effect 0.349   
 
Post hoc Analyses 
To further test the validity of using habit as a formative measure, several alternate 
models were analyzed as a post hoc step. The construct of habit has been a topic of much 
debate among scholars, and has been modeled in many different ways. We compare our 
research model to some of these models that tested habit.  
Habit conceptualized as Limayem et al. 2007 
Data were collected for the reflective scale of Limayem et al. (2007) as a part of 
this study, which allowed comparison of the research model of this study using both 
formative and reflective scales of habit. The two models were tested using SmartPLS and 
the results are shown in Table 4.39. The path coefficients of the PMT variables of both 
models remained the same and are not displayed in the table. The magnitude of the path 
coefficient of the intention-behavior relationship was somewhat higher (0.375) in our 
research model that tested habit as a second-order formative construct, compared to the 
alternate research model where habit was conceptualized using the reflective scale from 
Limayem et al. (2007).  
Habit demonstrated a higher direct impact on secure behavior when tested with 
reflective scales, even though both relationships were significant at p<0.001. Only the 
model tested with the formative scales demonstrated that habit was a significant negative 
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moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. Although the path coefficient was high 
(-0.264) in the model tested with reflective scales, the moderation effect was non-
significant. This indicates that when habit is conceptualized as a formative construct, 
which accurately captures the habit domain, the negative moderating effect of habit is 
stronger compared to the 3-item reflective scale. The R-square value of secure behavior 
was higher in the research model with the reflective scale demonstrating that when habit 
was tested using the reflective scale of Limayem et al. (2007), the model had better 
explanatory power. As discussed previously, this may be due to the higher correlations 
between habit and other constructs due to the language of the reflective items being 
closely related to the items that measure behavioral intention and behavior. 








in Limayem et 
al. 2007 
H6: BINT  BEHV (+) 0.375****  (t=6.534) 0.303 * (t=1.487) 
H7a: HBT  BEHV (+) 0.596****  (t=6.089) 0.744 **** (t=3.593) 
H7b: HBT  INT-BEHV (-) -0.273**** (t=3.182) -0.264 n.s. (t=0.771) 
R2 of BINT 0.403  0.403 
R2 of BEHV 0.36 0.487 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Base Model) 
0.177 0.443 
Effect Size (Moderator vs. 
Direct Effect) 
0.017 0.002 
Note:  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
The effect sizes of the moderation were compared between the two models. The 
model tested with the formative scale had a small effect size compared to the model with 
reflective scales, which had a large effect size when comparing the baseline model to the 
model with habit has a moderator. However, the effect size, when comparing the model 
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of habit as a direct effect to the model with habit as a moderator was medium when tested 
with the formative scale and the effect size was very small in when tested with the 
reflective scale. This provides further evidence that the negative moderating effect of 
habit is stronger when habit is conceptualized as a second-order formative construct. 
Habit as a Mediator of the PMT-Intention Relationship 
As an alternative model, we tested Vance et al. (2012) research model with both 
the formative and the reflective habit measures separately. First we tested the Vance et al. 
(2012) research model with the first-order reflective and second-order formative habit 
scale and the results are shown on Figure 4.20. All the hypothesized paths of this model 
were significant. The formative habit construct demonstrated significant influences on all 




Figure 4.20 Visit Verified Websites: Habit (Formative) as an Indirect Influence  
 
Next, we tested the Vance et al. (2012) research model with the 3-item reflective 
scale developed by Limayem et al. (2007) and the results are shown on Figure 4.21. Habit 
significantly influenced all the PMT variables except for response cost, with the highest 
path coefficient being 0.470 (p<0.001) between habit and self-efficacy. The supports for 
the hypotheses are consistent with the findings of Vance et al. (2012). However, the 
research model of Vance et al. (2012) demonstrated slightly higher explanatory power 
with an R-square of behavioral intention at 44 percent compared to the R-square value of 





Figure 4.21 Visit Verified Websites: Habit (Reflective) as an Indirect Influence  
 
Inertia as a mediator of Habit-Intention Relationship 
An alternative model, where habit directly influenced inertia and inertia directly 
influenced behavioral intention, was tested. Similar to the formative habit construct, a 
two stage approach was followed where the PLS latest scores for each dimensions were 
used as the formative measures of the inertia construct (Polites and Karahanna 2012). 
Affective-based inertia demonstrated a weight of 0.369 (p<0.01) and behavior-based 
inertia demonstrated a weight of 0.709 (p<0.001), thus were suitable to be included in the 
data analysis. Habit was modeled as positively influencing inertia and inertia was 
modeled as positively influencing behavioral intention, which reflects the research model 
of Polites and Karahanna (2012).  
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The results of the data analysis are shown on Figure 4.22. All the PMT variables 
significantly influenced behavioral intention except response cost. Habit significantly 
influenced inertia with a path coefficient of 0.512 (p<0.001) and inertia significantly 
influenced behavioral intention with a coefficient of 0.338 (p<0.001). Habit also 
explained 26.3 percent of the variance in inertia. The relationship between inertia and 
behavioral intention was positive for the visiting only verified websites too, which is in 
contrast to the hypothesis by Polites and Karahanna (2012). This means that increased 
levels of inertia leads to increased behavioral intention to perform secure behavior. R-
square of the behavioral intention was 49.5 percent. Mediation tests revealed that inertia 
partially mediated the relationship between habit and behavioral intention. Another 
research model where a reflective habit construct was utilized yielded similar results with 
similar explanatory power. 
A research model that included direct paths to behavioral intention from both 
habit and inertia demonstrated a R-square value of 49.8 percent, slightly increasing the 
explanatory power of the model due to the direct influence of habit on behavioral 
intention. The results suggest that inertia increased the explanatory power of the research 
model indicating that it may play a role in the performance of secure behaviors, although 
the path was significant in the opposite direction compared to the results of Polites and 





Figure 4.22 Visit Verified Websites: Inertia as a Mediator of Habit and Intention 
 
Habit as a Direct Influence of Behavioral Intention 
An alternative model where habit was modeled as a direct influence of behavioral 
intention was tested as a part of the post hoc analysis. First, the path between habit and 
behavioral intention was tested with the first-order reflective and second-order formative 
habit construct. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 4.23. The path from habit 
to behavioral intention was significant with a path coefficient of 0.187 (p<0.001). All the 
paths from PMT variables to behavioral intention were significant except for response 
cost. R-square value of behavioral intention was 43.5 percent explaining more 




Figure 4.23 Visit Verified Websites: Direct Influence of Habit on Behavioral Intention 
 
Next, the same model was tested with the reflective habit scale. The paths from 
perceived severity, perceived threat vulnerability and response cost to behavioral 
intention were non-significant. Only the paths from response efficacy and self-efficacy to 
behavioral intention were shown to be significant. The path from habit to behavioral 
intention was significant with a path coefficient of 0.334 (p<0.001). R-square of 
behavioral intention was 48.6 percent compared to the R-square of 43.5 percent when the 
model was tested with the formative habit scale. Therefore, the model with a reflective 
habit scale demonstrated higher explanatory power than the model with a formative habit 
scale when habit was modeled as a direct influence of behavioral intention. 
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Habit as a Moderator of the PMT-Behavior Relationship 
As a part of the post hoc study, an alternative model where PMT variables 
directly influenced actual behavior was tested. Habit was hypothesized to directly 
influence secure behavior while moderating the relationships between the PMT variables 
and actual behavior. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 4.24.  
Paths from perceived threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
cost to secure behavior were significant. Paths from perceived threat severity, perceived 
threat vulnerability and response cost were insignificant. Habit had a significant direct 
effect on secure behavior at p<0.001. However, habit did not significantly moderate any 
of the paths from the PMT variables to secure behavior.  
 




This chapter discussed the EFA results of the preliminary investigation as well as 
the statistical analyses of the main investigation of three different secure behaviors. Using 
SmartPLS, tests of the measurement and structural models were performed for all three 
behaviors. Tests for moderations effects of habit on the intention-behavior relationship 
were conducted in three stages. The first stage included testing a baseline model without 
the incorporation of habit. The second stage included modeling habit as a direct effect on 
behavior. In the final stage, the complete research model was tested by including habit as 
a moderating relationship between the intention-behavior relationships. Several 
alternative models were tested in the post hoc analysis that allowed the comparison of the 






The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the role of habit in information 
security behaviors in the workplace. In order to achieve this goal, a research agenda that 
consisted of three phases was executed. The first phase involved the identification of 
habitual behaviors related to information security. After a thorough review of academic 
publications and practitioner articles, a list of 49 unique secure behaviors was created. 
This list of behaviors was presented to a subject-matter expert panel and an employee 
expert panel, who were asked to select the behaviors they perceived to be habitual. Their 
responses were compiled and presented to members of a measurement panel. The 
measurement panel was requested to identify three behaviors that the panelists previously 
identified to be habitual. They were also requested to select behaviors that were practical 
to be measured through an online survey.  
The second phase involved tests to ensure that the three instruments developed to 
investigate the three secure behaviors demonstrated content validity, reliability, 
discriminant validity and convergent validity. Preliminary tests were conducted for each 
of the three behaviors. The third phase or the main investigation phase involved the 
development and testing of a conceptual research model for each of the three behaviors. 
Usable sample sizes of 421, 443 and 395 were used to test the three corresponding 
research models of the three secure behaviors using SmartPLS. While the support for 
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hypotheses varied somewhat among the three behaviors tested, in all three behaviors 
habit was shown to have a significant direct influence on actual secure behavior and was 
shown to negatively moderate the intention-to-behavior relationship.  
This chapter examines the results of the present study separately for each of the 
three behaviors followed by a discussion on the findings of the post hoc analyses. Next, 
the implications of this study, its findings and how they are related to both practice and 
theory in IS are discussed. Finally the limitations of this study are discussed followed by 
a discussion of future research directions.  
Behavior 1: Lock PC 
The first secure behavior investigated was locking the PC when leaving it 
unattended. Following the recommendations by Limayem et al. (2007), data analyses 
were performed in three stages. First analyzed was a baseline research model with only 
the PMT variables. The second model added habit as a potential direct effect on secure 
behavior. The third and final model added the possibility of habit negatively moderating 
the relationship between behavioral intention and secure behavior.  
The tested models, investigated direct relationships from threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal variables to the behavioral intention to lock a PC when leaving it 
unattended. Perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability demonstrated a 
significant positive relationship in determining whether individuals intended to lock their 
computers when leaving them unattended at the workplace. This provides support for H1 
and H2. Crossler (2010), Herath and Rao (2009), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Lee 
and Larsen (2009), Lee (2011), Liang and Xue (2010) and Woon et al. (2005) found that 
perceived threat severity was a significant predictor of their dependent variable of 
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different secure behaviors. Our findings are consistent with their results. The support for 
H1 explains that the higher individuals perceive the threat of someone else accessing their 
computers without permission, the more likely they are to develop intentions to lock their 
computers to secure them when leaving them unattended. In organizations, employees 
often have access to sensitive data and their computers are setup to easily access this data. 
If an unauthorized person accesses this data while an employee is logged onto the 
computer with his or her credentials, it is very likely that the individual who was 
authenticated will be held responsible for any unauthorized access or modification of the 
sensitive company data. Therefore, a severe threat of unauthorized access to sensitive 
company data exists if the computers are left unattended without being locked. The data 
suggests that the perceived severity of the threat influences the employees to develop 
intentions to lock their computers whenever they leave it unattended.  
Ifinedo (2012), Lee and Larsen (2009), and Liang and Xue (2010) found 
perceived threat vulnerability to be a significant factor that influences behavioral 
intention to perform secure behavior. This study had similar findings. The support for H2 
explains that the higher individuals perceive the probability of someone else accessing 
their computers without permission, the more likely they are to develop intentions to lock 
their computers to secure them when leaving them unattended. Many employees in many 
organizations work in open office areas or cubicles where other employees or 
unauthorized individuals can easily access any computer if they are not locked or logged 
off. Only a few employees have their own offices where the doors can be locked to 
secure their assets in the office. These results show that if the employees perceive that 
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they are vulnerable to the threat of someone else accessing their computer if they leave 
their work area, then they are more likely to lock their computers.  
Coping appraisal variables such as response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
cost were tested for direct relationships with behavioral intention. Response efficacy and 
response cost were found to have significant relationships with behavioral intention to 
lock the computers when leaving them unattended supporting H3 and H5. Support for H3, 
which hypothesized that response efficacy will positively influence behavioral intention, 
suggests that individuals are more likely to develop intentions to lock their computers as 
they gain confidence in the effectiveness of locking their computer to protect them from 
unauthorized access. This is consistent with the findings of prior research studies in an 
information security context (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; Herath and 
Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Workman 
et al. 2008). Response cost, which refers to any costs, such as time, money, and 
inconvenience associated with performing a secure behavior to cope with a threat, was 
also found to have a significant negative relationship with behavioral intention to lock the 
PC when leaving it unattended, therefore supporting H5. This finding is also consistent 
with the findings of prior research in information security (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee and 
Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Woon et al. 2005). While locking the PC when 
leaving it unattended may not cost money, it may cost time to individuals who are not 
savvy with using shortcuts to perform the locking task and it may also cause 
inconvenience to employees in having to lock their computers every time they leave it 
unattended and having to unlock it once they return. The findings suggest that when an 
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employee perceives response cost to be higher, they are less likely to develop intentions 
to lock their computers when leaving them unattended. 
In contrast to previous findings of information security research studies 
(Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; 
Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Woon et al. 
2005; Workman et al. 2008), self-efficacy was only shown to have a weak significant 
relationship with behavioral intention at p<0.10. Self-efficacy refers to the confidence of 
an individual in his or her ability to perform the specific secure behavior (locking the 
computer when leaving it unattended for this study). Examining the mean values for the 
self-efficacy construct, it seems that most of the respondents reported high self-efficacy 
with a mean of 4.27 out of 5. There was also little variability in this scale (standard 
deviation of 0.724), which could help explain the lack of an explanatory relationship. To 
test if the low significance between self-efficacy and behavioral intention was due to 
correlations with response efficacy, we examined if a suppressor effect from response 
efficacy was present in our model.  We found that both response efficacy and response 
cost acted as suppressors for self-efficacy in our model. When self-efficacy was 
considered without the suppressor variables, it positively influenced behavioral intention 
with a path coefficient of 0.246 at p<0.001, which is consistent with PMT. 
The hypothesized positive relationship between behavioral intention and self-
reported actual behavior was significant, supporting H6. This relationship has also been 
confirmed by a large number of IT adoption studies as well as many other behavioral 
studies in psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Venkatesh et al. 2003). The results 
suggest that individuals are more likely to lock their computers when leaving them 
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unattended when they have formed behavioral intentions to perform that behavior. PMT 
variables explained 34 percent of the variance in behavioral intentions. 53.6 percent of 
the variance in self-reported actual behavior was explained by behavioral intentions. 
While the high R-square value of actual behavior may be due to somewhat high 
correlations with behavioral intention, a significant portion of the variance in actual 
behavior has been explained by behavioral intentions in prior studies (Liang and Xue 
2010; Limayem et al. 2007; Venkatesh and Davis 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2000, 2003).  
A second model investigated the influence of habit only as a direct effect on 
actual behavior. H7a, in which habit was hypothesized to have a positive direct effect on 
actual behavior, was supported at p<0.001. Although this relationship has not been tested 
previously in an information security context, Moody and Siponen (2013) and Limayem 
et al. (2007) found habit to significantly influence actual behavior. The findings of this 
study are consistent with the findings of those studies. It was also examined that the path 
coefficient between behavioral intentions and actual behavior reduced from 0.732 to 
0.558 when habit was introduced into the model as a direct determinant of actual 
behavior. This explains that when habit is included as a direct determinant of actual 
behavior, it reduces the influence of intentions in determining actual behavior. The R-
square value of actual behavior increased to 59.6 percent, increasing the explanatory 
power of the research model.  
The final and complete research model hypothesized habit as a negative 
moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. The results indicate that habit does 
negatively moderate the intention-behavior relationship significantly at p<0.001 
supporting H7b. The inclusion of habit as a moderator in the research model increased the 
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R-square value of actual behavior to 60.9 percent while further reducing the coefficient 
value of the intention-behavior relationship to 0.524. However, the relationship between 
behavioral intention and actual behavior remained significant, which shows that intention 
still plays a significant role even when habit is present. As discussed in the literature 
review section, in extreme circumstances, habitual behavior may become very strong to 
the point that intention will not have any influence on the actual behavior. It is clear that 
in this behavior, habit was not sufficiently strong to completely negate the influence of 
behavioral intentions. This indicates that the respondents perform the lock PC behavior 
habitually, but the strength of their habit is at a medium level. However, less cognitive 
effort is utilized to perform the lock PC behavior due to the behavior being habitual as it 
is apparent in the reduced influence on behavioral intentions on actual behavior.  These 
findings are consistent with Limayem et al. (2007) in which habit negatively moderated 
the intention-behavior relationship. R-square difference tests between the models where 
habit was modeled as only a direct effect and where habit was also a moderator indicate 
that the moderation has a value of 0.033, which is a medium effect (Chin et al. 2003; 
Cohen 1988). This is consistent with the findings of Limayem et al. (2007), who also 
found that the negative moderation effect was at a medium level. 
Habit was operationalized as a first-order reflective and second-order formative 
construct in this study. Statistical tests conducted to examine the weights of the formative 
dimensions of habit indicate that the lack of awareness and uncontrollability dimensions 
were significant factors in forming the habit construct while mental efficiency was non-
significant. However, based on recommendations of prior research studies (Bollen and 
Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; 
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Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; Petter et al. 2007), mental efficiency was retained for further 
data analysis. Respondents of this study demonstrated that mental efficiency was high 
(mean=3.47) when the lock PC behavior is performed (e.g., I do not need to devote a lot 
of mental effort to decide to lock the computer every time I leave it unattended). 
However, it was not a significant contributor to the formation of habit. Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) found that awareness was not a significant factor that formed habit in 
their study. The non-significant dimensions in our study and the study of Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) may be due to the specific contexts of the studies or due to 
inconsistencies of the habit scale. However, the second-order habit construct consistently 
demonstrated significant effects on the dependent variable in this dissertation and the 
study by Polites and Karahanna (2012).  
Behavior 2: Verify Email Recipient 
The second secure behavior investigated was the verification of the recipient 
email address before sending email. Similar to behavior 1, data analyses were conducted 
in three stages: a baseline model with only the PMT variables, a model with PMT 
variables and habit as only a direct effect and a full research model where habit was 
hypothesized to influence secure behavior directly and negatively moderate the 
relationship between behavioral intention and secure behavior.  
The models tested, considered direct relationships from threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal variables to the behavioral intention to verify the email addresses of the 
recipients before sending email. Perceived threat severity demonstrated a significant 
positive relationship, supporting H1, which is consistent with many prior studies that 
found similar results (Crossler 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 
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2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Lee 2011; Liang and Xue 2010; Woon et al. 2005). The 
support for H1 explains that the higher an individual perceives the threat of an unintended 
recipient receiving an email with sensitive company data, the more likely he or she is to 
check the recipient addresses before sending email. In organizations, daily tasks of most 
employees involve communicating with other employees, clients and other interested 
parties through email. These emails may sometimes contain sensitive company 
information such as budgetary data, patent information, or corporate secrets where if an 
unintended recipient were to receive such an email, the company will have to suffer dire 
consequences. Therefore, most employees make sure that they verify recipient addresses 
before sending an email whether or not the email contains sensitive company 
information. The data suggests that the respondents perceive an unintended recipient 
receiving an email with sensitive corporate data as a severe threat, which in turn 
influences them to verify the recipient email addresses before sending an email.  
The hypothesized relationship between perceived threat vulnerability and 
behavioral intention (H2) was not supported. As discussed previously in the literature 
review section, the relationship between perceived threat vulnerability and behavioral 
intention has inconclusive results. While results of some previous studies indicate a 
significant relationship between perceived threat vulnerability and behavioral intention 
(Ifinedo, 2012; Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Pahnila et al., 
2007; Woon et al., 2005), some studies indicate non-significant relationships (Herath and 
Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Malimage & Warkentin, 2010; Woon et al. 
2005). The data suggests that on average, respondents perceived that the possibility of an 
unintended recipient receiving an email with sensitive company information is low 
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(mean=2.84). However, if an unintended recipient were to receive an email with sensitive 
company data, they perceived it would be severe. The results may indicate that the 
respondents are very careful when sending emails with sensitive data such that they 
check the recipient addresses often. It may also mean that they are not involved in 
sending emails with any sensitive data. 
Coping appraisal variables such as response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
cost were tested for direct relationships with behavioral intention. H3, where it was 
hypothesized that response efficacy will significantly influence behavioral intention, was 
supported. This suggests that individuals are more likely to develop intentions to verify 
email addresses of the recipients before sending email, as they gain in confidence that the 
verification of email addresses will result in reducing the chances of an unintended 
recipient receiving an email with sensitive company information. Support for H3 is also 
consistent with the findings of prior research studies (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; 
Crossler 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee 
and Larsen 2009; Workman et al. 2008). Self-efficacy was found to have a significant 
influence on behavioral intention, supporting H4. This is consistent with the findings of 
prior research studies as well (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; Herath and 
Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and 
Xue 2010; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). This suggests that individuals are 
more likely to verify the recipient email addresses before sending email as they gain 
confidence in their ability to verify the recipient email addresses are the intended ones.  
Response cost was not shown to have a significant relationship with behavioral 
intention. Although the path co-efficient was negative (-0.075) as hypothesized, the path 
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was not significant. Some of the previous studies found that response cost was a 
significant factor influencing behavioral intention (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee and Larsen 
2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Vance et al. 2012; Woon et al. 2005). The findings of this 
study are consistent with the findings of Ifinedo (2012) and (Crossler 2010) where the 
path between response cost and behavioral intention was not significant. This suggests 
that individuals do not associate costs, such as time, money, and inconvenience with 
verifying the recipient email addresses before sending email. Compared to locking a PC 
when leaving it unattended, verifying the email addresses before sending an email 
involves very little time or effort resulting in less inconvenience to the employees. This is 
reflected by the findings of this study as well. 
The hypothesized positive relationship between behavioral intention and self-
reported actual behavior was significant, supporting H6. This relationship has also been 
confirmed by a large number of IT adoption studies as well as many other behavioral 
studies in psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Venkatesh et al. 2003). The results 
suggest that individuals are more likely to verify email addresses of the recipients before 
sending email, when they have formed behavioral intentions to perform that behavior. 
PMT variables explained 34.9 percent of the variance in behavioral intentions while 41.7 
percent of the variance in self-reported actual behavior was in turn explained by 
behavioral intentions. This is consistent with previous studies where a significant portion 
of the variance in actual behavior was explained by behavioral intentions (Liang and Xue 
2010; Limayem et al. 2007; Venkatesh and Davis 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2000, 2003).  
A second model investigated the influence of habit only as a direct effect on 
actual behavior. H7a, where habit was hypothesized to have a positive direct effect on 
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actual behavior, was supported at p<0.01. Although this relationship has not been tested 
previously in an information security context, Moody and Siponen (2013) and Limayem 
et al. (2007) found habit to significantly influence actual behavior. The findings of this 
study are consistent with the findings of those studies. The path coefficient between 
behavioral intentions and actual behavior was reduced from 0.646 to 0.597 when habit 
was introduced into the model as a direct predictor of actual behavior. The R-square 
value of actual behavior increased to 43.4 percent, increasing the explanatory power of 
the research model.  
The final and complete research model hypothesized habit as a negative 
moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. The results indicate that habit does 
negatively moderate the intention-behavior relationship significantly at p<0.001 
supporting H7b. The inclusion of habit has a moderator in the research model increased 
the R-square value of actual behavior to 44.5 percent while further reducing the 
coefficient of the intention-behavior relationship to 0.551. However, the relationship 
between behavioral intention and secure behavior remained significant, which explains 
that intention still has a significant role even with habit as a direct predictor of this 
behavior. As discussed in the literature review section, in extreme circumstances, habitual 
behavior may become very strong to the point that intention will not have any influence 
on the actual behavior. It is clear in our study that habit is not sufficiently strong to make 
the influence of behavioral intentions non-significant. This indicates that the respondents 
habitually verify the recipient email addresses before sending email, but the strength of 
their habit is at a medium level. However, less cognitive effort is utilized to verify the 
email addresses due to the behavior being habitual as it is apparent in the reduced 
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influence on behavioral intentions on actual behavior.  These findings are consistent with 
those of Limayem et al. (2007) showing habit to negatively moderate the intention-
behavior relationship. R-square difference tests between the models where habit was 
modeled as a direct effect and habit was modeled as a moderator indicate that the 
moderation has an effect size value of 0.02, which is a small effect (Chin et al. 2003; 
Cohen 1988). This is somewhat consistent with the findings of Limayem et al. (2007), 
who found a negative moderation effect that was at the medium level. However, it is 
important to note that when an effect size is small, it does not mean that the change in R-
square is unimportant (Abelson 1985; Prentice and Miller 1992). 
Habit was operationalized as a first-order reflective and second-order formative 
construct in this study. Statistical tests conducted to examine the weights of the formative 
dimensions of habit indicate that lack of awareness and mental efficiency dimensions 
were significant factors in forming the habit construct while uncontrollability was not 
significant. However, based on recommendations of prior research studies (Bollen and 
Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; 
Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; Petter et al.2007), uncontrollability was retained for further 
data analysis. Respondents of this study demonstrated that uncontrollability was above 
neutral (mean=3.22) when the recipient email addresses are verified (e.g., It would be 
difficult to control my tendency to verify the recipient email addresses before sending 
email). However, it was not a significant contributor to the formation of habit. Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) found that awareness was not a significant factor that formed habit in 
their study. The insignificant dimensions in our study and the study of Polites and 
Karahanna (2012) may be due to the specific contexts of the studies or due to 
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inconsistencies of the habit scale. However, the second-order habit construct consistently 
demonstrated significant effects on the dependent variable in both the studies.  
Behavior 3: Visit Verified Websites 
The third secure behavior investigated was visiting only verified websites. Similar 
to behavior 1 and 2, data analyses were run in three stages: a baseline model with only 
the PMT variables, a model with PMT variables and habit as only a direct effect, and a 
full research model where habit was hypothesized to influence secure behavior directly 
while negatively moderating the relationship between behavioral intention and secure 
behavior.   
The model tested, investigated direct relationships from threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal variables to the behavioral intention to visit only verified websites. 
Perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability demonstrated significant 
positive relationships in determining whether individuals intended to visit only verified 
websites at the workplace. This provides support for H1 and H2. Threats of visiting 
unverified or unknown websites include virus or spyware infection of the computer at the 
workplace, which may expose the company network and data to outsiders. Crossler 
(2010), Herath and Rao (2009), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Lee and Larsen (2009), 
Lee (2011), Liang and Xue (2010) and Woon et al. (2005) found that perceived threat 
severity was a significant predictor of their dependent variable of different secure 
behaviors and our findings are consistent with their results. The support for H1 explains 
that the higher an individual perceives the threat of getting infected with malware by 
visiting unknown websites, the more likely he or she is to develop intentions to visit only 
verified websites. In organizations, employees have access to sensitive data and their 
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computers are setup to easily access this data. If a computer gets infected with a virus or 
other type of spyware, the information stored on that computer and on the company 
network will be at risk of being compromised. Therefore, a severe threat of data breach or 
compromise exists, if the computers get infected with virus or spyware because of 
visiting unknown websites. The data suggests that employees understand this threat to be 
severe and it influences them to develop intentions to visit only verified websites.  
Ifinedo (2012), Lee and Larsen (2009), Liang and Xue (2010) and Workman et al. 
(2008) found perceived threat vulnerability to be a significant factor that influences 
behavioral intention to perform secure behavior. This study had similar findings. The 
support for H2 shows that the higher an individual perceives the probability of their 
computer getting infected with malware by visiting unknown websites; the more likely 
they are to develop intentions to visit only verified websites. The findings of the 
relationships between the threat appraisal and coping appraisal variables suggest that 
individuals perceive that a severe threat of getting their work computer infected with 
malware is severe and the possibility of that happening is high. Therefore, they are more 
likely to visit only verified websites to protect their computers from malware infections. 
Coping appraisal variables such as response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
cost were tested for direct relationships with behavioral intention. H3, where it was 
hypothesized that response efficacy will significantly influence behavioral intention, was 
supported. This suggests that individuals are more likely to develop intentions to visit 
only verified websites as they gain in confidence that visiting only verified websites will 
prevent them from getting infected with malware. Support for H3 is also consistent with 
the findings of prior research studies (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; 
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Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; 
Workman et al. 2008). Self-efficacy was found to have a significant influence on 
behavioral intention, supporting H4. This is consistent with the findings of prior research 
studies as well (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; 
Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; 
Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). This suggests that individuals are more likely to 
visit only verified websites as they gain confidence in their ability to identify websites or 
web-links that are safe and do not pose a threat of malware.  
Response cost did not demonstrate a significant relationship with behavioral 
intention. Although the path co-efficient was negative (-0.013) as hypothesized, the path 
was not significant. Some of the previous studies found that response cost was a 
significant factor influencing behavioral intention (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee and Larsen 
2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Vance et al. 2012; Woon et al. 2005). The findings of this 
study are consistent with the findings of Ifinedo (2012) and (Crossler 2010) where the 
path between response cost and behavioral intention was not significant. This suggests 
that individuals do not associate any costs, such as time, money, or inconvenience with 
visiting only verified websites. Compared to locking a pc when leaving it unattended, 
visiting only verified websites involves very little time or effort resulting in less 
inconvenience to the employees. This is reflected by the findings of this study as well. 
The hypothesized positive relationship between behavioral intention and self-
reported actual behavior was significant, supporting H6. This relationship has also been 
confirmed by a large number of IT adoption studies as well as many other behavioral 
studies in psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Venkatesh et al. 2003). The results 
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suggest that individuals are more likely to visit only verified websites when they have 
formed behavioral intentions to perform that behavior. PMT variables explained 40.3 
percent of the variance in behavioral intentions. Only 24.7 percent of the variance in self-
reported actual behavior was explained by behavioral intentions. While the high R-square 
value of actual behavior may be somewhat low compared to behavior 1 and 2, it is still a 
relatively high percentage. A significant portion of the variance in actual behavior has 
been explained by behavioral intentions in prior studies (Liang and Xue 2010; Limayem 
et al. 2007; Venkatesh and Davis 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2000, 2003).  
A second model investigated the influence of habit only as a direct effect on 
actual behavior. H7a, where habit was hypothesized to have a positive direct effect on 
actual behavior, was supported at p<0.001. Although this relationship has not been tested 
previously in an information security context, Moody and Siponen (2013) and Limayem 
et al. (2007) found habit to significantly influence actual behavior. The findings of this 
study are consistent with the findings of those studies. It was also examined that the path 
coefficient between behavioral intentions and actual behavior reduced from 0.497 to 
0.375 when habit was introduced into the model as a direct effect of actual behavior. This 
explains that when habit is present, it reduces the influence of intentions as the driving 
force of actual behavior. When habit was introduced into the model, the R-square value 
of actual behavior increased to 34.9 percent, increasing the explanatory power of the 
research model.  
The final and complete research model hypothesized habit as a negative 
moderator of the intention-behavior relationship. The results indicate that habit does 
negatively moderate the intention-behavior relationship significantly at p<0.001 
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supporting H7b. The inclusion of habit as a moderator in the research model increased the 
R-square value of actual behavior to 36 percent, while the coefficient value of the 
intention-behavior relationship remained constant at 0.375. However, the relationship 
between behavioral intention and secure behavior remained significant, which shows that 
intentions still play a significant role even when habit is present. As discussed in the 
literature review section, in extreme circumstances, habitual behavior may become very 
strong to the point that intention will not have any influence on the actual behavior. It is 
clear that in our study, habit is not extremely strong to make the influence of behavioral 
intentions non-significant. This indicates that the respondents visit only verified websites 
habitually, but the strength of their habit is at a medium level. However, less cognitive 
effort is utilized to visit only verified websites due to the behavior being habitual as it is 
apparent in the reduced influence on behavioral intentions on actual behavior.  These 
findings are consistent with Limayem et al. (2007), where they found habit to negatively 
moderate the intention-behavior relationship. R-square difference tests between the 
models where habit was modeled as a direct effect and habit was modeled as a moderator 
indicate that the moderation has an effect size value of 0.02, which is a small effect (Chin 
et al. 2003; Cohen 1988). This is somewhat consistent with the findings of Limayem et 
al. (2007), who also found a negative moderation effect that was at the medium level. 
Again, it is also important to note that when an effect size is small, it does not mean that 
the change in R-square is unimportant (Abelson 1985; Prentice and Miller 1992).  
Habit was operationalized as a first-order reflective and second-order formative 
construct in this study. Statistical tests conducted to examine the weights of the formative 
dimensions of habit indicate that lack of awareness and uncontrollability dimensions 
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were significant factors in forming the habit construct, while mental efficiency was non-
significant. This is consistent with the findings of lock PC behavior where mental 
efficiency was not a significant factor that formed the habit construct. However, based on 
recommendations of prior research studies (Bollen and Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos 
and Siguaw 2006; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; 
Petter et al.2007), mental efficiency was retained for further data analysis. Respondents 
of this study demonstrated that mental efficiency was high when the visiting only verified 
websites behavior is performed (e.g., I do not need to devote a lot of mental effort to 
decide to visit only verified websites). However, it was not a significant contributor to the 
formation of habit. Polites and Karahanna (2012) found that awareness was not a 
significant factor that formed habit in their study. The insignificant dimensions in our 
study and the study of Polites and Karahanna (2012) may be due to the specific contexts 
of the studies or due to inconsistencies of the habit scale. However, the second-order 
habit construct consistently demonstrated significant effects on the dependent variable in 
both the studies. 
Post hoc Analyses 
To further test the validity of using habit as a formative measure, several 
alternative models were analyzed as a post hoc step. This section discusses the findings 
of the post hoc alternative models that tested the behaviors of locking the PC, verifying 
email address of recipients and visiting only verified websites respectively. It is important 
to note that all the statistical analyses of the structural models of this dissertation were 
conducted with SmartPLS. PLS software such as SmartPLS, does not provide any fit 
statistics similar to covariance based SEM tools such as AMOS or LISREL. A goodness-
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of-fit (GoF) index was recently suggested by some scholars, but it has been heavily 
criticized due to the over reliance on the R-square value and communality values. Chin 
(1998) also criticizes the overreliance of fit indices and posits that a model with high 
goodness-of-fit may still yield low R-square values and low path coefficients resulting in 
a model with low predictive power. Moreover, he suggests that research models with 
formative measures would not enable researchers to accurately calculate goodness-of-fit. 
Therefore, the post hoc analyses compared the R-square values and path coefficient 
values between models instead of GoF values.  
Behavior 1 or locking the computer when leaving it unattended was tested with 
alternative models. Habit was measured with a 3-item reflective scale developed by 
Limayem et al. (2007), and the reflective scale was used to test the main research model. 
The alternative model with the reflective scale demonstrated higher explanatory power 
than our research model with the alternative model demonstrating an R-square value of 
71 percent for the actual behavior compared to the main research model R-square value 
of 60.9 percent. The habit coefficient in the alternative model also demonstrated a higher 
predictive ability on actual behavior compared to the main research model. The 
coefficient value of the relationship between habit and actual behavior in the main 
research model was 0.515 and the value increased to 0.75 in the alternative model. 
However, it is important to note that the path coefficient of the moderating path of habit 
on intention-behavior relationship was lower in the alternative model compared to the 
main research model (-0.143 vs. -0.226). Although the alternative model with the 
reflective habit scale may demonstrate higher predictive power than the main research 
model, it is important to consider that the reflective scale fails to accurately capture the 
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multidimensional nature of habit (Polites and Karahanna 2012). Therefore, a formative 
scale that takes the different dimensions of habit would still be preferred to measure 
habit.  
Lock PC behavior was tested on another alternative model where PMT was 
modeled to mediate the habit-intention relationship as it was modeled by Vance et al. 
(2012). This alternative model was tested with both the formative and reflective 
constructs of habit. When the Vance et al. (2012) model was tested with the formative 
scale, habit demonstrated significant direct paths with only threat severity and threat 
vulnerability while all of the direct paths from habit to coping appraisal variables were 
found to be non-significant. When habit was tested with the reflective scale, the 
alternative model yielded similar results to Vance et al. (2012) with all the paths from 
habit to threat and coping appraisal being significant. Both alternative models showed 
similar predictive power with the R-square value of actual behavior being 53.6 percent, 
which is less than the 60.9 percent of the main research model.  
Lock PC behavior was again tested on another alternative model where inertia 
was included as a mediator of the habit-intention relationship as it was modeled by 
Polites and Karahanna (2012). Although inertia is not applicable in the context of this 
dissertation, considering the possible relationship between inertia and habit, inertia was 
measured and an alternative model was tested as a part of the post hoc analysis of this 
study. All the paths between PMT variables and behavioral intention were significant 
except for perceived threat vulnerability. Habit-inertia path and inertia-intention path 
were significant at p<0.001 in the opposite direction as hypothesized by Polites and 
Karahanna (2012). This may indicate that inertia may be somewhat relevant to the 
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behavior of locking the computer when leaving it unattended, since inertia refers to the 
attachment of existing behavioral patterns (status-quo) even if there are better 
alternatives. In the study of Polites and Karahanna (2012), inertia was modeled to 
negatively influence behavioral intention, where the higher the inertia, the lesser an 
individual would intend to perform an alternate behavior. However, for the context of this 
study, no alternative behaviors were suggested to the respondent; therefore in the context 
of our study, the higher the inertia of an individual, the more likely he or she would 
intend to perform the lock PC behavior as the data suggested.  
Two more alternative models were tested with the from the lock PC behavior. 
One of the alternative models tested the direct influence of habit along with PMT 
variables on behavioral intention. The R-square value of the behavioral intention yielded 
51.5 percent, which was much higher than the R-square value of the behavioral intention 
in the main research model. However, the two models cannot be compared since the 
alternative model omitted the variable of actual behavior. However, it is interesting to see 
that all the paths of this research model were significant. Another alternative model tested 
the influence of PMT variables on actual behavior while habit moderated the paths 
between the PMT variables and behavior. The dependent variable of this research model, 
actual behavior, had an R-square value of 52.6, but most of the paths were not significant. 
Perceived threat severity and response cost were found to have significant paths on actual 
behavior while habit significantly moderated those paths. All other paths were found to 
be non-significant. The results suggest that while actual behavior may matter the most in 
information security, it may not be influenced by threat and coping variables when a 
behavior is habituated.   
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Behavior 2 or verifying the recipient email addresses before sending email was 
tested with alternative models. Habit was measured with a 3-item reflective scale 
developed by Limayem et al. (2007), and the reflective scale was used to test the main 
research model. The alternative model with the reflective scale demonstrated lower 
explanatory power than our main research model. The calculated R-square value for the 
actual behavior of the alternative model was 55 percent compared to the main research 
model R-square value of 60.9 percent. The habit coefficient in the alternative model 
demonstrated a higher predictive ability on actual behavior compared to the main 
research model. The coefficient value of the relationship between habit and actual 
behavior in the main research model was 0.515 and the value increased to 0.616 in the 
alternative model. However, it is important to note that the path coefficient of the 
moderating path of habit on intention-behavior relationship was not significant in the 
alternative model (p>0.05). This indicates that when investigating the role of habit in 
verifying the email recipient before sending email, the formative scale better captures the 
habit.  
Verifying email recipients was tested on another alternative model where PMT 
was modeled to mediate the habit-intention relationship as it was modeled by Vance et al. 
(2012). This alternative model was tested with both the formative and reflective 
constructs of habit. When the Vance et al. (2012) model was tested with the formative 
scale, habit demonstrated significant direct paths from habit to PMT variables except for 
the path from habit to self-efficacy. When habit was tested with the reflective scale, the 
alternative model yielded similar results to Vance et al. (2012) with all the paths from 
habit to threat and coping appraisal being significant. Both alternative models showed 
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similar predictive power with the R-square value of actual behavior being 41.7 percent, 
which is less than the 44.5 percent of the main research model.  
Verifying email recipients was again tested on another alternative model where 
inertia was included as a mediator of the habit-intention relationship as it was modeled by 
Polites and Karahanna (2012). All the paths between PMT variables and behavioral 
intention were shown to be significant. Habit-inertia path and inertia-intention path were 
significant at p<0.001 in the opposite direction as hypothesized by Polites and Karahanna 
(2012). This may indicate that inertia may be somewhat relevant to the behavior of 
verifying email recipients before sending email. Since no alternative behaviors were 
suggested to the respondent, in the context of our study, inertia should increase the 
behavioral intentions to verify the recipient email addresses before sending email as the 
data suggested.  
Two more alternative models were tested with the behavior of verifying email 
recipients. One of the alternative models tested the direct influence of habit along with 
PMT variables on behavioral intention. The R-square value of the behavioral intention 
yielded 42.6 percent, which is lesser than the R-square value of the behavioral intention 
in the main research model. However, the two models cannot be compared since the 
alternative model omitted the variable of actual behavior. It is interesting to see that all 
the paths of this research model were significant except for perceived threat vulnerability. 
Another alternative model tested the influence of PMT variables on actual behavior while 
habit moderated the paths between the PMT variables and behavior. The dependent 
variable of this research model, actual behavior, had an R-square value of 41.4. All the 
paths between the PMT variables and behavior were significant except for the path 
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between perceived threat vulnerability and behavior. Paths between perceived threat 
severity and response cost with behavior were shown to be significantly moderated by 
habit, which other relationships were not significantly moderated. Interestingly, the 
relationship between habit and behavior was non-significant for this study. The results 
suggest that when considering the behavior of verifying email recipients before sending 
email, threat and coping appraisals are strong determinants of actual behavior than habit.   
Behavior 3 or visiting only verified websites was tested with alternate models. 
Habit was measured with a 3-item reflective scale developed by Limayem et al. (2007), 
and the reflective scale was used to test the main research model. The alternate model 
with the reflective scale demonstrated higher explanatory power than our main research 
model. The calculated R-square value for the actual behavior of the alternative model was 
48.7 percent compared to the main research model R-square value of 36 percent. The 
habit coefficient in the alternate model demonstrated a higher predictive ability on actual 
behavior compared to the main research model. The coefficient value of the relationship 
between habit and actual behavior in the main research model was 0.596 and the value 
increased to 0.616 in the alternative model. However, it is important to note that the path 
coefficient of the moderating path of habit on intention-behavior relationship was not 
significant in the alternate model (p>0.05). This indicates that when investigating the role 
of habit in visiting only verified websites, the formative scale better captures the habit.  
Visiting only verified websites was tested on another alternative model where 
PMT was modeled to mediate the habit-intention relationship as it was modeled by 
Vance et al. (2012). This alternative model was tested with both the formative and 
reflective constructs of habit. When the Vance et al. (2012) model was tested with the 
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formative scale, habit demonstrated significant direct paths from habit to all the PMT 
variables. When habit was tested with the reflective scale, the alternate model yielded 
similar results to Vance et al. (2012) with all the paths from habit to threat and coping 
appraisal being significant. Both alternative models showed similar predictive power with 
the R-square value of actual behavior being 24.6 percent, which is less than the 36 
percent of the main research model.  
Visiting only verified websites was again tested on another alternative model 
where inertia was included as a mediator of the habit-intention relationship as it was 
modeled by Polites and Karahanna (2012). All the paths between PMT variables and 
behavioral intention were significant except for perceived threat vulnerability. Habit-
inertia path and inertia-intention path were significant at p<0.001 in the opposite 
direction as hypothesized by Polites and Karahanna (2012). For the context of this study, 
no alternative behaviors were suggested to the respondent; therefore, inertia should 
increase the behavioral intentions to visit only verified websites as the data suggested.  
Two more alternative models were tested with the behavior of visiting only 
verified websites. One of the alternate models tested the direct influence of habit along 
with PMT variables on behavioral intention. The R-square value of the behavioral 
intention yielded 43.5 percent, which was much higher than the R-square value of the 
behavioral intention in the main research model. The two models cannot be compared 
since the alternative model omitted the variable of actual behavior. However, it is 
interesting to see that all the paths of this research model were significant except for the 
path between response cost and behavioral intention. Another alternative model tested the 
influence of PMT variables on actual behavior while habit moderated the paths between 
 
251 
the PMT variables and behavior. The dependent variable of this research model, actual 
behavior, had an R-square value of 41.8 percent, but most of the paths were not 
significant. Habit showed a significant relationship with behavior but failed to moderate 
any of the paths between the PMT variables and behavior. Response efficacy and self-
efficacy were the only variables that showed significant paths with behavior. All other 
paths were found to be non-significant. The results suggest that in the behavior of visiting 
only verified websites, habit was a strong determinant of behavior along with response 
efficacy and self-efficacy.  
Implications For Research 
This dissertation contributes to the field of IS, especially information security by 
investigating the role of habit in information security behaviors. Habit theory, which has 
been extensively investigated in the psychology discipline, has not received much 
attention in the IS discipline and has received even less attention in the domain of 
information security. The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that habit plays a 
significant role in the performance of information security behaviors and provide support 
of that notion with results from an investigation of three secure behaviors.  
To test the role of habit in the context of information security, we drew from the 
theoretical perspectives of a well-established and highly validated theory in information 
security, which is the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT).  PMT has been utilized by 
many cross-sectional information security studies. However, most of these studies rely on 
the assumption that behavioral intention is the driving factor of actual behavior. Due to 
the theoretical background of the correlations between intentions and actual behavior and 
due to the challenges of collecting data on actual behavior, most researchers are content 
 
252 
to measure behavioral intentions as a proxy for actual behavior. This perfectly aligns with 
the suggestions of TRA and TPB. Behavioral intentions may be the driving force of 
behavior in the initial stages of performing a behavior. However, these studies fail to 
identify that the influence of behavioral intentions as the driving force of behavior starts 
to diminish over time, and most behaviors become habituated. Subjects of a research 
study may or may not have formed habits related to the behavior that is tested. However, 
by failing to capture the existence of habit during cross-sectional studies, prior studies 
may have left out an important antecedent that may have increased the predictive ability 
of their research model. More importantly, they have failed to test the role of habit in 
information security behaviors. 
This dissertation is not the first attempt to investigate the role of habit in 
information security. Several information security research studies have clearly identified 
habit as a major factor that drives secure behaviors, but only a few of them have 
empirically tested it. Moody and Siponen (2013), Pahnila et al. (2007), Siponen et al. 
(2010) and Vance et al. (2012) have empirically tested the role of habit in information 
security behaviors. However, most of them hypothesized that habit will directly influence 
behavioral intentions, which is in contrast to the widely accepted definition of habit, as 
automatic behavior that requires little or no cognitive effort. This study overcame this 
limitation by modeling habit as a direct influence of actual behavior and a moderator of 
the intention-behavior relationship, similar to Limayem et al. (2007). Previous studies by 
Pahnila et al. (2007) and Vance et al. (2012), which explored habit in an information 
security context, measured habit through reflective scales. While the reflective scales 
they utilized to measure habit are validated and heavily tested, they fail to capture the 
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multi-dimensional aspects of habit. This study measured habit with a first-order 
reflective, second-order formative construct, therefore, capturing the multiple dimensions 
of habit.  
The findings of this dissertation provide numerous contributions to IS theory. 
First, the findings of this study confirm the significant relationship between behavioral 
intention and actual behavior in the context of information security. While the intention-
behavior relationship has been tested in many research studies, only a few information 
security studies have tested that relationship (Liang and Xue 2010; Workman et al. 2008). 
This study measured secure behavior through a self-reported scale. Measurement of 
actual behavior using self-reported scales has been criticized by scholars. However, due 
to challenges in measuring actual behavior, self-reported scales are gaining acceptance in 
IS research. This study investigated the intention-behavior relationship in three secure 
behaviors and found consistent findings where behavioral intentions significantly 
influenced self-reported actual behavior in all three behaviors examined. These findings 
should encourage researchers to measure actual behavior with self-reported scales since it 
provides an opportunity to increase the predictive ability of the research model. It also 
provides the opportunity to test other interaction and moderation effects of many 
variables on actual behavior, which otherwise would not have been possible.  
Second, the findings of this study provide strong empirical evidence to illustrate 
the importance of habit in information security behaviors. In all the three behaviors 
examined, habit significantly influenced secure behavior directly. The inclusion of the 
habit variable as an antecedent of secure behavior increased the variance explained by the 
secure behavior significantly in all three behaviors, demonstrating the importance of 
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habit. This also shows that previous information security studies have failed to capture 
this important aspect of habit in their research studies. If they measured habit, it could 
have led to richer findings. The importance of habit in information security behaviors is 
further highlighted by the investigation of the moderation effects. In all three behaviors 
examined in this study, habit was found to moderate the intention-behavior relationship 
significantly. The values of the effect sizes in R-square difference tests suggest that all 
three behaviors have a medium effect size value for the moderation effect. This finding 
itself is a significant contribution to information security research. Prior to this study, 
information security scholars have not considered the moderating effect of habit on the 
intention-behavior relationship (Moody and Siponen 2013; Pahnila et al. 2007; Siponen 
et al. 2010; Vance et al. 2012). Previous studies simply assumed that behavioral 
intentions will continue to be the driving force of behavior regardless of the repetitive or 
routine nature of the performance of that behavior. Findings of this study would provide 
an opportunity for information security researchers to re-evaluate their views on the 
intention-behavior relationship in an information security context. As discussed later on 
this chapter, a longitudinal study would provide better evidence on how the influence of 
intentions on actual behavior diminishes over time.  
Third, this study contributes to information security research by adopting a first-
order reflective and second-order formative habit construct in the context of information 
security. The first-order reflective dimensions of habit are formed of 4 items each and 
this study evaluated the reliability, validity and loadings of those dimensions on three 
different secure behaviors. These validated items can be potentially adopted by future 
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researchers who are interested in examining the role of habit on other secure behaviors 
and want to capture the multidimensional aspect of habit. 
Fourth, a list of 49 secure behaviors was developed after a rigorous review of 
academic literature and practitioner articles. While some behaviors of this list were 
adopted from Posey et al. (2013), the list of 49 secure behaviors was subjected to a 
subject-matter expert panel and an employee panel who were asked to rate each behavior 
to the degree they perceived it to be habitual. Appendix B, table B.5 illustrates the results 
of the expert and employee panel surveys, which provide the percentage of panelists who 
rated each behavior to be habitual. Three of those behaviors were selected for this study. 
However, the list of behaviors and their habit strength as perceived by the panelists 
provide future researchers with a source to select the secure behaviors they need to test 
for the role of habit.  
Finally, PMT was extended with the inclusion of habit in the research model. 
PMT was extended with habit by Vance et al. (2012), but this study provides an alternate 
method to extend PMT with habit while accounting for the moderating effects of habit 
and capturing the different dimensions of habit with a formative scale. Investigation of 
three secure behaviors that has not been tested before is also a contribution to information 
security research. The findings of these three studies can be utilized to extend our 
knowledge of secure behaviors and PMT. 
Implications for Practice 
Organizations continue to face dynamic threats to the security of their information 
systems on a daily basis. Most of these organizations have created technical controls to 
deter these threats and have implemented information security policies that are mandated 
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to all employees. However, these controls and security policies are only effective to the 
extent that employees and others follow them. This dissertation makes a contribution to 
practice by providing evidence of the role habit plays in information security behaviors and 
explaining how it can be utilized to the advantage of organizations to strengthen their 
information security practices.  
The results of this study provide strong support to the existence of habit as a 
major factor that influences the performance of secure behavior. Most employees perform 
a routine set of tasks on a daily basis and some of these tasks are likely to be habituated 
over time. If organizations can make their employees perform secure behaviors 
habitually, it will reduce the need for security policies or negative sanctions for non-
compliance. The first step in this process is to identify secure behaviors that are habitual. 
As it was discussed previously in Chapter III, not all behaviors are habitual. Thus, it is 
important to understand habitual secure behaviors. This dissertation provides a solid 
foundation to organizations in identifying habitual secure behaviors. A list of 49 secure 
behaviors was ranked by subject-matter experts and a panel of employees to the degree to 
which they perceived those behaviors to be habitual. Some behaviors were ranked highly 
by both the expert panel and employee panel while some behaviors were perceived 
differently by the two panels to the degree they thought the behaviors were habitual. 
Organizations can examine this list to get a general idea about which secure behaviors 
their employees may perform habitually. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to the 
practice by extending the understanding of habitual secure behaviors. 
This dissertation also aids the practice by identifying that habits can be positive or 
negative. Positive habits are the performance of recommended secure behaviors 
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habitually in compliance with the organizational security policies. While organizations 
would want their employees to comply with the security policies, they would strive to 
make their employees perform compliant behavior habitually. Habituation of secure 
behaviors by employees provides organizations with two main benefits. First, it will 
provide them with peace of mind since employees are less likely to neglect performance 
of secure behavior (e.g., locking their computer when leaving it unattended) since the 
behaviors happens automatically (Oulasvirta et al. 2012; Plamondon 2011; Vandermeer 
2006). Second, it will provide organizations the opportunity to have a relaxed security 
policy, which increases employee satisfaction (Plamondon 2011). Negative habits are 
non-compliant behavior that is performed habitually by employees. Negative habits are 
highly undesirable and organizations should quickly identify any negative habits and take 
immediate steps to curtail them. While this dissertation focused solely on positive habits 
of secure behaviors, it provides opportunities to organizations to identify possible 
negative habits of employees.   
Following the identification of possible secure behaviors that can be habituated, 
organizations should find ways to influence their employees to perform these behaviors 
habitually. There are several methods employees can deploy to foster positive habits 
(Plamondon 2011). One of the methods is through enforced security policies. When the 
performance of certain secure behavior is mandated, it will force employees to perform 
these behaviors routinely. Eventually, employees will learn to associate environmental 
cues with these secure behaviors and perform these secure behaviors regardless of the 
security policies. Another method to foster positive habit is through security education, 
training and awareness (SETA) programs. SETA programs can be effective solutions to 
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form positive habits and break negative habits of employees through frequently 
administered security communications such as pop-up messages, sidebar in a newsletter 
or post-it notes with encouragement to comply with security policies. These may 
eventually become environmental cues that trigger the performance of secure behavior 
automatically. For example, a post-it note that asks the question “did you lock your 
computer?” will trigger an employee who is about to leave the workspace to lock his or 
her computer automatically.  
It was not possible to analyze the formation of habit as a part of this study because 
the data are cross-sectional and measurements overtime are required to study the 
evolution of habits. However, understanding of habit formation and habitual secure 
behaviors is critical in certain contexts such as the healthcare sector. The findings of this 
study can be applied in the healthcare sector to test if the same behaviors are performed 
habitually by employees in the healthcare sector. The healthcare sector has increased the 
need for stringent information security procedures with the adoption of digital patient 
records and other technology related tools (Appari and Johnson 2010; Warkentin, 
Johnston, and Shropshire 2011). Many reports of privacy and data breaches in the 
healthcare sector provide the importance of enforced security policies that require 
employees to perform secure behaviors.  
All three behaviors investigated in this study can be related to recommended 
secure behaviors performed by employees in the healthcare sector. Healthcare employees 
are likely to have access to private patient data (Warkentin, Johnston, and Shropshire 
2011), thus they should definitely lock their computer when the leave it unattended to 
prevent an unauthorized user gaining access to private patient data. Healthcare employees 
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are also likely to communicate with their superiors and colleagues through email and 
these emails may contain private patient data. Therefore, it is important that employees 
verify the email addresses of the recipients before sending email because if an unintended 
recipient receives an email with private patient data, it would be a severe problem. 
Visiting unknown websites at the workplace poses the threat of malware infection that 
may expose the computer access, information stored on the computer and the network to 
outsiders. In the case of a computer in the workplace of a healthcare employee, this poses 
a huge threat. Therefore, employees should be careful only to visit verified websites and 
avoid clicking web-links that are suspicious. It is clear that the three behaviors tested in 
this dissertation are highly applicable to the healthcare sector. The results indicate that 
habit plays a major role in the secure behaviors being performed. Superiors of the 
healthcare industry can utilize these findings to foster habits of secure behaviors in their 
employees. 
The findings of this study related to the direct paths between PMT variables and 
behavioral intention will be beneficial to practice as well. The results of the lock PC 
behavior suggest that high perceptions of threat severity and vulnerability will influence 
individuals to form intentions to lock their computer when leaving it unattended.  
Organizations can use this information to educate their employees about the 
consequences of an unauthorized user accessing their computer if they leave it unattended 
without locking it and to educate them about the possibility of someone else accessing 
their computer since most of them work in open workspaces or cubicles. Employees can 
also be educated in the effectiveness of locking their computers to protect them from 
unauthorized access and easy ways to lock their computers. Similarly, employees can be 
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educated about the threat severity and vulnerability of the other two behaviors tested in 
this study along with the effectiveness and the ease of performing the recommended 
behavior.  
Limitations 
This study has several limitations, as do all research studies. The limitations of 
this study are discussed in this section. It is not feasible to remove all limitations; 
however, we are hopeful that these limitations will lead to opportunities for future 
research where they can be addressed.  
One of the limitations of this study is that it was conducted in a cross-sectional 
manner. As discussed in Chapter II, habit is a process where individuals, to achieve a 
certain goal, repetitively and successfully perform a certain behavior, until it becomes 
habitual. Habits become stronger overtime and it is a gradual process. In extreme 
situations, certain habitual behaviors may be performed with no cognitive effort (Triandis 
1980). The time it takes and other factors that lead to stronger habits, such as the success 
rate, and environmental cues will vary among individuals, resulting in varying levels of 
habit strength among different individuals.  Certain scholars posit that a minute level of 
habit will be generated the first time a certain behavior is performed, and every time the 
same behavior is repeated, the strength of habit increases (Ouellette and Wood 1998). 
However, other scholars refute this argument and posit that habits are born under 
different circumstances for different individuals (Verplanken and Orbell 2003; 
Verplanken 2006). There is a widely accepted notion of habit: Behaviors when they are 
performed initially will be cognitive and will agree with the TPB and TRA, where 
behavioral intentions are created and lead to actual behavior. However, certain behaviors 
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may be performed repetitively and successfully in order to achieve certain goals, where 
individuals may associate certain environmental cues with the performance of these 
behaviors. When these cues are encountered, the behaviors are performed automatically 
or with very little cognitive effort, which is called habitual performance of the behavior.  
The gradual strengthening of habit makes it a strong contender for longitudinal 
studies. First, the initial influence of behavioral intentions on actual behavior can be 
examined. At this point, habits should be non-existent or should have little influence on 
actual behavior. If the behavior is habitual in nature, habits will develop over time 
strengthening the influence of habit on actual behavior while the influence of behavioral 
intentions on actual behaviors reduces as habit develops.  A longitudinal study would 
enable researchers to collect data at several points of time and examine how the strength 
of habit develops over time as well as the significance of behavioral intentions or 
cognitive process diminishes. Collecting data in a cross-sectional manner such as it was 
done in this study, reduces the ability of the researchers to analyze how habits materialize 
and gain in strength over-time. However, longitudinal studies are not easy to conduct 
(Venkatesh and Davis 2000)  since this type of study requires access to the same sample 
and data collection over time such as months or years. These difficulties may explain 
why most of the studies that have investigated the role of habit in IS have been cross-
sectional. 
The data for this study was collected from respondents from multiple 
organizations. Although this can be considered an advantage due to greater 
generalizability (Compeau et al. 2012), it also introduces some limitations. Collecting 
data from multiple companies such as it was done in this study, may introduce some 
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biases to the collected data. The biases are related to the different factors that the 
respondents are exposed to in their organization environment. For example, different 
organizations may have different organizational cultures. Certain companies may have a 
robust security policy and stringent enforcement of that policy through negative 
sanctions. Respondents who are employed in these types of companies are likely to 
follow security policies more carefully and will have a higher likelihood to perform 
recommended secure behaviors (e.g., lock the computer when leaving it unattended). 
They are also more likely to perform these behaviors habitually due to the repetitive and 
successful nature of the behaviors that are triggered by environmental cues such as 
warnings or notices of sanctions for those who do not comply with security policies.  
Conversely, respondents of companies that have implemented relaxed security policies 
are less likely to form habits to perform secure behaviors. These factors such as 
organizational culture, information security policy enforcement and sanctions involved 
for non-compliance, were not taken into account in this study; therefore, could not be 
controlled. However, the type of industry, which the respondents were employed, was not 
found to be a significant factor during the data analysis.  
All the data of this study were collected with self-reported scales utilizing an 
online survey, which can be considered a limitation of this study. Although survey 
methodology is commonly used in IS research and other disciplines, it is also criticized 
for its limitations and biases. It is recommended researchers measure actual behavior and 
investigating behavioral intentions as a proxy of actual behavior has been criticized (Lee 
2011). However, measuring actual secure behavior, such as accessing computer logs of 
computer usage, is very challenging and in most cases impossible (Crossler et al. 2013; 
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Warkentin et al. 2012). Because of these challenges, researchers have measured actual 
behavior through self-reported scales, which provides researchers with the ability to test 
relationships such as intention-behavior relationship. Only a few research studies have 
collected actual secure behavior such as password changes, security patch updates and 
backups by accessing computer logs (Lee 2011; Workman et al. 2008) while most 
researchers have measured only behavioral intention or measured actual behaviors with 
self-reported scales.  
The data for the study were collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 
which is a popular crowdsourcing website. The data collected were high quality and 
reliable. However, rewarding the respondents for completing surveys may bias the 
responses since they are motivated to earn the reward. Therefore, they may only provide 
formidable responses resulting in a lower response spread.  The very low reward given 
for each response (20 cents) may also have encouraged respondents to complete the 
survey quickly, so that they can complete another task to earn more money. However, 
there was a good response spread in the data collected in the three studies conducted for 
this dissertation, but paid survey responses could still be considered a limitation of this 
study. There is also the possibility of the same respondent completing the same survey in 
order to earn more rewards. Although steps were taken to restrict an individual 
respondent from completing the same survey again, robust procedures do not exist in 
achieving this. The fact that AMT respondents have to visit a link hosted in Qualtrics to 
complete the survey, and having visit the AMT site again with a code to obtain the 
reward money, creates potential problems and loopholes.  
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One of the major constructs investigated in this study is habit. Prior studies have 
measured habit using frequency of past behavior, self-reports and response frequency 
measures. Past behavior and frequency of past behavior are the most frequently used 
methods to measure habits with the theoretical lens that for the development of habits, it 
requires a certain amount of repetition and practice. However some scholars conducting 
behavioral research argue that frequency and past behavior alone cannot constitute habit. 
In order to measure the automaticity of habit and to capture the whole habit domain, habit 
is measured in this study through a self-reported first-order reflective, second-order 
formative scale.  
Self-reports have been the commonly used method to measure habit in the recent 
scholarly research. The self-reported habit index (SRHI), which was created by 
Verplanken and Orbell (2003), is one of the most commonly utilized scales to measure 
habit (Sniehotta and Presseau 2012). Limayem et al. (2007) and Polites and Karahanna 
(2012) developed self-reported scales to measure habit in the context of information 
systems. However, some critics are skeptical about measuring habit with self-reported 
scales and argue that these scales are not valid. Contrary to constructs used in behavioral 
models such as intention and attitude, which belong to conscious human cognition, habit 
is of an unconscious nature. Therefore, these scholars suggest that it may not be 
appropriate to ask people to report the strength of their habits, when an essential feature 
of habit is its unconscious character (Klockner and Matthies 2012). Justifying the use of 
self-reports to measure habits, two of the prominent researchers of habit, Verplanken and 
Orbell (2003, p.1316), suggest that “if measured appropriately, it is possible to have 
people reflect on their behavior in terms of the degree to which it is habitual.” Even 
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though habit is measured frequently using self-reported scales, measuring habit with only 
self-reported scales may still be considered as a limitation of this study. 
Several potential constructs were not included in our research model in order to 
test a parsimonious model. This study tests the traditional PMT model with habit 
modeled as a direct influence of behavior and a moderator of the intention-behavior 
relationship. There are many possible antecedents of behavioral intention and actual 
behavior described in the literature we could have tested. However, the sheer number of 
possible antecedents makes it impractical to test all of them in our research study. 
Possible antecedents that could have been included in our research model will be 
discussed in the future research section. 
Another limitation of this study is the study of only three behaviors, although 
many previous studies investigated antecedents of only one behavior. The three behaviors 
tested in this study were selected using a systematic 5-step procedure that began with a 
pool of 129 behaviors relevant to IS that could have been studied. 49 of these were 
identified to be reviewed by an expert panel and separately by employees for the extent to 
which habit was considered important in explaining each of the behaviors. Separately, the 
feasibility of accurately measuring each behavior was evaluated. Ten behaviors were 
identified that were feasible to measure and were rated as having high, medium to high, 
and medium dependence on habit. It was a deliberate choice to consider not just 
behaviors considered highly dependent on habit to increase the generalizability of the 
conclusions. Another expert panel identified the final three behaviors that were used in 
the pilot and main studies. This study considered three behaviors, which is an 
improvement upon the single behavior often studied in other research. Although these 
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three were carefully selected to represent high and medium relationship to habit, the 
study of other behaviors will be necessary to demonstrate the strength of habit in IS-
related behaviors. 
Another possible limitation of this study is its focus only on positive habits. In 
terms of information security and security policy compliance, behaviors performed by 
employees may be compliant or non-compliant(Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 
2009; Ifinedo 2012; Puhakainen and Siponen 2010; Vance et al. 2012; Warkentin, 
Johnston, and Shropshire. 2011). For example, an employee may frequently and 
automatically lock his or her computer every time he or she leaves the terminal 
unattended. This may demonstrate a habitual compliant behavior or a positive habit 
(Siponen et al. 2010). Another employee, even though the organizational policy states 
otherwise, may intentionally share his or her password to a secure system with a 
colleague (Siponen and Vance 2010). Continuously sharing of passwords, however, may 
become a habitual (automatic) non-compliant behavior or a negative habit. This study 
only focused on positive habits. However, many behaviors performed by employees in 
the workplace may be negative habits that affect the information security of an 
organization.  
Future Research 
The findings of this dissertation provide valuable contributions to both IS theory 
and practice. This study is also one of the few studies that explored the role of habit in an 
information security context. However, there are many possible areas where new research 
studies can address the limitations of this dissertation and/or expand on the findings of 
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this study in order to better understand the role of habit in information security. Possible 
future research ideas are discussed in this section. 
An important direction for future research investigating the role of habit in 
information security is to measure habit in a longitudinal manner instead of cross-
sectional. As mentioned in the limitations section, by measuring habit in a cross-sectional 
manner such as it was done on this dissertation and most of the scholarly articles 
exploring habit, the habit formation process is ignored. Therefore, important antecedents 
related to habit formation cannot be captured until the study is conducted in a 
longitudinal manner. The formation of habit is a process where individuals repetitively 
and successfully perform a certain behavior to achieve a certain goal. Eventually, this 
behavior will be performed automatically whenever a certain situation is encountered or 
faced with an environmental cue, making the behavior habitual. Habits are formed 
gradually, making it highly applicable for a longitudinal study where different levels of 
habit strength can be measured at different stages of time. While intentions may play a 
key role in the performance of actual behavior in initial stages of performing a behavior, 
when the same behavior is performed routinely, the decision-making process and intentions 
change, and the influence of intentions on behavior decreases (Kim and Malhotra 2005; 
Venkatesh et al. 2000). In a five month longitudinal study on technology adoption, 
Venkatesh et al. (2000) found that actual usage of IS was heavily influenced by intentions 
in the initial stage (t=1) and identified a significant decrease of intentions on actual 
behavior as time progressed, which they attributed to the behaviors becoming 
“habituated.” Similarly, future research studies should conduct longitudinal studies to 
understand the role of habit on information security behaviors where the initial 
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significance of intentions on the actual secure behavior, and the decrease of the cognitive 
decision making process can be examined over time.  
However, it will be challenging to measure the habitual performance of a secure 
behavior in a longitudinal manner for several reasons. First, it would be difficult to 
identify when a respondent initiates the performance of a secure behavior. Second, it 
would be difficult to gain access to actual data such as computer logs to identify if a 
certain behavior was performed (e.g., logging off the computer). Finally, it would be 
difficult to keep track of the secure behavior performed by the respondents for a long 
period of time (e.g., months, years) and also to identify if the behaviors were performed 
automatically, when triggered by environmental cues. If these challenges can be 
overcome, a longitudinal study to investigate the role of habit in information security 
behaviors can be conducted in the future. If it is not practical to conduct a longitudinal 
study to investigate habit in an information security context, cross-sectional studies 
would still provide ample opportunities for researchers to investigate different behaviors 
and the influence of habit on the automatic performance of those behaviors.  
We measured the survey instrument from respondents who are employed in 
multiple organizations across different industries. This was identified as a possible 
limitation previously due to the different organizational cultures that may promote 
different security policies and different levels of required compliance and sanctions. 
While respondents from multiple organizations may provide more generalizable data 
(Compeau et al. 2012), future studies should address some of the limitations of this study 
with regards to the sample. First, future studies should focus on collecting data from 
multiple organizations, which increases generalizability, but should take rigorous steps to 
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control for variables such as organizational culture differences, existence of security 
policies, security policy enforcement, positive or negative sanctions involved with 
compliant and non-compliant behavior. These controls will take into account the biases 
that may be introduced to the data due to different organizational factors. Second, future 
research should also conduct studies focusing on one organization for each study. By 
focusing only on one organization, any biases of data collection from multiple 
organizations can be avoided. Researchers can also focus more on specific security 
policies or secure behaviors that are unique to the organization that is on focus. While 
gender as a control variable did not have any influence in our study, future research 
should continue to test the influence of gender and how it affects the strength of habit in 
the context of information security behaviors.  
Future research studies should collect data from multiple sources if possible. This 
dissertation collected data only through Amazon Mechanical Turk. While the data did not 
have any significant issues, data can be collected through different panel providers to 
provide more generalizability and also to reduce any possible biases of respondents that 
belong to a certain panel provider. There are several reputable survey panels available 
through companies such as Qualtrics, Empanel and Survey Monkey. These panels have 
access to respondents from different demographics and different organizations and the 
incentives or rewards provided to the respondents for completing a survey are different 
too. However, researchers may face the risk of collecting data from the same respondent 
completing the same survey if they are recruited by several panel providers. Due to the 
sheer number of members in each of these survey panels, the probability of a situation 
 
270 
like that happening would be low. In the same vein, it will be desirable that future studies 
collect from other sources than just survey panels.  
Data can be collected from students, which is one of the most common sources of 
data for research studies. However, researchers should be careful in collecting data from 
students related to information security behaviors and their habits, since students have 
shown little concerns about the security and privacy of information that belong to them or 
the academic organizations. Certain secure behaviors identified in this study such as 
locking the PC when leaving it unattended will not be applicable to be tested with student 
data. Collecting data related to habitual secure behavior will provide insights into the 
factors that form good and bad habits among students, which will be beneficial to 
academic institutions and their IT services departments to enforce policies and strengthen 
information security. Student data will also provide researchers with the ability to 
compare if the factors that contribute to the formation of habit in secure behaviors are 
similar or different between students and organizational computer users.  
Future research studies can expand the findings of this study by collecting data in 
different contexts as well. While, a comparison of data from organizational users with 
students can be beneficial, a better comparison would be to compare organizational users 
with home users. Organizational respondents usually perform secure behaviors because 
they need to protect sensitive information related to their organization and because they 
are required to do so by the enforced security policies. Therefore, the habit strength of 
these behaviors may be influenced by different factors related to the organization. In a 
home setting, any secure behaviors that individuals perform are done so completely 
voluntarily. Therefore, researchers can collect data from both home users and 
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organizational users for comparison purposes and to understand if differences exist on 
factors that influence the formation of habit in different settings. Data can also be 
collected from respondents (students, organizational users and home users) without any 
incentives or rewards. This would alleviate any potential biases introduced by the offers 
of incentives for completing surveys. Multi-cultural studies can also be conducted to test 
if differences exist among habit formation and habit strength among individuals from 
different cultures and countries.  
This dissertation focuses only on habitual behaviors related to information 
security, but habit is prevalent in many behaviors that individuals perform on a daily 
basis. Researchers suggest that more than 40 percent of our daily behaviors are habitual 
(Duhigg 2012; Neal et al. 2006). Future research can study if differences exist in the 
factors that influence the formation of habit related to information security behaviors, IS 
behaviors and other daily performed behaviors. Differences that exist in the 
environmental cues that trigger habitual behavior and the duration it takes to form habits 
between daily habits and information security habits can be examined through these 
studies as well. Researchers will also be able to identify if habitual security behaviors are 
formed in a unique manner or if they are formed similar to habits of daily behaviors that 
are performed on a daily basis.  
One of the major issues with investigating habit in academic research is the 
operationalization of habit. Previous studies have measured habit through frequency of 
past behavior and response frequency (RF) measures. The most frequently used method 
is using self-reported formative and reflective scales to measure habit with self-reported 
habit index (SRHI) being the most popular measure (Sniehotta and Presseau 2012). 
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Critics have questioned measuring habit through self-reported scales because by 
definition habit is automatic in nature and uses less cognitive resources. They argue that 
if habitual behaviors are performed automatically by individuals without awareness of 
why they performed the behavior, survey items will not be able to capture the strength of 
habit or if the individuals performed the behavior habitually. Although Verplanken and 
Orbell (2003) argue that “if appropriately measured” habit can be measured through self-
reports, future studies should explore other methods to measure habit.  
One of the possible methods to measure habit is through an experiment. During 
experimental studies, the behavior and the habit will be measured in a controlled and 
unrealistic environment that would reduce realism. However, a controlled environment 
would be more appealing for researchers where they can control for many factors and 
focus specifically on how habits are formed. For example, a simulated experimental 
environment can be created where the subjects are required to perform information 
security related tasks on a routine basis. Researchers can identify factors that lead to habit 
formation and even manipulate certain factors to see if any significant differences 
manifest with the habit formation process. An experiment will also be beneficial to a 
longitudinal study, where researchers can have access to the same set of respondents over 
a longer period of time. 
Another possible method to measure habit is through neuro-physiological 
methods such as Electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI). EEG equipment from companies such as EMOTIV are readily available 
and affordable, which provides researchers with better opportunities to measure the 
neurological aspects of habit. FMRI is a more robust method to measure habit, but it is 
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not economically feasible for most researchers to conduct research using that method. 
Both EEG and fRMI have been suggested by Janes et al. (2009) and Dimoka (2012) as 
possible methods to measure habit. Both these methods examine brain waves of subjects 
when they are performing certain tasks. As mentioned previously, decision making 
processes utilize the prefrontal cortex of the brain while routine or automatic behaviors 
utilize the basal ganglia of the brain. EEG and fMRI methods will be able to identify 
which part of the brain functions when a certain behavior is performed and researchers 
will be able to identify if the basal ganglia or the prefrontal cortex is activated when a 
certain behavior is performed. Depending on the area of the brain that is active, 
researchers will be able to understand if a certain behavior is performed habitually or 
intentionally. These neuro-physiological methods will also aid researchers in longitudinal 
studies. 
The experiments and neuro-physiological methods to measure habits are highly 
beneficial to researchers in measuring habit. However, these methods may not always be 
practical or feasible for most researchers to measure habit. These methods also have 
limitations such as lack of realism. Behaviors are habituated when they are performed 
successfully and repetitively in a stable context. However, when habit is measured with 
either an experiment or a neuro-physiological method, the controlled and unrealistic 
environment (Dennis and Valacich 2001), removes the stable context required for habits 
to be performed. Therefore, researchers should not completely avoid using self-reported 
scales to measure habit, which is considered to be the most appropriate method.  
One of the areas that future research can focus is developing a more robust self-
report scale to measure habit. Currently, there are several validated self-report scales. 
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Self-report habit index (SRHI) by Verplanken and Orbell (2003), is a 12-item reflective 
scale, which is frequently utilized by researchers. Although this scale is measured 
reflectively, careful examination of the items suggest a formative or multi-dimensional 
structure that taps into dimensions such as awareness, mental efficiency, uncontrollability, 
frequency and self-identity. Although empirical results from the studies that measured habit 
with SRHI suggest of a reflective structure of the scale, the inclusion of items related to 
frequency and self-identify to measure habit has been questioned (Sniehotta and Presseau 
2012). Limayem et al. (2007) developed and validated a 3-item reflective habit scale to 
measure habit in the context of IS continuance. While this scale is a parsimonious way of 
measuring habit, it fails to capture the multi-dimensional aspects such as lack of awareness, 
uncontrollability and mental efficiency.  
Polites and Karahanna (2012) developed a formative scale for habit that captures 
the multi-dimensional aspects of habit. Their scale is one of the more robust scales 
developed to capture habit, where three first-order reflective constructs: lack of 
awareness, uncontrollability and mental efficiency form the three dimensions of the 
second-order formative habit construct. Their scale was validated and tested in the 
context of new information system acceptance. However, they found that the dimension 
of awareness was not a significant factor in forming the second-order habit construct. 
Similarly, the findings of this dissertation indicate that mental efficiency was not a 
significant factor in forming habit when the behaviors investigated were locking the PC 
when leaving it unattended and visiting only verified websites. We also found that 
uncontrollability was not a significant factor forming the habit construct when the 
behavior tested was verifying email recipients before sending emails. While this may be 
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due to different contexts of the investigations, this may also be due to certain limitations 
of the scale developed by Polites and Karahanna (2012). Future studies should re-validate 
their scale in many contexts in IS and other disciplines to confirm its reliability and 
validity. In terms of future information security research, their scale should be revalidated 
in different secure behaviors to ensure its applicability in an information security context. 
It is appropriate that future research should also focus on developing a self-reported habit 
scale, specifically for information security context since the current scales by Limayem et 
al. (2007) and Polites and Karahanna (2012) were developed to test habit in the context of 
IS continuance or adoption and  post-adoption of technology.  
Data collected though self-reported habit measures can also be supplemented with 
other objective measures such as experiment results, fMRI or EEG results. Straub et al. 
(1995) suggests that limitations of self-reported scales can be reduced by supplementing 
the findings with objective data. This is especially critical when actual behavior is 
measured through self-reported scales, where social desirability is very likely to bias the 
data. For example, survey items asking about actual behavior about their behavior related 
to locking the PC when they leave it unattended, it is highly possible that most 
respondents will give a favorable answer. If the survey data can be supplemented with 
actual data logs from the computer to check the locking activity of each respondent, it 
will lead to stronger findings. Similarly, if the results of the self-reported habit scale can 
be supplemented with data from an experiment, fMRI or EEG, it will add more reliability 
to the findings. Using objective measures will make it easier for researchers to identify 
which behaviors are actually habitual and which are not, instead of solely relying on self-
reported measures.  
 
276 
Another appropriate direction for future research is conducting a qualitative study 
to investigate different aspects of habit. A qualitative study is appropriate to study habit 
in the context of information security since our understanding of how habit influences 
secure behavior is in its infancy stage. An exploratory study would provide better insights 
into identifying factors that influence habit formation and identify which secure 
behaviors are habitual and which are not. Siponen et al. (2010) used a qualitative approach 
to investigate the role of habit in information security behaviors. Through several interviews, 
they identified that several secure behaviors were influenced by habit. However, their 
qualitative study can be significantly improved by conducting a thorough study involving a 
diverse pool of subjects from different organizations, industries and countries. A future 
qualitative study should also involve the investigation of areas such as habit formation, 
factors that contribute to changes in habit strength, breaking habits, different dimensions that 
form habit and differences of positive and negative habits. The findings of the qualitative 
study can be followed by survey, experiment, or neuro-physiological methods to conduct a 
mixed-method research study. This merging of qualitative and quantitative data to 
develop a deeper understanding of a phenomenon or a research problem is called 
‘triangulation’ (Mingers 1997, 2001; Venkatesh et al. 2013). There have been calls for 
mixed-method studies in IS research since only less than 5 percent of the empirical 
studies published between 2001 to 2007 in the AIS Basket of Journals utilized mixed-
methods (Venkatesh et al. 2013). Therefore, a great opportunity exists to conduct mixed-
method research studies to gain deep insights to habit while contributing significantly to 
IS research.  
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The dissertation study focused solely on the role of habit in information security 
behaviors utilizing PMT. However, there were several potential antecedents that were not 
tested in our research model for the sake of parsimony. General Deterrence Theory 
(GDT) constructs such as sanction severity, sanction certainty and sanction celerity are 
possible constructs that should be tested in the future along with habit. Although Pahnila 
et al. (2007) investigated sanctions and habit as antecedents of behavioral intentions, it 
would be appropriate to test the influence of habit on actual behavior in the presence of 
constructs from the deterrence theory. Siponen et al. (2010) suggested that sanctions or 
other deterrence factors may play a role in the habit formation. However, they did not 
provide any statistical evidence to support it. Enforced information security policies in 
organizations and negative sanctions for non-compliance are highly likely to persuade 
employees to perform recommended secure behaviors on a routine basis. Although initial 
performance of these behaviors may be performed intentionally due to the security 
policies that are in place, repetitive performance of the same secure behavior routinely is 
likely to make it habitual. General Deterrence Theory (GDT) has been tested extensively 
and sanction severity, sanction certainty and sanction celerity have been found to be 
antecedents of behavioral intention to comply with security policies (D’Arcy and Devaraj 
2012; D’Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and Rao 2009; Hovav and D’Arcy 2012; Siponen and 
Vance 2010). As it was tested with the PMT variables in this study, habit may also be 
tested as a moderator of the relationships between the deterrence variables and behavioral 
intention. However, further research is needed to test these views with the support of 
empirical results.  
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Social influence is another variable that warrants an investigation in future studies 
that test the role of habit in information security behaviors. Social influence is the 
willingness of an individual to perform a behavior to the degree to which he or she 
perceives that those whose opinions matter support the performance of that behavior 
(Venkatesh et al. 2003). Different variations of social influence have also been tested as 
subjective norms (Herath and Rao 2009) and normative beliefs (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) tested the relationship between social influence and 
behavioral intention to perform secure behaviors and found that social influence was a 
significant factor that influenced intentions. Similar to the deterrence variables, social 
influence may be a significant factor that will contribute to the development of habit. If 
an individual continues to perform a secure behavior due to the views of the people that 
matter to him or her, he or she is likely to form habitual patterns related to performing 
those behaviors. This provides an opportunity for future research studies to test the 
impact of social influence on behavioral intentions and actual behavior in the presence of 
PMT, deterrence factors and habit.  
As discussed previously, deterrence factors related to sanctions may lead to the 
formation of habit. It is important to note that sanctions can be positive or negative. 
Positive organizational sanctions or rewards may include pay raises, performance 
bonuses, and praise or recognition at work. Negative organizational sanctions or 
punishment may include reprimands, demotions, termination of employment or public 
ridicule. Both positive and negative sanctions may lead to the routine performance of 
secure behaviors that may cause the habituation of those behaviors. Future research 
studies could investigate if either of the two types of sanctions has a stronger influence in 
 
279 
habit formation of secure behavior performance, which would provide many benefits to 
organizations. They can use the findings to increase either positive or negative sanctions 
as long as employees perform the recommended secure behaviors in the workplace.  
Future research can also examine the role of past behavior on behavioral 
intentions and actual behavior. There have been criticism for using past behavior as a 
proxy of habit (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000; Limayem et al. 2007). However, the influence 
of past behavior may be worth exploring further especially in a longitudinal study that 
investigates habit formation and performance of habitual behaviors. For example, 
researchers can examine if subjects were performing a secure behavior such as backing 
up their data in the past. If that is the case, they can explore the reasons for the past 
behavior. If the subjects have not been backing up their data and suddenly start backing 
up their data, researchers can examine the causes for the new behavior and the factors 
that triggered it (e.g., social influence, experience of data loss).   
Researchers also need to understand the influence of habit in volitional and non-
volitional acts related to information security. It is easy to regard positive secure 
behaviors as positive habits, but it is unclear whether an omission of performing a secure 
behavior can be habitual and can be called a negative habit. For example, if an individual 
does not lock their PC when they leave it unattended volitionally, and repeatedly fail to 
lock his or her PC, does that lead to habituation? Since the omission of locking the PC is 
performed purposely by the employee, it may involve more cognitive effort; therefore it 
may not be considered a habit. Future research needs to explore these conundrums in 





This dissertation investigated the role of habit on three different information 
security behaviors. The data analysis confirmed that habit plays a major role in the 
performance of secure behaviors supporting the hypotheses. Habit demonstrated a 
significant direct effect on behavior as well as a negative moderating effect on the 
intention-behavior relationship. The findings of this study provide several contributions 
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BEHAVIOR SELECTION PROCESS 
 
306 
Table B.1 Behaviors Selected From Academic References 
# 
Behavior Source 
1 Sharing password with co-workers. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
2 Using anti-spyware software. Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
3 Backing up data regularly. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
4 Setting up strong passwords to login to systems. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
5 Making sure the anti-virus is automatically updated. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
6 Using caution when opening links/attachments in 
email. 
Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
7 Scanning the computer for spyware and keeping it 
up to date. 
Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
8 Writing passwords down. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
9 Change passwords often. Crossler and Belanger (2010) 
10 Adherence to security policies.  Herath et al. (2010) 
11 Good password practices. Workman et al. (2008) 
12 Locking the computer when not in use Vance et al. (2012) 
13 Encryption of sensitive information. Vance et al. (2012) 
14 Update software regularly. Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
15 Logging off workstations. Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
16 Shredding sensitive documents. Johnston & Warkentin (2010) 
17 Voluntary IS security training participation Siponen et al. (2010) 
18 Obeying IS security policies. Siponen et al. (2010) 
19 Constantly updating anti-virus software Anderson & Agrwal (2010) 
20 Being suspicious of e-mails from unknown sources. Anderson & Agrwal (2010) 
21 Effectively securing passwords. Anderson & Agrwal (2010) 
22 Enabling security in your wireless network. Woon et al. (2005) 
23 Avoid copying sensitive data to USB drives. Siponen & Vance (2010) 
24 Avoid revealing sensitive information to outsiders. Siponen & Vance (2010) 
25 Avoid sending confidential information 
unencrypted. 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
26 Using unauthorized access to copy, modify or delete 
critical data. 
D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
27 Avoid downloading personal internet software to 
your company computers. 
D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
28 Avoid reading confidential documents. Vance et al. (2012) 
29 Report a computer virus immediately. Vance et al. (2012) 




Table B.2 Behaviors Selected From Posey et al. (2013) 
# Behavior 
1 Respond to emails, which have a legitimate business request. 
2 Documents any changes made in the computer system. 
3 Opens email attachments only if you know the email's sender and was 
expecting the email. 
4 Not allowing unauthorized individuals to do your work. 
5 When using a shared computer, log off the previous employee before 
logging in with your credentials. 
6 Set up a screen saver password to protect unauthorized logins. 
7 Refrain from verbally discuss sensitive information in areas where 
unauthorized persons may be located (e.g., a hallway, an elevator) 
8 Locks your workstation when leaving the office space so that the workstation 
cannot be accessed by other individuals. 
9 Refrain from forwarding email spam to co-workers. 
10 Store information only according to the retention policies specified by 
his/her organization. 
11 Change passwords according to the organization's security guidelines. 
12 Notify your co-workers of important security information you become aware 
of. 
13 If you identify something that looks out of the ordinary in your work 
environment, you immediately reports it to the proper organizational 
authorities. 
14 Refrain from using shortcuts in the computer system that would be against 
the organization's accepted security protocol. 
15 Refrain from connecting personal devices (e.g., laptop, smartphone, tablet 
devices) into the company network. 
16 Properly destroys and disposes of all unneeded sensitive documents. 
17 Perform a "double check" of your work to make certain that the sensitive 
information you enter into the computer system is accurately coded. 
18 Work at a steady but cautious pace to ensure that you perform your job tasks 
in a secure manner. 
19 Backs up important data and documents on a regular basis. 
20 Avoid writing your passwords down. 
21 Converts sensitive documents to Adobe PDF format so that none of the 
information in the document can be altered once it is finalized. 
22 Avoid opening emails that you believe have a chance of containing a virus or 
other potentially malicious components. 
23 Avoid installing software on your computer workstation unless authorized to 
do so. 
24 Immediately apply software updates to your computer workstation when 





Table B.2 (Continued) 
 
# Behavior 
25 Pauses before responding to an email to make certain that you are 
responding to a valid request. 
26 Uses corporate email for work-related activities only. 
27 While at work, utilize the Internet for work-related tasks only. 
28 Avoid discussing sensitive company information with the media unless 
authorized to do so. 
29 Avoid allowing anyone to look over his/her shoulder when he/she works on 
sensitive documents. 
30 Always store sensitive corporate information only on protected media or 
locations (e.g., a protected server) 
31 When compiling a new email message, verify that you actually send the 
email only to the intended recipients receive the communication. 
32 Avoid setting up a wireless network access point in the corporate office 
without proper approval. 
33 Properly destroy unneeded data residing on the computer system or the 
computer workstation. 
34 Always logs out of the computer system as soon as you are done using it. 
35 Always read and pay close attention to security newsletters sent by your 
organization's department that is responsible for information-security 
matters. 
36 Always verify an individual's identity prior to releasing sensitive information 
to them. 
37 Protect your computer-system account information by never giving it to 
other individuals. 
38 Avoid writing your system login information down. 
39 Set the permissions of computer files to prevent unauthorized access. 
40 Actively attempts not to accidentally disclose sensitive company information 
with unauthorized individuals. 
41 Avoid putting sensitive information in emails or other forms of electronic 
communication (e.g., instant messages) unless authorized to do so as 
required by your job. 
42 Avoid displaying sensitive documents in public (e.g., airplane or airport). 
43 Always properly logs into and out of computer systems at work. 
44 Always create strong passwords (i.e., passwords having a combination of 
lower- and upper-case letters, numbers, and special characters). 
45 Avoid leaving active computers unattended. 
46 Immediately report a lost access card to the proper organizational authorities. 
47 Clears sensitive information off of your desk or computer before allowing 
someone entrance into your office or leaving at the end of the work day. 
48 Always lock sensitive, physical documents in a secure location when they 




Table B.2 (Continued) 
 
# Behavior 
49 Adheres to the information-security guidelines and policies adopted by your 
organization. 
50 Avoid discussing company-specific, information-security information (e.g., 
internal protocols, breaches) with anyone who does not need to know. 
51 Do not open emails that "just do not look right" to you. 
52 Informs your co-worker if you believe that the co-worker is engaging in 
behaviors not accepted by their company's information-security guidelines 
and policies. 
53 Do now allow anyone else to utilize your computer workstation. 
54 Uses secured wireless and/or wired networks approved by your organization 
for offsite network access. 
55 Reminds your fellow co-workers of information-security guidelines and 
protocols adopted by your organization. 
56 Immediately inform your supervisor upon awareness of the physical theft of 
computer equipment. 
57 Immediately inform the authorized individual or department within the 
organization if you found a potential information-security problem or 
loophole 
58 Only accesses information in the computer system that is required for your 
job. 
59 Do not allow anyone else to utilize a computer workstation under your 
account and login information 
60 Do not perform work on a computer workstation with a co-worker's account 
information or under a co-worker's login session 
61 Quickly notify the sender of an email if that email contained sensitive 
information that was not meant for you. 
62 Immediately report a co-worker's negligent information-security behavior to 
the proper organizational authorities. 
63 If you receive an email from someone you know but the topic or content 
looks suspicious, you contact the sender to verify that the communication 
attempt was valid. 
64 Keep the laptop or other electronic devices issued to them by their 







Table B.3 Behaviors Selected From Practitioner Sources 
# Behavior Source 
1 Using security software (anti-virus, anti-spyware) 1 
2 Writing down sensitive information on paper 2 
3 Using authorized access to copy, modify or delete critical data 2 
4 Avoid using unauthorized/insecure web apps in company 
networks 
3 
5 Avoid responding to fake emails or scams. 3 
6 Avoid opening attachments in emails from unknown senders 3 
7 Avoid posting sensitive information on social networking 
sites. 
3 
8 Encrypt corporate data before transferring it to USB devices. 3 
9 Following company security policies. 3 
10 Copy confidential or sensitive business information onto USB 
devices 
4 
11 Transferred Sensitive information onto computers outside the 
company network 
4 
12 Download personal internet software to their company 
computers 
4 
13 Turn off security settings or firewalls on workplace computers 5 
14 Share passwords with co workers 6 
15 Collect sensitive documents from the printer as soon as it was 
printed. 
6 
16 Avoid clicking URLs on social media links. 6 
17 Always use the most updated version of Internet Browser. 7 
18 Encrypting emails with sensitive data. 8 
19 Avoid discarding sensitive documents in the trash. 9 
20 Verify the firewall in the computer is switched on. 9 
21 Lock the office door when you leave for the day. 9 
22 Avoid leaving important documents on your desk or printing 
area. 
9 
23 Shred documents no longer necessary with a cross-cut 
shredder. 
9 
24 When issuing data to others be sure to understand what it will 
be used for and send only the data required. 
9 







Table B.3 (Continued) 
 
# Behavior Source 
26 Avoid downloading content directly from an unknown internet 
site. 
10 
27 Avoid opening or responding to an email from an 
unrecognized source. 
10 
28 Always lock the screen (Ctrl + Alt + Del) when leaving a 
computer terminal unattended and log-off completely when 
leaving for the day. 
10 
29 Avoid inserting portable media into the computer unless you 
are sure of its origin. 
10 
30 Avoid taking sensitive or valuable information away from 
work unless it is essential and secured via encrypted laptops or 
USB devices. 
10 
31 When away from the premises and/ or in public areas, keep all 
sensitive information secure to prevent loss or theft. 
10 
32 Create good browsing habits. 11 
33 Avoid installing unauthorized software in your computer. 12 
34 Avoid sharing sensitive information on social media. 12 
35 Be careful when accessing corporate data with personal 
mobile devices such as smartphones or tablets. 
12 
36 have mobile safeguards in place and ensure that no sensitive 








































Table B.4 Behaviors Selected for Step 2 
# Behavior 
01 Avoid sharing passwords with co-workers. 
02 Use anti-spyware software. 
03 Backup data regularly. 
04 Set up strong passwords to login to systems. 
05 Verify regularly that anti-virus and/or anti-spyware software is auto updated. 
06 Change passwords often. 
07 Locking the computer when leaving it unattended. 
08 Always encrypt sensitive information. 
09 Immediately apply software updates when they become available. 
10 Logoff or shutdown the computer when leaving the office for the day. 
11 Shred sensitive documents. 
12 Complying with information security policies. 
13 Being cautions of emails from unknown sources. 
14 Avoid coping sensitive data to portable media (e.g., USB, portable HDD). 
15 Avoid revealing sensitive information to outsiders. 
16 Avoid installing unauthorized software on your computer. 
17 Avoid reading confidential documents that does not belong to you. 
18 Report a computer virus immediately. 
19 Avoid using a laptop for personal use. 
20 Avoid writing down sensitive information on paper. 
21 Avoid visiting unknown/suspicious websites. 
22 Avoid opening email attachments from unknown senders. 
23 Avoid posting sensitive information on social networking sites. 
24 Encrypt corporate data before copying to portable media. 
25 Avoid leaving sensitive documents at the printer. 
26 Avoid clicking URLs on social media links. 
27 Always use the most updated version of the browser. 
28 Encrypt emails with sensitive data. 
29 Regularly verify that the firewall on the computer is active. 
30 Always lock the office door when leaving for the day. 
31 Avoid leaving important documents at the working area/desk. 
32 Avoid responding to emails from unknown sources. 
33 Avoid inserting portable media that is not yours into the computer. 




Table B.4 (Continued) 
 
# Behavior 
35 Avoid using public networks to connect to corporate servers remotely. 
36 Avoid discussing sensitive information in public areas (e.g., hallway, elevator). 
37 Avoid connecting personal devices (e.g., laptop, tablet) to company network. 
38 Ensuring sensitive data entered into the system is accurate. 
39 Use corporate email only for work-related activities. 
40 Always verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 
41 Set computer file permissions to prevent unauthorized access. 
42 Avoid leaving active computers unattended. 
43 Always lock sensitive physical documents in a secure location when not in use. 
44 Immediately inform authorities if you discover an information security problem. 
45 Do not perform work on a computer under a co-worker’s login session. 
46 Always verify with the sender if the email content seem suspicious. 
47 Document any changes made in the computer system. 
48 Avoid downloading files from unknown websites. 























15 Avoid revealing sensitive information to outsiders. 91% 67% 
30 Lock the office door when leaving for the day. 91% 58% 
10 Logoff or shutdown the computer when leaving the office for 
the day. 
73% 74% 
36 Avoid discussing sensitive information in public areas (e.g., 
hallway, elevator). 
73% 51% 
7 Lock the computer when leaving it unattended. 64% 67% 
13 Being cautious of emails from unknown sources. 64% 63% 
22 Avoid opening email attachments from unknown senders. 64% 60% 
1 Avoid sharing passwords with co-workers. 55% 88% 
21 Avoid visiting unknown/suspicious websites. 55% 56% 
25 Avoid leaving sensitive documents at the printer. 55% 60% 
32 Avoid responding to emails from unknown sources. 55% 58% 
42 Avoid leaving active computers unattended. 55% 40% 
48 Avoid downloading files from unknown websites. 55% 70% 
23 Avoid posting sensitive information on social networking 
sites. 
9% 72% 
16 Avoid installing unauthorized software on your computer. 36% 65% 
40 Verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 45% 63% 
4 Set up strong passwords to login to systems. 45% 60% 
3 Use anti-spyware software. 45% 58% 
49 Secure keys and ID badges. 27% 53% 
27 Use the most updated version of the browser. 9% 51% 
 






7 Lock the computer when leaving it unattended. 64% 67% 
40 Verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 45% 63% 








A power analysis was conducted using the G-power software to identify a suitable 
sample size for this study. Using “a priori” type of power analysis to compute the 
required sample size, an effect size (f2) of 0.15 (medium effect), alpha of 0.05 and a 
power of 0.95 required sample size was calculated with the number of predictors as 45 
(total number of items). The results of the power analysis are shown below. A sample of 
308 is needed to achieve a power of 0.95 and to detect a medium effect size. 
 







Survey Instrument for the Lock PC Behavior 
 
All items were measured using a 5 point likert scale (1-Strongly Disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-
Neither Agree not Disagree, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly Agree). 
Perceived Threat Severity (PSEV) - (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) 
PSEV1: If an unauthorized individual accesses my computer, it will be a severe problem. 
PSEV2: It would be a significant problem for me if an unauthorized individual accesses 
my computer. 
PSEV3: If an unauthorized individual accesses my computer, it will be serious. 
Perceived Threat Vulnerability (PVUL) - (Witte et al. 1996) 
PVUL1: The chances of an unauthorized individual accessing my computer are high. 
PVUL2: It is likely that an unauthorized individual may access my computer. 
PVUL3: It is possible that an unauthorized individual may access my computer. 
Response Efficacy (REFF) - (Lee 2011) 
REFF1: Locking the computer works for protection against unauthorized access to my 
computer. 
REFF2: Locking the computer is an effective solution to prevent an unauthorized 
individual accessing my computer. 
REFF3: I can effectively prevent an unauthorized individual accessing my computer by 
locking it. 
REFF4: Unauthorized access to my computer can be effectively prevented by locking it. 
Self-Efficacy (SEFF) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
SEFF1: I am confident that I have the skills to lock my computer. 
SEFF2: I know I can successfully lock my computer. 
SEFF3: I believe that I have the knowledge necessary to lock my computer. 
SEFF4: I personally have the skills to lock my computer. 
Response Cost (RCST) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
RCST1: Locking my computer is a burden. 
RCST2: It is inconvenient to lock my computer. 
RCST3: Locking my computer is time consuming. 




Behavioral Intention (BINT) - (Venkatesh et al. 2003) 
BINT1: I intend to lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
BINT2: I predict that I would lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
BINT3: I plan to lock the computer every time I leave it unattended. 
Actual Behavior (BEHV) - (Myyry et al. 2009; Workman et al. 2008) 
BEHV1: I lock my computer every time I leave it unattended. 
BEHV2: I always make sure that my computer is locked before I leave the computer 
unattended.  
BEHV3: Locking my computer is something I do every time I leave it unattended. 
Lack of Awareness (AWAR) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
AWAR1: Every time I leave my computer unattended, I choose to lock it even being 
aware of doing it. 
AWAR2: Every time I need to leave my computer unattended, I unconsciously lock it. 
AWAR3: Locking my computer, whenever I need to leave it unattended, is something I 
do without being aware. 
AWAR4: Locking my computer whenever I leave it unattended is something I do 
unconsciously. 
Uncontrollability (CTRL) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
CTRL1: I find it difficult to overrule my impulse to lock my computer whenever I leave 
it unattended. 
CTRL2: I find it difficult to overcome my tendency to lock my computer whenever I 
leave it unattended. 
CTRL3: It is difficult to control my tendency to lock my computer whenever I leave it 
unattended.  
CTRL4: It is hard to restrain my urge to lock my computer whenever I leave it 
unattended. 
Mental Efficiency (EFFC) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
EFFC1: I do not need to devote a lot of mental effort in deciding to lock my computer 
whenever I leave it unattended. 
EFFC2: It would require effort not to lock my computer whenever I leave it unattended. 
EFFC3: Choosing to lock my computer whenever I leave it unattended requires little 
mental energy.  




Habit (HBT) - (Limayem et al. 2007) 
HBT1: Locking the computer every time I leave it unattended has become automatic to 
me. 
HBT2: Locking the computer every time I leave it unattended is natural to me. 
HBT3: When leaving the computer unattended, locking it is an obvious choice for me. 
Affective Based Inertia (INTA) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to lock my computer whenever I leave it unattended 
INTA1: because it would be stressful to change. 
INTA2: because I am comfortable doing so. 
INTA3: because I enjoy doing so. 
Behavioral Based Inertia (INTB) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to lock my computer whenever I leave it unattended 
INTB1: simply because it is what I have always done. 
INTB2: simply because it is part of my normal routine. 

















Survey Instrument for The Visit Only Verified Websites Behavior 
 
All items were measured using a 5 point likert scale (1-Strongly Disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-
Neither Agree not Disagree, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly Agree). 
Perceived Threat Severity (PSEV) - (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) 
PSEV1: If an unintended recipient receives my email with confidential company 
information, it will be a severe problem. 
PSEV2: It would be a significant problem for me if an unintended recipient receives my 
email with confidential company information. 
PSEV3: If an unintended recipient receives my email with confidential company 
information, it will be serious. 
Perceived Threat Vulnerability (PVUL) - (Witte et al. 1996) 
PVUL1: Chances of an unintended recipient receiving my email with confidential 
company information are high. 
PVUL2: It is likely that an unintended recipient will receive my email with confidential 
company information. 
PVUL3: There is a possibility that an unintended recipient will receive my email with 
confidential company information. 
Response Efficacy (REFF) - (Lee 2011) 
REFF1: Before sending email, verifying it is sent only to the intended recipients, works 
for protection against an unintended recipient receiving it. 
REFF2: Verifying that email is sent only to the intended recipients is an effective 
solution to prevent an unintended recipient from receiving it. 
REFF3: I can effectively prevent an unintended recipient from receiving my email by 
verifying that email is sent only to the intended recipients before sending it. 
REFF4: Sending sensitive information to unintended people through email can be 
effectively prevented by verifying the list of recipients. 
Self-Efficacy (SEFF) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
SEFF1: I am confident that I have the skills to verify that email is sent only to the 
intended recipients. 
SEFF2: I know I can successfully verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 
SEFF3: I believe that I have the knowledge necessary to verify that email is sent only to 
the intended recipients. 
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SEFF4: I personally have the skills to check and verify the recipients of an email 
message before it is sent. 
Response Cost (RCST) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
RCST1: Having to verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients is a burden. 
RCST2: It is inconvenient to verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 
RCST3: Verifying that email is sent only to the intended recipients is time consuming. 
RCST4: It is troublesome to verify that email is sent only to the intended recipients. 
 
Behavioral Intention (BINT) - (Venkatesh et al. 2003) 
BINT1: I intend to verify that email is sent only to intended recipients every time before 
I send email. 
BINT2: I predict that I would verify email is sent only to intended recipients every time 
before I send email. 
BINT3: I plan to verify that email is sent only to intended recipients every time before I 
send email. 
Actual Behavior (BEHV) - (Myyry et al. 2009; Workman et al. 2008) 
BEHV1: I always verify that email is sent only to intended recipients before I send email. 
BEHV2: I always make sure that email is sent only to intended recipients every time 
before I send email.  
BEHV3: Verifying that email is sent only to intended recipients is something I do, every 
time before I send email. 
Lack of Awareness (AWAR) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
AWAR1: Every time I am about send an email, I verify that email is sent only to 
intended recipients without even being aware of doing it. 
AWAR2: Every time I am about send an email, I unconsciously verify that email is sent 
only to intended recipients. 
AWAR3: Verifying that email is sent only to intended recipients before sending an email 
is something I do without being aware. 
AWAR4: Verifying that email is sent only to intended recipients before sending an email 






Uncontrollability (CTRL) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
CTRL1: I find it difficult to overrule my impulse to verify that email is sent only to 
intended recipients every time I am about to send an email.  
CTRL2: I find it difficult to overcome my tendency to verify that email is sent only to 
intended recipients every time I am about to send an email.  
CTRL3: It is difficult to control my tendency to verify that email is sent only to intended 
recipients every time I am about to send an email. 
CTRL4: It is hard to restrain my urge to verify that email is sent only to intended 
recipients every time I am about to send an email. 
Mental Efficiency (EFFC) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
EFFC1: I do not need to devote a lot of mental effort in deciding verify that email is sent 
only to intended recipients every time I am about to send an email. 
EFFC2: It would require effort not to verify that email is sent only to intended recipients 
every time I am about to send an email.  
EFFC3: Choosing to verify that email is sent only to intended recipients every time I am 
about to send an email, requires little mental energy. 
EFFC4: I have no need to think about verifying that email is sent only to intended 
recipients every time I am about to send an email. 
Habit (HBT) - (Limayem et al. 2007) 
HBT1: Verifying the recipients of email before sending a message has become automatic 
to me. 
HBT2: Verifying the recipients of email before sending a message is natural for me.  
HBT3: When sending email, verifying the recipients first is an obvious choice for me.. 
Affective Based Inertia (INTA) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to verify the recipients before sending emails simply because  
INTA1: because it would be stressful to change. 
INTA2: because I am comfortable doing so. 
INTA3: because I enjoy doing so. 
Behavioral Based Inertia (INTB) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to verify the recipients before sending emails simply because  
INTB1: simply because it is what I have always done. 
INTB2: simply because it is part of my normal routine. 




Survey Instrument for the Verify Email Behavior 
 
All items were measured using a 5 point likert scale (1-Strongly Disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-
Neither Agree not Disagree, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly Agree). 
Perceived Threat Severity (PSEV) - (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) 
PSEV1: If my computer were infected by malware, it would be severe. 
PSEV2: If my computer were infected by malware, it would be serious. 
PSEV3: If my computer were infected by malware, it would be serious. 
Perceived Threat Vulnerability (PVUL) - (Witte et al. 1996) 
PVUL1: The chances of my computer getting infected with malware are high. 
PVUL2: It is likely that my computer may get infected with malware. 
PVUL3: There is a possibility that my computer will get infected with malware. 
Response Efficacy (REFF) - (Lee 2011) 
REFF1: Visiting only known websites works for protection against my computer getting 
infected with malware. 
REFF2: Visiting only known websites is an effective solution to prevent my computer 
getting infected with malware. 
REFF3: I can effectively prevent my computer getting infected with malware by visiting 
only known websites. 
REFF4: Malware infection of my computer can be effectively prevented by visiting only 
known websites. 
Self-Efficacy (SEFF) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
SEFF1: I am confident that I have the skills to visit only known websites. 
SEFF2: I know I can successfully visit only known websites without much effort. 
SEFF3: I believe that I have the knowledge necessary to visit only known websites. 
SEFF4: I personally have the skills to visit only known websites. 
Response Cost (RCST) - (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
RCST1: Visiting only known websites is a burden. 
RCST2: It is inconvenient to only visit known websites. 
RCST3: Visiting only known websites is time consuming. 




Behavioral Intention (BINT) - (Venkatesh et al. 2003) 
BINT1: I intend to visit only known websites every time I use the internet. 
BINT2: I predict that I would visit only known websites every time I use the internet. 
BINT3: I plan to visit only known websites every time I use the internet. 
Actual Behavior (BEHV) - (Myyry et al. 2009; Workman et al. 2008) 
BEHV1: I always visit only known websites every time I use the internet. 
BEHV2: I always make sure that I only visit known websites every time I use the 
internet. 
BEHV3: Visiting only known websites is something I do, every time I use the internet. 
Lack of Awareness (AWAR) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
AWAR1: Every time I use the internet, I choose to visit only known websites without 
even being aware of doing it. 
AWAR2: Every time I use the internet, I unconsciously visit only known websites. 
AWAR3: Visiting only known websites every time I use the internet is something I do 
without being aware. 
AWAR4: Visiting only known websites every time I use the internet is something I do 
unconsciously. 
Uncontrollability (CTRL) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
CTRL1: I find it difficult to overrule my impulse to visit only known websites every 
time I use the internet. 
CTRL2: I find it difficult to overcome my tendency to visit only known websites every 
time I use the internet. 
CTRL3: It is difficult to control my tendency to visit only known websites every time I 
use the internet. 
CTRL4: It is hard to restrain my urge to visit only known websites every time I use the 
internet. 
 
Mental Efficiency (EFFC) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
EFFC1: I do not need to devote a lot of mental effort in deciding to visit only known 
websites every time I use the internet. 
EFFC2: It would require effort not to visit only known websites every time I use the 
internet. 
EFFC3: Choosing to visit only known websites every time I use the internet, requires 
little mental energy. 
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EFFC4: I have no need to think about visiting only known websites every time I use the 
internet. 
Habit (HBT) - (Limayem et al. 2007) 
HBT1: Visiting only known websites every time I use the internet has become automatic 
to me. 
HBT2: Visiting only known websites every time I use the internet is natural to me. 
HBT3: When using the internet, visiting only known websites is an obvious choice for 
me. 
Affective Based Inertia (INTA) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to visit only known websites simply because  
INTA1: because it would be stressful to change. 
INTA2: because I am comfortable doing so. 
INTA3: because I enjoy doing so. 
Behavioral Based Inertia (INTB) - (Polites & Karahanna 2012) 
I continue to visit only known websites simply because  
INTB1: simply because it is what I have always done. 
INTB2: simply because it is part of my normal routine. 
INTB3: simply because I have done so regularly in the past. 
 
 
 
